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IMPORT DEMAND FOR EDIBLE OILS IN INDIA:   
AN APPLICATION OF SOURCE- 
DIFFERENTIATED MODELS
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Abstract 
The source-differentiated import demand for edible oils in India is estimated using 
different versions of the differential demand model; including the Rotterdam, the almost 
ideal demand system (AIDS), the Central Bureau of Statistics (CBS), the National Bureau 
of Research (NBR), and General specifications. The General model that nests all the 
other models is estimated to determine the model that best fits the data. Based on the 
nested tests, the General model is found to best fit the data. Additionally, the tests for 
weak separability and product aggregation support the estimation of source differentiated 
models including all three edible oil types (palm oils, soybean oils, and other oils). 
Results indicate that soybean oils have larger own-price (in absolute values) elasticities 
than palm oils. They also indicate that Malaysia and the U.S. have the largest expenditure 
elasticities in the palm and soybean oil import markets, respectively. Moreover, strong 
substitute relationships are found between Indonesian palm oil and Brazilian soybean oil, 
and between Malaysian palm oil and Argentine soybean oil. The strong substitute 
relationships between palm and soybean oils imply that the tariff differences between 
these two oils could affect the market shares of these oils in the Indian edible oil import 
market significantly. 
 
Keywords: Differential demand systems, Barten’s model selection method, Indian edible 
oil import demand, source-diffentiation. 
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Introduction 
India is one of the leading importers of edible oils in the world, accounting for about 11 
percent of world edible oil imports in 2005. More specifically; in 2005, India accounted 
for approximately 11 and 20 percent of world palm and soybean oil imports, respectively 
(USDA-FAS 2007).  In recent years, imports have accounted for a notable share of  
agricultural consumption—accounting for about 40 percent of India’s edible oil 
consumption and about 30 percent of its total value of agricultural imports in 2005 
(USDA-FAS 2007; FAOSTAT 2007). With a population of more than one billion and an 
economy that is expected to grow at a high rate, edible oil imports are likely to increase 
in the coming years. 
         India grew rapidly from a relatively small importer of edible oils in the 1990s to one 
of the leading importers since 1998 (Dohlman, Persaud, and Landes 2003). To protect 
domestic oilseed producers, the government of India instituted an import quota for edible 
oils in 1988. The quota lasted until 1994, when the edible oils market became liberalized 
with the membership of India into the WTO (Dohlman, Persaud, and Landes 2003). 
Imports were very low during the quota period (1988-1994). In 1994, India replaced 
quantitative restrictions with tariffs and started allowing private traders to import 
unlimited quantities of oils (Dohlman, Persaud, and Landes 2003). Currently (2008), the 
tariff policy is still in effect.  
        As a result of the shift in import policy; total edible oil imports, consisting of mostly 
palm and soybean oils, increased from an annual average of about 0.39 million metric 
tons during  1988 -1994 to 4.26 million metric tons during 1998 – 2005 (FAOSTAT 
2007). The pattern of edible oil consumption also has changed in India over the past three 
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decades. During the period 1972-74, peanut oil, rapeseed oil (canola oil), and cotton seed 
oil dominated the Indian edible oil market; accounting for an annual average of about 53, 
25, and 9 percent, respectively. However, during 2003-05, the palm and soybean oils 
accounted for an annual average of about 30 and 21 percent of total edible oil 
consumption in India (USDA-FAS 2007). 
         Regarding imported oils, palm and soybean oils are dominant, accounting for 62 
and 33 percent of the import market share in 2005. Almost all the palm oil consumed in 
India is satisfied by imports, and about 55 percent of soybean oil consumed is satisfied by 
imports (FAOSTAT 2007). Indonesia and Malaysia, large palm oil exporters in the global 
markets; dominate the market in India, accounting for 79 and 20 percent of the total 
Indian palm oil imports in 2005, respectively. In the soybean oil import market, 
Argentina and Brazil dominate as large exporters, accounting for 70 and 21 percent of the 
total Indian soybean oil import market share in 2005. The U.S. only accounted for 2 
percent of India’s total soybean oil imports in 2005 (GTIS 2007). The higher price of 
U.S. soybean oil compared to those of Argentina and Brazil could be the reason for the 
low U.S. market share in India (Dohlman, Persaud, and Landes 2003). In 2005 the 
average price (unit value including import tariff) of soybean oil from U.S. was Rs. 54.15 
per kg, while those of soybean oils from Argentina and Brazil were Rs. 35.60 and Rs. 
35.80 respectively (GTIS 2007; SAI 2007).         
 Even though India plays a significant role in the global markets for edible oils, 
very little published research is available regarding the analysis of import demand for 
edible oils in India. The few studies that are available are either descriptive, or have used 
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a single equation approach to estimate the domestic demand for edible oils in India 
(Dohlman, Persaud, and Landes 2003; Persaud and Landes 2006).  
With the rapid globalization of India’s edible oil market, understanding the 
interrelated demands for various edible oils and the factors shaping them would help in 
understanding this market. More specifically, an understanding of source-differentiated 
import demand elasticities and the factors underlying them can provide valuable 
information to the exporting countries, in developing effective marketing programs aimed 
at expanding sales and market shares in India. For example, this information can be 
especially useful to U.S. exporters. This is because, despite the significant growth in the 
Indian imports of edible oils since early 1990s, the U.S. has not been successful in 
increasing its soybean oil sales to India. This has been attributed to the stiff competition 
U.S. soybean oil faces from Malaysian and Indonesian palm oils and Argentine and 
Brazilian soybean oils (Dohlman, Persaud, and Landes 2003).  Reliable estimates of 
elasticities are also needed for policy evaluations in India, such as the tariff policy and 
welfare analysis.  
Objectives 
The general objective of this study is to determine the demand for source and type 
differentiated edible oil imports in India. More specifically, the objective of this study is 
to determine the impact of economic factors (prices and expenditures) and non-economic 
factors (seasonality) on competitiveness of various supplying countries in the Indian 
edible oil import market. Moreover, the objective is to provide reliable estimates of 
import demand elasticities in this market by selecting a model that best fits the Indian 
edible oils import data.  
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Literature Review 
Published studies on edible oil demand in India have been limited. Dohlman, Persaud, 
and Landes (2003), using a descriptive method, studied Indian edible oil import demand 
during 1980-2002. They argued that prices played a dominant role in India’s edible oil 
import demand. Dutta and Ahmed (2001), using cointegration and an error correction 
model, studied the behavior of Indian aggregate imports (both agricultural and non-
agricultural) during 1971-1995. They found that India’s import demand was largely 
affected by real GDP, and was not very sensitive to the changes in import prices. 
         Regarding the analysis of the soybean and its products markets, various studies 
have analyzed the impact of domestic and trade policies of major exporters on the world 
markets. Williams and Thompson (1984) studied the impact of Brazilian soybean policies 
during 1960-78 on the world soybean market, using a simultaneous equations model and 
a dynamic simulation analysis. Their results showed that the intervention policies by the 
Brazilian government such as soybean price ceilings, and export restrictions aimed at 
promoting the crushing of soybeans locally, reduced the producer price of soybeans. It 
was concluded that the U.S. soybean industry benefitted as a result of Brazil’s restrictive 
export policy. Moreover, it was concluded that policies designed to encourage exports of 
value added soybeans, such as tax advantages for soybean product exports unavailable 
for domestic sales of soybean products or for exports of soybeans increased world prices 
of soybeans, while decreasing world prices of soybean products. Andino, Mulik, and Koo 
(2005), using an error component three stage least squares procedure, found that the 
depreciation of currencies in Argentina and Brazil during 1994-2003 decreased soybean 
exports from the U.S.   
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          Regarding the global market analysis for palm oil; Othman and Alias (2000), used 
a single equation import demand model to study the demand for Malaysian palm oil in 
the European Union (EU) and U.S. markets during 1980-1995. They found that palm oil 
and soybean oil prices were very significant in affecting the U.S. and the EU palm oil 
imports from Malaysia. Talib and Darawi (2002) analyzed the Malaysian palm oil market 
during 1970-1999, using a 2SLS procedure. Their results indicated that palm oil exports 
were dependent on world population, level of world economic activity (used industrial 
production index of industrialized countries), palm oil price, and soybean oil price. 
      Regarding the empirical developments in modeling import demands; a wide variety 
of models have been utilized in the literature, which have been applied to a variety of 
agricultural commodities and countries. Yang and Koo (1994) estimated the import 
demand for meats in Japan using a restricted source differentiated almost ideal demand 
system (RSDAIDS) model, assuming separability between domestic and imported meats. 
Henneberry and Hwang (2007) estimated the import demand for meats in South Korea 
using a RSDAIDS model, including both domestic and imported meats.  Fabiosa and 
Ukhova (2000) estimated the import demand for pork in Japan using a two-stage version 
of the almost ideal demand system (AIDS) model. In their study they allowed for the 
substitution between domestic and imported pork products. Seale, Sparks, and Buxton 
(1992) used a source differentiated Rotterdam model to estimate the import demand for 
U.S. apples in Canada, Singapore, Hong Kong, and United Kingdom. They assumed 
block independence between domestic and imported products. Mutondo and Henneberry 
(2007) used a source differentiated Rotterdam model to estimate the demand for meats in 
U.S. Similar to Seale, Sparks, and Buxton (1992), Mutondo and Henneberry (2007) did 
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not assume separability between domestic and imported meats. Schmitz and Seale (2002) 
estimated the import demand for disaggregated fresh fruits in Japan using Rotterdam, 
AIDS, Central Bureau of Research (CBS), and National Bureau of Research (NBR) 
models. Following Barten (1993) they also tested the models against the General model 
that nested all the four models. They found that for a five-good case the test did not reject 
Rotterdam, and CBS models, while for a six good case the test only did not reject the 
Rotterdam model. Agobola and Damoense (2005), using a Stock Watson Dynamic OLS 
model, estimated a long run import demand for chickpeas, pulses, and lentils in India.  
However, there has been no study that had estimated the import demand for edible oils in 
India. In this study, following Barten (1993), the factors shaping the Indian edible oil 
import demand are determined by using differential demand models. 
Conceptual Framework 
In order to select the appropriate theory, it is important to determine whether the 
imported good is directly consumed by the consumers or it is an input in a production 
process. In India, the imported edible oils are sold after repackaging, refining, 
hydrogenating, or blending with other oils (Dohlman, Persaud, and Landes 2003).  
        In this study, following Davis and Jensen (1994), it is assumed that the firms that 
import edible oils are multi product firms that utilize imported edible oils as a factor to 
produce different edible oil products. It is also assumed that these firms deal exclusively 
with imported edible oils. In this framework, the importing firm first decides on the 
quantity of edible oils that needs to be imported, and then on the quantity that needs to be 
imported from different sources.  
 9 
      Therefore; given this assumption,  an input demand system based on the production 
theory, with the firm’s profit maximization or cost minimization as an objective, may be 
the appropriate theory to be used here to derive source differentiated edible oil demand, 
rather than deriving demands based on the consumer theory (Mutondo and Henneberry 
2007). Nevertheless, Davis and Jensen (1994) show that a second stage Marshallian input 
demand system derived from a two-stage profit maximization problem is analogous to a 
Marshallian demand system derived from a two-stage utility maximization problem.   
Therefore a model based on consumer theory can be justified to be used in this study to 
estimate the import demand. 
       Following Davis and Jensen (1994), the Marshallian demand function for edible oil i 
from source h can be expressed as:  
 (1)                                                qih = qih ( pih , E)  
where  qih   is the edible oil i  imported from source h ,  pih  is the price of edible oil i from 
source h  , and E is the total expenditure spent on imported edible oils. 
    Assuming edible oils are normal goods, it can be hypothesized that own-price would 
have a negative impact, while expenditure would have a positive impact on the quantity 
demanded. 
The Empirical Model 
The Rotterdam and the almost ideal demand system (AIDS) are the two most popular 
model specifications that are used in the literature to estimate import demands for 
agricultural commodities (Seale, Sparks, and Buxton 1992; Yang and Koo 1994; 
Henneberry and Hwang 2006; Mutondo and Henneberry 2007). As different functional 
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forms may result in different elasticity estimates, which in turn may result in contrasting 
policy evaluations, it is important to choose a functional form that best fits the data.  
      In this study the source differentiated import demand for edible oils in India is 
estimated by four separate versions of the differential demand model. The four model 
specifications used in this study are Rotterdam, AIDS (Almost Ideal Demand System), 
NBR (National Bureau of Research), and CBS (Central Bureau of Statistics). These 
models differ from one another in the ways they are parameterized. The NBR and the 
CBS models are the hybrid versions of the Rotterdam and the AIDS models. The General 
model which is a demand model by itself that nests all the four models is also estimated 
to determine the model that best fits the data (Barten 1993).  
The Rotterdam Model 
The absolute price version of the Rotterdam model is derived by totally differentiating a 
Marshallian demand function (Barten 1964; Theil 1965). It can be specified by adding an 
intercept to capture changes in tastes and preferences and a quarterly dummy variable for 
seasonality as follows: 
(2)                       wih d log qih=αih +θih d log Q + ∑j ∑k πih jk d log pjk + ∑l αih l Dl   
                           i,j=1,2,…,m;(when i≠j) h =1,2,…,n, and k=1,2,…,s; and l=1,3,4       
where subscript i and j indicate edible oil  types (palm oil, soybean oil, other oils),                                                                                                                                                                                    
and h and k  indicate supply sources( country of origin); wih=(wih t + wih, t-1)/2 is the 
average expenditure share for edible oil i from source h, wih =pihqih/E; pih is the price of 
edible oil i from source h;  qih  is the quantity of edible oil i from source h; E is the total  
expenditure spent on edible oil imports, t  is the time subscript; d log qih=log(qih t)-
log(qih,t-1); d log Q = ∑i ∑h  wih d log qih  is the Divisia quantity index; d log pjk=log(pjk t)-
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log(pjk,t-1) ; Dl  is a quarterly dummy variable ;  and αih, θih, πih jk, and αih l  are the 
parameters of the model that need to be estimated. The expenditure coefficient θih =pih 
(∂qih/ ∂E) is the marginal propensity to spend on edible oil i from source h if the total 
expenditure on edible oil imports were to be increased (marginal budget share); and πih jk 
= (pihpjk/E)sih jk ,  is the compensated price effect (Slutsky terms), sij = ∂qih/∂pjk + 
qjk∂qih/∂E, is the (i,j)th element of the Slutsky substitution matrix .  
     The theoretical restrictions such as homogeneity and symmetry can be imposed and 
tested easily. Also, if the estimated model satisfies concavity it does so globally.  
Theoretical restrictions of adding-up, homogeneity, and symmetry as shown below will 
be imposed on the model parameters.                                   
 (3)               Adding-up         ∑i ∑h αih =0 ,∑i ∑h θih = 1, ∑i ∑h πihjk =0 , and  ∑i∑h αih l = 0; 
 (4)               Homogeneity     ∑j ∑k πih jk = 0 ; and    
 (5)               Symmetry            πih jk =  πjk ih  
Elasticities are calculated using the following formulas (Barten 1993), where the 
expenditure elasticity is given by 
(6)                                           ηih = θih /wih, 
Slutsky (compensated) elasticities are calculated using 
(7)   Own price elasticity    :    ζih ih= πih ih /wih 
(8)   Cross price elasticity   :    ζihjk= πih jk /wih  (i=j is possible) 
Cournot (uncompensated) elasticities are calculated using         
(9)    Own price elasticity    :    εih ih = πih ih /wih - θih     or  εih ih = ζih ih - ηih wih 
(10)  Cross price elasticity   :    εih jk = (πih jk - θih wjk)/wih  or  εih jk = ζih jk - ηih wjk   
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All the elasticities are calculated at mean expenditure shares. The variances of 
expenditure elasticities, Slutsky own and cross-price elasticities, and Cournot own and 
cross-price elasticities can be calculated using the equations (11),(12), and(13) 
respectively 
(11)                                           var(ηih)=  var(θih)/ w2ih ; 
(12)                                           var(ζih ih)=var(πih ih)/ w2ih ,   
                                                  var(ζih jk)=var(πih jk)/ w2ih ; and      
(13)                                           var(εih ih)=var(ζih ih)+ w2ih var(ηih)-2 wih cov (ζih ih, ηih), 
                                                  var(εih jk)=var(ζih jk)+ w2jk var(ηih)-2 wjk cov (ζih jk, ηih).                                                                            
The CBS Model 
In the Rotterdam model, marginal budget shares ( θih), and Slutsky terms ( πih jk ) are 
assumed to be constant. This leads to the assumption that the marginal budget shares do 
not change with total expenditures. An alternative model that would allow marginal 
budget shares to vary was developed by Keller and Van Driel (1985) based on the model 
developed by Working (1943). The Working model can be specified as 
(14)                                               wih =  αih + βih log E 
where ∑i ∑h αih =1, and ∑i ∑h βih =0. The marginal budget share can be derived by 
multiplying equation (14) by E and differentiating with respect to E, which would result 
in 
 (15)                                         (∂ pih qih/ ∂E) =  αih + βih (1+ log E ) 
                                                                       = wih + βih   
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Equation (15) shows that the marginal budget share of good i from source h differs from 
the budget share by βih. As the budget share is not constant with respect to the total 
expenditure, the marginal budget share also changes with total expenditure. 
Substituting Equation (15) for θih in Equation (2) would result in CBS model as follows 
(16)                   wih (d log qih - d log Q )= αih +βih d log Q + ∑j ∑k πih jk d log pjk + ∑l αih l Dl   
where  βih, and  πih jk are constant coefficients. This model has the AIDS expenditure 
coefficients and the Rotterdam price coefficients. This implies that the expenditure 
parameters are interpreted as they are in the AIDS Model and the price parameters are 
interpreted as they are in the Rotterdam model. Like the Rotterdam model this model also 
would allow testing for and imposing theoretical restrictions easily and would satisfy 
concavity globally as the price parameters are Slutsky terms. The theoretical restrictions 
are  
(17)                Adding-up         ∑i ∑h αih =0 ,∑i ∑h βih = 0, ∑i ∑h πihjk =0 , and ∑i∑h αih l = 0; 
(18)                Homogeneity     ∑j ∑k πih jk = 0 ; and    
(19)                Symmetry            πih jk =  πjk ih  
The expenditure elasticity is calculated using the expression (Barten 1993): 
(20)                               ηih =  1+ βih /wih   or   ηih = θih /wih            
Slutsky (compensated) elasticities are calculated using: 
(21)   Own price elasticity    :  ζih ih= πih ih /wih 
(22)   Cross price elasticity   :  ζih jk= πih jk /wih   (i=j is possible) 
Cournot (uncompensated) elasticities are calculated using:         
(23)  Own price elasticity    : εih ih = πih jk /wih –( wih + βih)  or  εih ih = ζih ih - ηih wih 
(24)  Cross price elasticity   : εih jk = (πih jk - βih wjk)/wih- wjk  or εihjk = ζih jk - ηih wjk   
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The AIDS Model 
 The AIDS model is derived from an expenditure function representing Price Independent 
Generalized Logarithmic (PIGLOG) preferences. It is flexible and would satisfy exact 
aggregation over consumers without invoking parallel linear Engel curves (Deaton and 
Muellbauer 1980). It can be specify by adding a quarterly dummy variable for seasonality 
as follows: 
 (25)                        wih =  αih  +  ∑j ∑k λih jk log pjk + βih log( E/P) + ∑l αih l Dl   
where P is the price index and can be defined as: 
  (26)                  log P =   α0 +  ∑i ∑h log pih + ½  ∑i  ∑j ∑h  ∑k λih jk log  pih log pjk                      
The linear approximation is provided by Stone’s index which can be expressed as: 
  (27)                  log P
 
 =  ∑i ∑h wih log pih 
By substituting Divisia Price index ∑i ∑h wih d log pih for the differential form of Stone’s 
index (d log P
 
 ) , Equation(25) can be expressed in differential form as follows(Barten, 
1993): 
 (28)         dwih = αih + βih d log Q  + ∑j ∑k λih jk d log pjk + ∑l αih l Dl   
where  dwih = wih (d log pih + d log qih  - d log E), and d log E = d log P + d log Q  
Equation (28) can also be expressed as (Barten, 1993): 
(29)          wihd log qih = αih + (wih + βih) d log Q  +  ∑j ∑k [λih jk- wih (δih jk- wjk )]d log pjk  
                                         + ∑l αih l Dl            
where δih jk is the Kronecker delta which is equal to 1 if i is equal to j, and h is equal to k; 
otherwise it is equal to zero. Barten (1993) also shows that: 
(30)                                    βih = θih – wih, and 
(31)                                   λih jk  = πih jk + wih δih jk - wihwjk  
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Similar to the Rotterdam model, this model also would allow testing for and imposing 
restrictions such as homogeneity and symmetry using the model parameters. However, 
this model would satisfy concavity only locally as the Slutsky term depends on budget 
shares.  Theoretical restrictions can be imposed on the parameters as follows: 
 (32)             Adding-up        ∑i ∑h αih =0 ,∑i ∑h βih = 0, ∑i ∑h λih jk =0 , and  ∑i∑h αih l = 0; 
 (33)             Homogeneity     ∑j ∑k λih jk = 0; and    
 (34)             Symmetry             λih jk =  λjk ih   
The expenditure elasticity is calculated using the formula (Barten 1993): 
 (35)                                             ηih =  1+ βih /wih   or   ηih = θih /wih            
Slutsky elasticities are calculated as follows: 
 (36)   Own price elasticity    :    ζih ih=-1+ λih ih /wih + wih   or    ζih ih= πih jk /wih 
 (37)   Cross price elasticity   :    ζih jk= λih jk /wih +  wjk     or   ζih jk= πih jk /wih (i=j  is possible) 
Cournot elasticities are calculated as follows:  
 (38)   Own price elasticity    :  εih ih = -1+ λih ih /wih - βih     or  εih ih = ζih ih - ηih wih 
 (39)   Cross price elasticity  :  εih jk = λihjk/ wih - βih wjk/wih or  εih jk= ζih jk - ηih wjk  
The NBR Model 
The NBR model developed by Neves (1987) is another hybrid version of the Rotterdam 
and the AIDS models. It can be derived by substituting θih - wih  for βih  in Equation (28) 
and can be expressed as: 
 (40)   dwih + wihd log Q  = αih + θih d log Q  + ∑j ∑k λih jk d log pjk + ∑l αihl Dl   
Equation (40) can also be expressed as (Barten 1993): 
 (41)  wih d log qih = αih + θih d log Q   +  ∑j ∑k [λih jk- wih (δih jk- wjk )]d log pjk + ∑l  αih l Dl            
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       The NBR model has Rotterdam expenditure coefficients and AIDS price coefficients. 
This implies that the expenditure coefficients are interpreted as they are in the Rotterdam 
model, and the price coefficients are interpreted as they are in the AIDS model. As this 
model has AIDS price coefficients it can satisfy concavity only locally. Theoretical 
restrictions can be imposed as follows: 
 (42)              Adding-up         ∑i ∑h αih =0 ,∑i ∑h θih = 1, ∑i ∑h λih jk =0 , and  ∑i∑h αih l = 0; 
 (43)              Homogeneity     ∑j ∑k λih jk = 0 ; and    
 (44)              Symmetry             λih jk =  λjk ih   
 The expenditure elasticity is calculated using the formula (Barten,1993): 
  (45)                                         ηih =  θih /wih                    
Slutsky elasticities are calculated as follows: 
 (46)   Own price elasticity    :    ζih ih=-1+ λih ih /wih + wih   or    ζih ih= πih jk /wih 
 (47)   Cross price elasticity   :    ζih jk= λihjk /wih +  wjk      or   ζih jk= πih jk /wih  (i=j is possible) 
Cournot elasticities are calculated as follows:  
 (48)   Own price elasticity    : εih ih = -1+ λih ih /wih - θih    or  εih ih = ζih ih - ηih wih 
 (49)   Cross price elasticity  :  εih jk = (λih jk- θihwjk) / wih + wjk  or εih jk= ζih jk - ηih wjk  
The General Model 
All the models presented above1 have the same left-hand side variable wih d log q and the 
right-hand side variables d log Q
 
and d log pjk . The Rotterdam and the NBR models are 
assumed to have constant marginal budget shares (i.e., θih), and the AIDS and the CBS  
models are assumed to have variable ones (i.e., wih + βih). The Rotterdam and the CBS 
                                                 
1
 All the model specifications including the General model and the theoretical restrictions are presented in 
Appendix I-A. 
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models are assumed to have constant Slutsky terms (i.e., πih jk), and the AIDS and the 
NBR are assumed to have variable ones (i.e., λih jk - wih δih jk +wihwjk). 
       Following Barten (1993), Schmitz and Seale developed a General model that nests  
 all the four models. More specifically, any of the above four models could be obtained 
by imposing appropriate restrictions on the nesting parameters of the General model. This 
model is developed to determine which of the above four models best fits the data.  It is 
specified incorporating an intercept to capture changes in tastes and preferences and a 
quarterly dummy variable for seasonality as follows: 
(50)     wih d log qih = αih + (dih + δ1 wih) d log Q  +  ∑j ∑k [eih jk+ δ2wih (δih jk- wjk )]d log pjk 
                                     
 
+ ∑l αih l Dl           
where δ1, and  δ2 are nesting parameters that need to be estimated. The expenditure and 
price coefficients can be expressed as (Barten 1993): 
(51)                          dih = δ1 βih+(1- δ1) θih  
(52)                          eih jk = (1+ δ2) πih jk -δ2 λih jk  
Equation (50) can also be expressed as: 
(53)   wih d log qih = αih +  dih d log Q  + δ1 wih d log Q  +  ∑j ∑k eih jk d log pjk 
                                                
 +δ2 (d log pih -d log P) +  ∑l αih l Dlt            
If δ1 = 0   and δ2 = 0 then Equation (53) becomes Rotterdam; if  δ1 = 1  and δ2 = -1 it 
becomes AIDS; if  δ1 = 1  and δ2 = 0 it becomes CBS; and if δ1 = 0  and δ2 = -1 it 
becomes NBR.  Theoretical restrictions can be imposed as follows: 
(54)           Adding-up  ∑i ∑h αih =0  ∑i∑h dih = 1- δ1,  ∑i ∑h eih jk =0 , and  ∑i∑h αihl = 0; 
(55)           Homogeneity   ∑j∑k eih jk = 0 ; and    
(56)           Symmetry            eih jk =  ejk ih  
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 The expenditure elasticity is calculated using the formula (Barten 1993): 
(57)                                       ηih =  dih /wih + δ1   or  ηih =  θih /wih                                
 Slutsky elasticities are calculated as follows: 
(58) Own price elasticity  :   ζih ih=eih ih /wih + δ2 (1- wih  )  or  ζih ih= πih ih/wih 
(59) Cross price elasticity :   ζih jk= eih jk /wih - δ2 wjk                  or   ζihjk= πih jk /wih  
                                               (where i=j is possible) 
Cournot elasticities are calculated as follows:  
(60)  Own price elasticity  :  εih ih = eih ih /wih - dih +δ2 - wih(δ1+ δ2) or  εih ih = ζih ih - ηih wih 
(61)  Cross price elasticity :   εih jk = (eih jk– wjk dih) / wih -wjk(δ1+ δ2)  
                                                                          
or   εih jk= ζih jk - ηih wjk    
Test for Symmetric Weak Separability 
This test is conducted to determine if the three studied edible oil groups (soybean oil, 
palm oil, and other oils) are weakly separable. If these three groups are found to be 
weakly separable, then the marginal rate of substitution between any two commodities in 
a group is independent of quantities demanded in other groups. The results of this test 
would help in making correct policy decisions. If the groups are weakly separable and if 
the model is estimated without taking this into consideration, then the estimates of 
elasticities might be biased resulting in wrong policy decisions (Eales and Wessels 1999).  
          Although different tests are available to test for separabilty, Pudney (1981) shows 
that different specifications make little difference to the empirical results. This study uses 
the separability test suggested by Moshini, Moro, and Green (1994). The restriction to 
conduct this test for the General system is specified as (Eales and Wessels 1999): 
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where A and B represent edible oil groups. As the test is symmetric, if groups A and B are 
found to be separable then group B is separable from group A, and group A is separable 
from group B. 
      The restriction for the Rotterdam model can be derived by substituting δ1=0 and δ2 =0 
in equation (63), for AIDS by substituting δ1=1and δ2 =-1, for NBR by substituting δ1=0 
and δ2 =-1, and for CBS model by substituting δ1=1and δ2 =0. 
        For each model a total of sixteen nonlinear restrictions are necessary to conduct this 
test. There will be only three independent off-diagonal Slutsky price coefficients 
corresponding to the substitution possibilities among the three groups rather than the 
twenty eight coefficients.  As Wald test is not invariant to the reformulations of nonlinear 
restrictions, a likelihood ratio test is used to conduct this test. As the restrictions for 
Rotterdam model depend only upon coefficients the results are global. For all the other 
models the results are only local as the restrictions are imposed using mean budget 
shares. 
Test for Product Aggregation  
 The product aggregation test is conducted in order to determine if the supply source 
differentiation is necessary for both palm and soybean oils. This is done by testing if the 
expenditure coefficients and the own and cross-price coefficients of the source 
differentiated model are same as those of the non-source differentiated model (Hayes, 
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Wahl, and Williams 1990; Yang and Koo 1994). The restrictions to conduct this test for 
all the five models can be specified as:   
 (62)                                           φih   =  φi         ∀ h ∈  i ,                         
                                                 Ψih jk = Ψij        ∀ h,k ∈  i,j. 
where φih, and Ψih jk are the terms that represent the expenditure, and  own and cross-price 
parameters from the source differentiated models, and φi , and Ψij  are the terms that 
represent the expenditure , and own and  cross-price parameters from the non-source 
differentiated models. For the General model nesting coefficients are also included in the 
restrictions.  A Wald test is used to conduct this test.   
Test for Homogeneity and Symmetry 
The theoretical restrictions of homogeneity and symmetry are tested for all the models by 
using the appropriate restrictions. The homogeneity is tested separately and symmetry is 
tested jointly with homogeneity. A Wald test is used to conduct this test. 
Test for Homothetic Preferences 
The preferences are homothetic if the marginal budget shares are equal to the 
corresponding budget shares (unitary expenditure elasticities). If the preferences are 
found to be homothetic, then it can be concluded that the budget shares do not depend on 
the total expenditure and the import demand depends only on relative prices changes.  
For the General model the appropriate restrictions to conduct this test are δ1=1 and dih =0 
for all i and h, for Rotterdam and NBR it is θih =wih , and  for AIDS and CBS it is  βih =0. 
A Wald test is used to conduct this test.  
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     The results are local for Rotterdam and NBR models as the restrictions are imposed 
using mean budget shares. For these models budget shares must be constant for 
homotheticity to hold globally.  
Test for Endogeneity 
The d log Q (expenditure) and disturbance terms in the differential demand systems may 
not be independent of each other resulting in an expenditure endogeneity problem. The 
theory of random rational behavior is used to test for endogeneity (Theil 1975). 
According to this theory, if d log Q is exogenous, then the covariance of the error terms 
would be proportional to the Slutsky terms. It can be expressed as follows (Lee, Brown, 
and Seale 1994): 
(64)                                            cov(vih, vjk)=µ  πih jk  
where vih and  vjk are error terms, and µ is the factor of proportionality. If a regression of 
cov(vih, vjk) on constant and  πih jk  resulted in an insignificant constant and a significant 
slope term, it can be concluded that the term d log Q is exogenous.  
Data 
This study used quarterly data from 1999 (quarter I) to 2006 (quarter III). The data period 
begins after the elimination of import quota for edible oils that was in place from 1988 to 
1994. Data on wholesale prices of imported edible oils are not available. In this study, 
unit values which are calculated by dividing the value of imports by the volume of 
imports are used to calculate the wholesale prices. Data on import value in kilograms and 
volume in U.S. dollars are obtained from Global Trade Information Services (2007).  
       In India, the import tariff structure for edible oils is very complicated. The rates 
differ among different edible oils (palm versus soybean oil) and for some edible oils the 
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rates differ between different fractions (crude versus refined oils). For example, during 
February 2005-August 2006, the tariff rates for crude and refined palm oils were 88.8 and 
99.4 percent respectively. During the same period the tariff rate for both crude and 
refined soybean oils was 50.8 percent. 
      A common problem with the tariff application in India has been the understatement of 
actual prices for invoicing purposes by importers to pay lower tariffs. In order to prevent 
under invoicing, India introduced a tariff value system for palm oil in August 2001, and 
soybean oil in September 2002. This system requires that the tariffs are calculated as a 
percentage of the reference prices established by the Government for the imported edible 
oils and not the prices stated by the importers.  Although the reference prices are changed 
frequently to make sure that they reflect the actual market prices, sometimes the delays in 
making the appropriate changes have resulted in charging tariffs that are higher or lower 
than the rates that would have been charged if the tariffs had been charged using actual 
market prices (Dohlman, Persaud, and Landes 2003). The data on tariff rates and 
reference prices are obtained from the Solvent Extractors Association of India (2007). As 
the data on tariffs are available only from December 1999, the rates that were prevalent in 
December 1999 are applied to January 1999-December 1999.  
         The data used are aggregates of different fractions (crude and refined). Out of the 
total palm oil imported during November 2001-October 2006, an annual average of about 
90 percent was crude oil. Out of the total soybean oil imported during the same period an 
annual average of about 99 percent was crude oil. During November 2001-October 2005 
no refined sunflower seed oil was imported and during November 2005-October 2006 
about 1 percent of the total sunflower seed oil imported was refined oil (Solvent 
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Extractors Association of India 2007). All of rapeseed oil, peanut oil, palm kernel oil, 
coconut oil, and cottonseed oil imported during November 2001-October 2006 were 
crude oils. The data on different fractions of oils imported prior to November 2001 are 
not available. 
         For some oils, crude oils are subject to a different tariff rate compared to refined 
oils. More specifically; for soybean oil, since September 2004, the same tariff rates have 
been applied to both crude and refined oils. Even prior to September 2004, there was not 
a large difference between the tariff rates applied to crude and refined oils. As the refined 
oil constitutes only about 1 percent of the total soybean oil imports, and as there is not 
much difference in the tariff rates between crude and refined soybean oils, for the tariff 
calculation purposes, all the imported soybean oils are categorized as crude for this study. 
As refined oil constitutes just 1 percent of the total sunflower seed oil imports and that 
too only during November 2005-October 2006; all of sunflower seed oil is considered as 
crude oil along with rapeseed oil, peanut oil, palm kernel oil, coconut oil, and cottonseed 
oil for calculating tariffs. For palm oil, weighted tariff rates are used for calculating 
appropriate tariffs. Even though the data on percentage of different fractions of edible oils 
imported are available at the aggregate level (e.g., percentage of crude palm oil in total 
palm oil imports), they are not available by supply sources. However it is known that in 
the palm oil group India has been importing most of its refined palm oil from Malaysia 
(Subramani 2005). So, it is assumed that out of the total refined palm oil imported 90 
percent was from Malaysia and the rest was from Indonesia. As the data on different 
fractions of palm oil imported prior to November 2001 are not available it is assumed that 
10 percent of the total palm oil imported during Jan 1999-October 2001 was refined oil. 
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This assumption is made based on the percentage of refined palm oil imported during 
November 2001-October 2006. All of the palm oil imported from rest of the world is 
consider as crude oil for calculating tariffs. 
          After adding the tariffs to unit import values to represent wholesale prices; the 
prices are converted from U.S. dollars to Indian rupees, using the current exchange rate 
between the U.S. dollar and the Indian rupee. Data on exchange rate is obtained from the 
Reserve Bank of India (2007). Major exporters of the studied oils are considered as 
individual supply sources, while all other exporters are summed into the Rest-of-the-
World category. For palm oil; as Indonesia accounts for 57 percent of the total palm oil 
import mean expenditure share [1999 (quarter I) to 2006 (quarter III)] and Malaysia for 
42 percent, they are included in this study as two sources of supply for palm oil. All the 
other sources that supply palm oil are aggregated as the ROW. For soybean oil; 
Argentina, Brazil, and the U.S. account for 68 percent, 22 percent, and 6 percent of the 
total soybean oil import mean expenditure share, respectively; and are considered as 
separate supply sources. Even though the U.S. accounts for just 6 percent of the total 
soybean oil import mean expenditure share, it is considered as a separate supply source 
because the U.S. has been a consistent supplier of soybean oil to India during the period 
of this study. All the other sources that supply soybean oils are aggregated as the ROW.  
The other edible oils , including sunflower oil, rapeseed oil, peanut oil, palm kernel oil, 
coconut oil, and cottonseed oil account for just 8 percent of the total edible oil import 
mean expenditure share, and therefore are aggregated as one category called Other Oils. 
The budget shares of the imported edible oils for 1999, sample mean, and 2006 are 
presented in Table I-1. An overview of the data shows that the budget share of palm oil 
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from Malaysia has decreased from 49 percent in 1999 to 8 percent in 2006 (average of 
first three quarters), while those for palm oil from Indonesia and soybean oil from 
Argentina have increased from 17 and 9 percent to 47 and 31 percent respectively during 
the same period. The share of other oils has decreased from 12 to 7 percent and there 
have not been any significant changes in the allocation of budget shares to rest of the oils 
during the data period.    
Misspecification Tests, Estimation Procedures, and Model Selection 
The parameters of all the models are estimated, with homogeneity and symmetry 
imposed and using iterative seemingly unrelated regression (ITSUR). The demand 
system includes soybean oils from Brazil, Argentina, the U.S., and the rest of the world 
(ROW); palm oils from Malaysia, Indonesia, and ROW; and other oils.  Because of the 
singularity of the contemporaneous covariance matrix due to adding-up restrictions, the 
models are estimated after omitting the other oils equation. The parameters of the 
dropped equation are estimated by dropping another equation and re-estimating the 
systems. 
          The Henze-Zirkler system test is conducted to test for normality of the error terms. 
The joint mean test (no autocorrelation, linear functional form, and parameter stability) 
and the joint variance test (static homoskedasticity, dynamic homoskedasticity, and 
variance stability), as suggested by McGuirk et al. (1995), are also conducted. The results 
of the misspecification tests are presented in Table I-2.  
       The results indicate that the null hypothesis of normality cannot be rejected at the 5 
percent significance level for General, AIDS, and CBS models, and at the 10 percent 
significance level for Rotterdam and NBR models. The results of the overall joint 
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conditional mean test show that the null hypothesis of no autocorrelation, linearity 
(functional form is linear in the parameters), and no structural change (parameters are 
stable) can be rejected at the 1 percent significance level for General, Rotterdam, and 
NBR models, while it cannot be rejected at the 1 percent level for AIDS and CBS 
models. The results of the overall joint conditional variance test show that the null 
hypothesis of static homoskedasticity (variance of the error term is constant), dynamic 
homoskedasticity (variance of the error term does not depend on the previous 
disturbance), and variance stability can be rejected at the 1 percent significance level for 
all the models.  
        As the General model nests all the other models and it is used to determine the 
model that best fits the data it is imperative that this model is first corrected for 
misspecifications. Even though the overall joint variance test for General model is 
rejected at the 1 percent significance level, the individual components of the test show 
that the null hypothesis of static homoskedasticity cannot be rejected at the 1 percent 
significance level, and the null hypotheses of dynamic homoskedasticity and variance 
stability cannot be rejected at the 5 percent significance level.  The individual 
components of the joint mean test show that there is a problem with autocorrelation as the 
null hypothesis of no autocorrelation is rejected at the 1 percent significance level. They 
also show that the null hypothesis of linearity cannot be rejected at the 10 percent 
significance level and the null hypothesis of no structural change cannot be rejected at the 
1 percent significance level. Based on the results of misspecification tests we decided to 
correct for autocorrelation by specifying a first-order autocorrelation (AR1) model as 
suggested by Berndt and Savin (1975). 
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       The General model corrected for autocorrelation is used to select the model that best 
fits the data. A Wald test is conducted to test Rotterdam, AIDS, NBR, and CBS models 
against the General model using appropriate restrictions. The results are presented in 
Table I-3. The results show that when tested against the general model all the models are 
rejected at the 1 percent significance level implying that the general model best fits the 
data.  
       Although Rotterdam, AIDS, NBR, and CBS models are rejected they are also 
estimated to compare the elasticities across the different models. These models are also 
corrected for first order autocorrelation.  
Results and Discussion 
Endogeneity, Theoretical Restrictions, Homotheticity, Separability, and Product 
Aggregation 
Test results for endogeneity are presented in Table I-4. The slope terms (parameters of 
Slutsky terms) are significant at the 1 percent significance level for General, Rotterdam, 
and NBR models, and they are significant at the 5 percent significance level for AIDS 
and CBS models. The intercept terms are insignificant at the 10 percent significance level 
for all the models. The results of the endogeneity tests suggest that the term d log Q is 
exogenous in all the models.  
       The test results for theoretical restrictions of homogeneity and symmetry are 
presented in Table I-5, along with those for homotheticity. The results show that the null 
hypothesis of homogeneity cannot be rejected for all the models at the 10 percent 
significance level, and that of symmetry can be rejected at the 1 percent significance level 
for all the models. Even though the symmetry does not hold, all the models are estimated 
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with both homogeneity and symmetry imposed as required by the theory (Henneberry, 
Piewthongngam, and Qiang 1999). Moreover, the symmetry must always be imposed for 
the Rotterdam model because the Slutsky substitution matrix must be symmetric 
(Schmitz and Seale 2002). As the General model nests all the other models including 
Rotterdam, and also for reasons of comparability homogeneity and symmetry are 
imposed for all the models (Barten 1993).  
        The test results for homotheticity show that the null hypothesis of homothetic 
preferences can be rejected at the 10 percent significance level or less for General, 
Rotterdam, and NBR models (Table I-5). However, it cannot be rejected at the 10 percent 
level for AIDS and CBS models. As the General model is found to be the one that best 
fits the data, it is only appropriate to draw a conclusion based on this model.  As the 
General model rejects homothetic preferences at the 10 percent level (p-value=0.0723) it 
can be concluded that there is a weak evidence for homothetic preferences. To see how 
the results change when assuming homothetic preferences, the General model was 
estimated with homotheticity imposed. This model resulted in positive and significant 
own-price Slutsky terms (at mean budget shares) violating the negativity condition. 
Because the imposition of homotheticity resulted in the significant violation of negativity 
(the General system satisfies negativity only locally), and also the fact that the evidence 
for homothetic preferences was found to be weak; homotheticity was not imposed.  
         Test results for symmetric weak separability and product aggregation are presented 
in Table I-6.  The null hypothesis that the three edible oil groups are weakly separable is 
rejected at the 1 percent significance level for all the models. These results support the 
estimation of source-differentiated models including all three edible oil groups. The null 
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hypothesis of no source differentiation for both palm and soybean oils is rejected at the 1 
percent significance level for all the models. The results support the estimation of source 
differentiated models. 
Parameter Estimates  
The marginal budget shares, Slutsky terms (compensated price effects), and the other 
parameters estimated from General, Rotterdam,  NBR, AIDS, and CBS  models are 
presented in Tables I-7, I-8, I-9, I-10, and I-11 respectively. For the General model, 
equations (51) and (52) are used to calculate the marginal budget shares and the Slutsky 
terms respectively. For the Rotterdam model; the expenditure and price coefficients are 
the marginal budget shares and the Slutsky terms, respectively. For the NBR model; the 
expenditure coefficients are the marginal budget shares, and the Slutsky terms are 
calculated using equation (31). For the AIDS model; the equations (30) and (31) are used 
to calculate marginal budget shares and the Slutsky terms, respectively. For the CBS 
model; the price coefficients are the Slutsky terms, and the marginal budget shares are 
calculated using equation (15). The marginal budget shares and Slutsky terms are 
calculated using the mean budget shares for the models that do not estimate them directly 
as it may be difficult to interpret the model parameters directly. 
           Because the Rotterdam, AIDS, NBR, and CBS models are rejected, the discussion 
will focus on the General Model. As required by the economic theory the own-price 
Slutsky terms for all the oils are negative, except for the palm oil from the ROW which is 
positive and insignificant at the 10 percent significance level. The own-price Slutsky 
terms for Malaysian palm oil and other oils are also not statistically different from zero at 
the 10 percent significance level. The own-price Slutsky terms for soybean oils from 
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Argentina, U.S., and the ROW are statistically significant at the 1 percent significance 
level and those for soybean oil from Brazil and palm oil from Malaysia are statistically 
different from zero at the 10 percent significance level.  Out of the 56 cross-price Slutsky 
terms; 6 are statistically different from zero at the 1 percent significance level, 6 are 
significant at the 5 percent significance level, and 4 are significant at the 10 percent 
significance level. Out of the 16 statistically significant cross price terms 10 are positive 
and 6 are negative.   
 As required by the economic theory, the marginal budget shares of all the oils are 
positive, except for soybean oil from the ROW which is negative and statistically not 
different from zero at the 10 percent significance level. The marginal budget shares of 
palm oil from ROW and soybean oil from Brazil are also not statistically different from 
zero at the 10 percent significance level. The marginal budget shares of Malaysian and 
Indonesian palm oils and Argentine soybean oil are statistically significant at the 1 
percent significance level, and those of other oils and U.S. soybean oil are significant at 
the 5 and 10 percent significance levels, respectively. The marginal budget share of 
Malaysian palm oil is the largest (0.410) followed by those of Indonesian palm oil 
(0.224) and Argentine soybean oil (0.207). This implies that if the total expenditure on 
edible oil imports is increased by Re. 1 then the largest proportion (41 paise) would go to 
Malaysian palm oil. 
         The marginal budget shares are not constant over time in the General model.  To 
show the trend in the marginal budget shares of the imported edible oils during the data 
period, they are presented for 1999 and 2006 along with those for sample mean (see 
Table I- 12). The marginal budget share of Malaysian palm oil has decreased 
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significantly from 0.569 in 1999 to 0.270 in 2006, while those of Indonesian palm oil and 
Argentine soybean oil have increased significantly from 0.079 and 0.142 to 0.296 and 
0.304 respectively during the same period.  However, the marginal budget share of 
Indonesian palm oil in 1999 was not statistically different from zero at the 10 percent 
level. Also, the marginal budget share of U.S. soybean oil and other oils have decreased 
marginally from 0.052 and 0.113 to 0.034 and 0.072 respectively. The marginal budget 
shares are larger than the corresponding budget shares for Malaysian palm oil and U.S. 
soybean oil, while they are smaller for Indonesian palm oil. This shows that Indian 
importers prefer Malaysian palm oil and U.S. soybean oil more than Indonesian palm oil. 
For soybean oil imported from Argentina, the marginal budget share was larger than the 
corresponding budget share in 1999, but they were almost identical in 2006.  This shows 
that the preferences for Argentine soybean oil have decreased during the data period. The 
marginal budget shares are similar to the corresponding budget shares for other oils.  
        In this study, it is hypothesized that seasonality affects oil demand in India. The 
model estimated in this study includes a quarterly seasonal dummy variable, incorporated 
as an intercept shifter. The estimation results show that out of the 24 coefficients 
associated with seasonal dummy variables, the one that is associated with the dummy 
variable representing the 4th quarter in the Malaysian palm oil equation is positive and 
significant at the 5 percent significance level, and the ones that are associated with the 
dummy variables representing 3rd and 4th quarters in the other oils equation are positive 
and are different from zero at the 10 and 5 percent significance levels respectively. This 
implies that the allocation decisions are affected by seasonal factors for these two oils. 
These results are consistent with what is expected based on Indian consumer food culture. 
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The 4th quarter coincides with a festival season in India, during which consumers 
purchase more refined oils to make sweets. The reason for increased consumption of 
Malaysian palm oil during the 4th quarter could be explained from the fact that India 
imports most of its refined palm oil from Malaysia. As the other oil category is the 
aggregate of several oils it is hard to explain the seasonal allocation pattern for this oil.  
         The intercept term in the other oil equation is negative and is statistically significant 
at the 10 percent significance. As the intercept terms in the differential systems represent 
trends, the significant negative intercept term suggests that there has been a negative 
trend in the allocation of budget share for other oils. This could be because of the shift in 
budget allocation from other oils to some of the rest of the oils. 
         The first order auto correlation coefficient is negative and statistically significant at 
the 1 percent significance level implying that the AR1 specification is appropriate. The 
nesting parameters are statistically different from zero at the significance level of 1 
percent. 
Comparion of Marginal Budget Shares and Own-Price Slutsky Terms across the 
Models 
The marginal budget shares and own-price Slutsky terms from all the models are 
presented in Table I-13. The results indicate that the marginal budget shares from all the 
models are similar.  The marginal budget shares from the Rotterdam and NBR models are 
very similar and so are the ones from the AIDS and CBS models. Recall that Rotterdam 
and NBR are assumed to have constant marginal budget shares, and AIDS and CBS are 
assumed to have variable ones. The marginal budget shares from the General model are 
more similar to those from the AIDS and CBS, than to those from the Rotterdam and 
NBR. This is because of the fact that the estimate of the nesting parameter δ1 in the 
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General model that tests the income structures, is closer to 1 (0.730) than to 0.   Recall 
that the restriction on δ1 is 1 for the General model to become either AIDS or CBS.   The 
results show that the AIDS and CBS-type expenditure responses better fit the data than 
do Rotterdam and NBR models. 
        The own-price Slutsky terms from the Rotterdam and NBR are similar, and those 
from the AIDS and CBS are similar. The results are interesting as the Rotterdam and 
CBS are assumed to have constant price parameters, and the AIDS and NBR are assumed 
to have variable ones. The own-price Slutsky term for Brazilian soybean oil is significant 
only in the General model and that for Malaysian palm oil is significant only in the 
Rotterdam and NBR models. The own-price Slutsky term for Indonesian palm oil from 
the General model is smaller in absolute value than those from the Rotterdam and NBR 
models. The own-price Slutsky terms for soybean oil from Argentina, Brazil, U.S., and 
ROW from the General model are larger in absolute values than those from the other 
models.  
Elasticity Estimates 
The expenditure elasticities, and Slutsky (compensated) and Cournot (uncompensated) 
price elasticities are calculated at the mean budget shares for all the models and are 
presented in Tables I-14, I-15, I-16, I-17 and I-18. The following discussion regarding the 
elasticities will focus on the General model. 
Expenditure Elasticities 
The expenditure elasticities for all the oils are positive except for the soybean oil from the 
ROW, which is negative and insignificant at the 10 percent significance level. In the palm 
oil import market the expenditure elasticities for palm oil from Indonesia and Malaysia 
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are statistically significant at the 1 percent significance level. The expenditure elasticity 
estimate for Malaysian palm oil is greater than one (1.480) and is more than twice than 
that for Indonesian palm oil (0.598). This implies that if the total expenditure on edible 
oil imports is increased by 1% then the demand for palm oil from Malaysia will increase 
by more than 1%. This might indicate the Indian importers preference for refined palm 
oil from Malaysia which has the lion’s share of India’s refined palm oil import market. 
       In the soybean oil import market, expenditure elasticities for soybean oils from 
Argentina and the U.S. are greater than one and are statistically significant at the 1 and 10 
percent significance levels respectively. As the expenditure elasticity estimate for U.S. 
soybean oil (2.590) is twice as large as that for Argentine soybean oil (1.191), an increase 
in the total expenditure would increase the demand for U.S. soybean more than that for 
Argentine soybean oil. This again might indicate the preference of Indian importers for 
U.S. soybean oil which is considered to be superior in quality compared with Argentine 
soybean oil (Dohlman, Pesrsaud, and Landes, 2003).  The expenditure elasticity for other 
oils is greater than one and is significant at the 5 percent significance level. 
Price Elasticities 
The Slutsky (compensated) price elasticities indicate the percentage change in quantities 
demanded in response to a 1% change in price keeping the real expenditure constant. 
These reflect only the substitution effects. The Slutsky own-price elasticity estimates for 
all the oils are negative except for palm oil from the ROW which is positive and 
insignificant at the 10 percent significance level. In the palm oil import market the 
Slutsky own-price elasticity for Indonesian palm oil is greater than one in absolute 
value(-1.579) and is statistically different from zero at the 10 percent significance level. 
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This implies that the demand for Indonesian palm oil is responsive to its own-price and is 
elastic.  
        In the soybean oil import market the Slutsky own-price elasticity estimates for 
soybean oils from Argentina, U.S., and ROW are statistically significant at the 1 percent 
significance level, and that for soybean oil from Brazil is significant at the 10 percent 
significance level. The own-price elasticity estimates for soybean oils from all the 
sources are greater than one implying that the demand for soybean oil is own-price 
elastic. The own-price elasticity estimates are similar in magnitude for soybean oils from 
Brazil (-4.357) and U.S. (-4.233), and for soybean oils from Argentina (-2.517) and the 
ROW (-2.333). This implies that for a 1% change in own-price the demand 
responsiveness would be similar for soybean oils from Brazil and U.S. and for soybean 
oils from Argentina and ROW. As the Slutsky own-price elasticity estimates for soybean 
oils from Brazil and U.S. are higher than those for soybean oils from Argentina and the 
ROW, a 1% change in own- price would impact the demand for soybean oils from Brazil 
and U.S. more than that for soybean oils from Argentina and ROW. There are statistically 
significant substitute relationships between Indonesian palm oil and Brazilian soybean 
oil, Malaysian palm oil and Argentine soybean oil, palm oil from ROW and Argentine 
soybean oil, Malaysian palm oil and soybean oil from ROW, and Argentine soybean oil 
and other oils at the 10 percent significance level or less. The substitute relationships 
between Indonesian palm oil and Brazilian soybean oil is highly asymmetric .The 
demand for Brazilian soybean oil is more sensitive to the Indonesian price (10.688) than 
the demand for Indonesian palm oil to Brazilian price (1.608). The relationships 
involving either soybean oil or palm oil from ROW are also asymmetric. There are 
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statistically significant complementary relationships between Indonesian palm oil and 
Argentine soybean oil, Indonesian palm oil and soybean oil from ROW and Malaysian 
palm oil and Brazilian soybean oil at the 10 percent significance level or less. 
          The Cournot (uncompensated) price elasticities indicate the percentage change in 
quantities demanded to a 1 % change in price, keeping the nominal expenditure constant. 
They reflect both substitution and income effects. The Cournot own-price elasticities for 
all the oils are slightly larger than the Slutsky ones except for soybean oil from ROW 
which is smaller than the Slutsky one in absolute value because of its negative 
expenditure elasticity. Thus, the demand responsiveness of own-price changes for 
Cournot elasticities would be slightly different from that for the Slutsky ones. The 
Cournot cross-price elasticities are slightly larger in absolute values for complementary 
relationships and smaller for substitute relationships than the Slutsky ones; except for the 
substitute relationship between Malaysian palm oil and soybean oil from the ROW, 
which is slightly larger than the Slutsky elasticity. Also the Cournot cross-price elasticity 
of soybean from ROW with respect to palm oil from Indonesia is insignificant while the 
Slutsky one is significant at the 10 percent significance level.  The results show that 
accounting for real expenditure effect does not significantly affect the demand 
responsiveness to own or cross-price changes.  
Comparison of Expenditure and Price Elasticities across the Models 
The expenditure elasticities, and Slutsky and Cournot own-price elasticities from all the 
models are presented in Table I-19. The expenditure elasticities from all the models are 
similar for all the oils, except for the other oils which are more than unity and significant 
at the 5 percent significance level in General, AIDS, and CBS models  and less than unity 
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and insignificant at the 10 percent significance level in Rotterdam and NBR models. The 
expenditure elasticities from NBR and Rotterdam are very similar, and so are the ones 
from AIDS and CBS. The expenditure elasticities from the General model are more 
similar to those from AIDS and CBS than to those from Rotterdam and NBR.  
        The own-price Slutsky and Cournot elasticities from Rotterdam and NBR models 
are similar and so are the ones from AIDS and CBS. The own-price elasticity estimates 
for all the oils from the General model are bigger in absolute values than those from the 
other models, except for Indonesian palm oil which is smaller than those from Rotterdam 
and NBR. The own-price elasticity estimate for Brazilian soybean oil is significant only 
in the General Model and that for Malaysian palm oil is significant only in Rotterdam and 
NBR models.  
       Regarding the cross-price elasticities, the results from Rotterdam and NBR models 
show statistically significant substitute relationship between palm oils from Indonesia and 
Malaysia (Tables I-15 and I-16) at the 5 percent significance level or less. Although the 
results from other models show substitute relationships between these two oils, they are 
not statistically significant at the 10 percent significance level.    
          The differences in price elasticities across the models show the importance of 
choosing the correct functional form. For example the own-price Slutsky elasticity for 
Malaysian palm oil from the Rotterdam model is highly elastic (-4.004) and significant at 
the 5 percent significant level, while that from the AIDS model is inelastic (-0.474) and 
insignificant at the 10 percent significance level.   
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Summary and Implications  
This study estimated the source differentiated import demand for edible oils in India 
using a family of differential demand systems. The method suggested by Barten (1993) 
was used to choose the model that best fit the data. Rotterdam, NBR, AIDS, and CBS 
systems were rejected when tested against the General system implying that the General 
system best fit the data. The test results of weak separability and product aggregation 
support the estimation of source differentiated models with all the studied oils included in 
the system.  
          If an exporting country has a higher expenditure elasticity compared to the other 
countries, then it can be assumed that the importers perceive the edible oil from that 
country to be superior in quality compared to the edible oils from other countries. If it 
also faces an own-price inelastic demand, then it can be considered as having a 
competitive advantage in the Indian edible oil import market (Yang and Koo 1994; 
Mutondo and Henneberry 2007). In the palm oil import market; Malaysia has the largest 
expenditure elasticity, while it is U.S. that has the largest expenditure elasticity in the 
soybean oil import market. In the overall market, the expenditure elasticity for U.S. 
soybean oil is the largest followed by that for Malaysian palm oil. This implies that if the 
expenditure on edible oil imports were to be increased in India, the demand for U.S. 
soybean oil will increase more than that for rest of the oils.  
       In the palm oil import market, the demand for Indonesian palm oil is own-price 
elastic. As the own-price elasticity for Malaysian palm oil from the General system is not 
statistically different from zero at the 10 percent significance level, it is difficult to 
conclude which country has competitive advantage in the palm oil import market. 
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However; a comparison of the own-price elasticity estimates for Malaysian palm oil from 
the Rotterdam (-4.006) and the NBR (-3.966) models, shows that the demand for 
Malaysian palm oil is highly own-price elastic and is about twice as large as the own-
price elasticity for the Indonesian palm oil. These elasticities may imply that Malaysia 
could experience a loss in its market share if it increased its price relative to the other 
suppliers, despite having the largest expenditure elasticity in the palm oil import market. 
        In the soybean oil import market the demand is own-price elastic for soybean oils 
from all the sources. The own-price elasticity estimates for soybean oils from the U.S. 
and Brazil are similar and larger in absolute value than those for soybeans oils from 
Argentina and the ROW, which are similar in their magnitudes. Even though the U.S. has 
the largest expenditure elasticity, its low market share could be because of its high own-
price elasticity because an increase in price would significantly decrease its market share. 
The low market share of Brazil also could be attributed to its high own-price elasticity. In 
the soybean oil import market, even though Argentina has smaller expenditure elasticity 
than the U.S., its relatively large market share could be because of its relatively small 
own-price elasticity compared to that of the U.S.  This implies that U.S. and Brazil could 
increase their market shares significantly by reducing their prices. If the tariff rates for 
soybean oils are decreased, then the soybean oil exporters in the U.S. and Brazil will 
benefit more than those in Argentina and ROW.  
        Finally, the results show that there are strong substitute relationships between 
Indonesian palm oil and Brazilian soybean oil and Malaysian palm oil and Argentine 
soybean oil. Given the strong substitute relationships between palm and soybean oils, the 
differences in tariff rates between these oils could play a significant role in determining 
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the market shares of these oils in the Indian edible oil import market. As the substitution 
relationship between Brazilian and Indonesian soybean oils is asymmetric, a change in 
the tariff rates of palm oil will have more impact on the Brazilian soybean oil than a 
change in the tariff rates of soybean oil on Indonesian palm oil. As the tariff rates for 
palm oils are higher that that for soybean oils, the palm oil exporting countries have been 
requesting the Indian Government to reduce the import tariffs for palm oils. If the Indian 
Government agreed to their requests, then the demand for soybean oil imports in India is 
expected to decrease. 
       Although the results from the General system do not show any statistically 
significant relationship between Malaysian and Indonesian palm oils, the Rotterdam and 
NBR systems show strong substitute relationship between these two oils. This is 
important to note, considering the fact that Indonesia and Malaysia are the largest 
exporters of palm oil in the world and Malaysia has been gradually losing its market 
share to Indonesia in India. The substitution relationship between Indonesian and 
Malaysian palm oils show that the tariff differences between crude and refined palm oils 
could play a significant role in determining the market shares of Malaysian and 
Indonesian palm oils in the Indian palm oil import market. This is because India imports 
most of its refined palm oil from Malaysia and the tariff rates for refined palm oil are 
higher than that for crude palm oil.  
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Table I-1. Budget Shares of Imported Edible Oils, 1999 (I Quarter) through 2006 
(III Quarter) 
 
Year                          Palm Oil                                   Soybean Oil 
                        Indo    Malay   ROW             Arg      Brazil     U.S.    ROW       Other Oil 
 
1999              0.1745  0.4863  0.0055         0.0911   0.0605   0.0363   0.0263      0.1196    
 
Mean             0.3746  0.2769  0.0097         0.1737   0.0564   0.0144   0.0120      0.0824 
 
2006a             0.4730  0.0836  0.0105         0.3073   0.0438   0.0103   0.0055      0.0660 
 
                                 
 
a
 Average of first three quarters.
                           
 
                        
 
 
Table I-2. Misspecification Test Results 
                                                                
                                                                                        Model 
   Test                                               
                                                        General       Rotterdam         NBR        AIDS       CBS                           
 
Normality                                       0.0550a       0.2040             0.2343      0.0623 0.0718 
 
 
Joint Conditional Mean 
 
Linear Functional From                 0.2227       0.0167             0.0244      0.0129      0.0118 
No Autocorrelation                        0.0004       0.0162             0.0074      0.0540      0.0460 
No Structural Change                    0.0461       0.7626             0.7871      0.8025      0.7021 
Overall Joint Mean                        0.0026       0.0013             0.0012      0.0411      0.0282 
 
Joint Conditional Variance 
 
Static Homoskedasticity               0.0258       0.0563              0.0547       0.0001     0.0001 
Dynamic Homoskedasticity          0.0732       0.0013              0.0197       0.0001     0.0001 
No Structural Change                   0.0513       0.0002              0.0003       0.0005     0.0040 
Overall Joint Variance                  0.0031       0.0001              0.0001       0.0001     0.0001 
 
a P-values 
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Table I-3. Results of the Nested Test between the General Model and the other 
Models 
 
                                                             Restrictions                                  
    Model                                                                                                 P-value                                         
                                                      δ1                                    δ2                                        
     
    
   Rotterdam                                   0                          0                            0.0001         
 
   NBR                                            0                         -1                           0.0001 
 
   AIDS                                           1                         -1                            0.0001 
 
   CBS                                             1                          0                            0.0001 
                                  
                                                                                                                                                           
 
 
 
 
Table I-4. Test Results for Endogeneity 
                                                             
                                                                           P-value 
 Model                                              
                                                         Intercept                               Slope                                        
 
General                                             0.4967                                 0.0025 
 
Rotterdam                                        0.5824                                  0.0001 
 
NBR                                                0.6030                                  0.0001 
 
AIDS                                               0.4112                                  0.0262 
 
CBS                                                 0.3990                                  0.0258                           
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Table I-5. Test Results for Homogeneity, Symmetry, and Homotheticity 
 
                                                                                  Restriction 
   
Model                                         Homogeneity         Symmetryb        Homotheticity 
 
General                                           0.7300a                  0.0001             0.0723    
 
Rotterdam                                       0.9755                   0.0003             0.0172     
 
NBR                                               0.9868                    0.0003             0.0231 
 
AIDS                                              0.9803                    0.0001             0.1411 
 
CBS                                                0.9326                    0.0001             0.1186     
                                                                                                                                                          
a
 P-values 
b Symmetry  is jointly tested with homogeneity.     
 
 
Table I-6. Test Results for Weak Separability and Product Aggregation 
                                                                                                                                                                              
                                                                                      Model 
                             
 Test                                         General           Rotterdam         NBR         AIDS        CBS                   
 
Weak Separabilitya                     0.0008             0.0006           0.0007        0.0001     0.0001        
 
Product Aggregation 
 Palm Oil                                   0.0001b             0.0001           0.0001       0.0001      0.0001 
  Soybean Oil                              0.0001             0.0001           0.0001       0.0001      0.0001           
  Joint test                                   0.0001             0.0001           0.0001        0.0001     0.0001   
 
 
a
 The test was conducted using likelihood ratio test. 
b
 P-values 
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Table I-7. Parameter Estimates from the General Model 
 
                                                        Dependent Variable  
Independent                  Palm Oil                                Soybean Oil 
variable               Indo    Malay   ROW        Arg      Brazil    U.S.    ROW      Other Oil 
 
Intercept            0.042    -0.034    0.009       0.008     0.020   -0.010    0.002    -0.031*                    
                         (0.028)   (0.033) (0.009)     (0.011)  (0.023)  (0.009) (0.007)   (0.016) 
Price ofa: 
 IndoPalm        -0.591*    0.319    -0.006    -0.274**  0.602*** 0.051   -0.044*    -0.056                
                         (0.288)   (0.276)  (0.075)   (0.121)  (0.146)  (0.040)  (0.024)   (0.087) 
 MalayPalm                    -0.313   -0.059      0.402***-0.388** -0.012   0.051*     -0.001     
                                        (0.532)  (0.079)   (0.132)  (0.153)  (0.040) (0.026)    (0.094) 
 ROWPalm                                    0.019      0.086*  -0.057     0.012    0.003      0.003 
                                                      (0.041)   (0.043)  (0.052)  (0.014)  (0.008)   (0.036)                                              
 ArgSoy                                                       -0.437***0.078     0.027   -0.020      0.139** 
                                                                     (0.098)  (0.094)  (0.023)  (0.016)   (0.054) 
 BrazilSoy                                                                  -0.246*  -0.012    0.022      0.000 
                                                                                   (0.137)  (0.030)  (0.017)   (0.070) 
 U.S.Soy                                                                                  -0.061***0.005     -0.008                                                                                    
                                                                                                 (0.013)  (0.006)   (0.020) 
 ROWSoy                                                                                              -0.028*** 0.011 
                                                                                                               (0.006)   (0.013) 
 Other Oil                                                                                                             -0.088 
                                                                                                                             (0.066) 
Expenditureb   0.224***    0.410*** 0.004      0.207***0.040      0.037*   -0.006     0.084**                                                                                     
                       (0.064)      (0.076)  (0.021)    (0.048) (0.051)    (0.019)  (0.017)  (0.034) 
I    Quarter      0.011        -0.001   -0.017     -0.010   -0.054      0.011    -0.009    0.032 
                       (0.046)      (0.054)  (0.015)    (0.028)  (0.038)   (0.014)  (0.012)  (0.025) 
III Quarter      -0.037       -0.041    -0.007       0.020    0.012      0.007    -0.001   0.041*** 
                       (0.043)      (0.050)  (0.014)     (0.024) (0.035)   (0.013)   (0.011)  (0.023) 
IV Quarter     -0.073         0.135** -0.012      -0.050  -0.050      0.014    -0.006    0.051**  
                       (0.045)      (0.053)  (0.015)     (0.030) (0.037)    (0.013)  (0.011) (0.024) 
ρ
c
                    -0.296*** 
                       (0.086) 
δ1                    0.730*** 
                                  
(0.152) 
δ2                             -3.418*** 
                       (0.583) 
Notes: Single, double, and triple asterisks indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels respectively. 
Numbers in parentheses are standard errors. The variances of own price slutsky terms are calculated as  
var(πih ih)=var(eih ih)+w2ih(1- wih)2 var(δ2)+2 wih(1- wih) cov(eih ih, δ2), those of cross price slutsky terms are 
calculated as var(πih  jk)=var(eih  jk)+w2ih w2jk var(δ2)-2 wih wjk cov(eih jk, δ2), and those of marginal shares are 
calculated as var(θih)=var(dih)+ w2ihvar(δ1)+2wih cov(dih, δ1). 
a
 Slutsky terms calculated at the mean budget shares using the model price parameters. 
b 
 Marginal budget shares calculated at the mean budget shares using the model  expenditure parameters. 
c   Autocorrelation coefficient. 
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Table I-8. Parameter Estimates from the Rotterdam Model 
 
                                                              Dependent Variable 
 
Independent                  Palm Oil                                Soybean Oil 
variable               Indo    Malay   ROW        Arg      Brazil    U.S.    ROW      Other Oil 
 
Intercept            0.037    -0.040    0.008       0.013     0.015   -0.005    0.003     -0.031                    
                         (0.030)   (0.042) (0.009)     (0.025)  (0.022)  (0.010) (0.007)    (0.018) 
Price ofa: 
 IndoPalm        -0.726**   0.832** -0.187** -0.283**  0.568*** 0.030   -0.041*     -0.193**                
                         (0.330)   (0.329)  (0.076)   (0.128)  (0.150)  (0.042)  (0.027)    (0.092) 
 MalayPalm                    -1.109**  0.117     0.435** -0.387**   0.007    0.045           0.060     
                                        (0.408)  (0.087)   (0.168)  (0.170)   (0.051) (0.031)    (0.113) 
 ROWPalm                                    0.025      0.031    -0.015     0.014   -0.005       0.020 
                                                      (0.038)   (0.043)  (0.048)  (0.014)  (0.008)    (0.035)                                                                                                                        
 ArgSoy                                                       -0.343***0.035     0.028   -0.013       0.109* 
                                                                     (0.111)  (0.096)  (0.028) (0.018)     (0.062) 
 BrazilSoy                                                                 -0.211     -0.022    0.020       0.011 
                                                                                  (0.129)   (0.030)  (0.017)    (0.074) 
 U.S.Soy                                                                                  -0.053***0.009      -0.013                                                                                    
                                                                                                 (0.016)  (0.007)    (0.025) 
 ROWSoy                                                                                              -0.016**    0.001 
                                                                                                               (0.006)    (0.015) 
 Other Oil                                                                                                               0.004 
                                                                                                                              (0.076) 
Expenditureb   0.234***    0.432***-0.009      0.220***0.038      0.044*   -0.009      0.051                                                                                                                       
                       (0.061)      (0.096)  (0.020)    (0.057) (0.050)    (0.022)  (0.017)   (0.040) 
I    Quarter      0.021         0.003   -0.015       0.017   -0.044      0.004    -0.009     0.024 
                       (0.041)      (0.067)  (0.014)    (0.040)  (0.036)   (0.016)  (0.012)   (0.030) 
III Quarter     -0.042        -0.027   -0.005       0.013     0.020     -0.003     0.001     0.043 
                       (0.039)      (0.063)  (0.013)     (0.038) (0.033)   (0.015)   (0.011)   (0.027) 
IV Quarter     -0.066         0.149** -0.014      -0.061   -0.051      0.013    -0.010     0.040 
                       (0.042)      (0.067)  (0.014)     (0.040) (0.035)    (0.016)  (0.011)   (0.028) 
ρ
c
                    -0.270*** 
                       (0.088) 
                            
 
Notes: Single, double, and triple asterisks indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels respectively. 
Numbers in parentheses are standard errors.  
a
  Model price coefficients are slutsky  terms  
b  
 Model expenditure coefficients are marginal budget shares. 
c    Autocorrelation coefficient. 
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Table I-9. Parameter Estimates from the NBR Model 
 
                                                              Dependent Variable 
 
Independent                  Palm Oil                                Soybean Oil 
variable               Indo    Malay   ROW        Arg      Brazil    U.S.    ROW      Other Oil 
 
Intercept           0.038    -0.038     0.008       0.013     0.016   -0.006    0.002     -0.032*                    
                        (0.025)   (0.042)  (0.009)     (0.025)  (0.022)  (0.009) (0.007)    (0.017) 
Price ofa: 
 IndoPalm        -0.758**   0.838** -0.186** -0.276**  0.567*** 0.032   -0.036       -0.181*                
                         (0.316)   (0.315)  (0.074)   (0.125)  (0.148)  (0.041)  (0.023)    (0.088) 
 MalayPalm                    -1.098**  0.117     0.435** -0.386**   0.002    0.045          0.047     
                                       (0.395)  (0.085)   (0.165)  (0.168)   (0.049) (0.031)    (0.109) 
 ROWPalm                                    0.022     0.033    -0.018     0.013   -0.005       0.023 
                                                      (0.038)   (0.042)  (0.049)  (0.014)  (0.008)   (0.034)                                                                                                                        
 ArgSoy                                                       -0.361*** 0.034    0.029    -0.011     0.119* 
                                                                     (0.110)  (0.096)  (0.027) (0.017)    (0.060) 
 BrazilSoy                                                                  -0.216    -0.017    0.021      0.015 
                                                                                   (0.129)  (0.030)  (0.017)   (0.072) 
 U.S.Soy                                                                                  -0.055*** 0.008    -0.012                                                                                    
                                                                                                 (0.015)  (0.007)   (0.024) 
 ROWSoy                                                                                              -0.019***-0.001 
                                                                                                               (0.006)   (0.014) 
 Other Oil                                                                                                             -0.009 
                                                                                                                             (0.072) 
Expenditureb   0.234***    0.434***-0.009      0.216***0.037       0.042*   -0.008    0.053                                                                      
                       (0.058)      (0.096)  (0.020)    (0.056) (0.050)    (0.021)  (0.017)  (0.038) 
I    Quarter      0.019         0.001   -0.015       0.017   -0.046      0.005    -0.010    0.029 
                       (0.041)      (0.068)  (0.014)    (0.040)  (0.036)   (0.015)  (0.012)  (0.028) 
III Quarter     -0.042        -0.031   -0.005       0.013     0.018    -0.000     0.001     0.046* 
                       (0.038)      (0.063)  (0.013)    (0.038)  (0.033)   (0.014)   (0.011)  (0.026) 
IV Quarter     -0.066         0.148** -0.014     -0.061   -0.052      0.013    -0.009     0.042 
                       (0.040)       (0.067)  (0.014)    (0.040)  (0.035)   (0.015)  (0.012)  (0.026) 
ρ
c
                    -0.289*** 
                       (0.087) 
                            
 
Notes: Single, double, and triple asterisks indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels respectively. 
Numbers in parentheses are standard errors.  
a
  Slutsky terms calculated at the mean budget shares using model price parameters.  
b  
 Model expenditure parameters are marginal budget shares. 
c    Autocorrelation coefficient. 
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Table I-10. Parameter Estimates from the AIDS Model 
 
                                                              Dependent Variable 
 
Independent                  Palm Oil                                Soybean Oil 
variable               Indo    Malay   ROW        Arg      Brazil    U.S.    ROW      Other Oil 
 
Intercept            0.041    -0.040    0.010       0.001     0.019   -0.008    0.002     -0.026                  
                         (0.031)   (0.030) (0.010)     (0.020)  (0.023)  (0.009) (0.007)    (0.017) 
Price ofa: 
 IndoPalm        -0.427      0.153    0.021     -0.344**  0.653*** 0.055   -0.067**    -0.044                
                         (0.303)   (0.273)  (0.080)   (0.124)  (0.150)  (0.046)  (0.026)    (0.095) 
 MalayPalm                    -0.131   -0.105     0.440***-0.426**  -0.007    0.061**      0.015     
                                       (0.309)  (0.078)   (0.127)   (0.150)   (0.041) (0.024)    (0.095) 
 ROWPalm                                    0.038     0.101** -0.057     0.010     0.005     -0.014 
                                                     (0.044)   (0.045)   (0.055)  (0.015)  (0.009)    (0.038)                                                                                                                        
 ArgSoy                                                       -0.416*** 0.084    0.027    -0.031*     0.138** 
                                                                     (0.110)  (0.093)  (0.024)  (0.015)    (0.057) 
 BrazilSoy                                                                  -0.225    -0.022    0.021      -0.029 
                                                                                   (0.141)  (0.031)  (0.018)    (0.076) 
 U.S.Soy                                                                                  -0.059*** 0.009     -0.014                                                                                    
                                                                                                 (0.014)  (0.007)    (0.023) 
 ROWSoy                                                                                              -0.020***  0.022 
                                                                                                               (0.006)   (0.013) 
 Other Oil                                                                                                              -0.075 
                                                                                                                              (0.072) 
Expenditureb   0.201**      0.416*** 0.010      0.206*** 0.046      0.041*   -0.011     0.090**                                                                                                                       
                       (0.072)      (0.071)  (0.023)    (0.046) (0.052)    (0.022)  (0.016)   (0.038) 
I    Quarter      0.017         0.003   -0.020       0.033   -0.050      0.008    -0.009     0.017 
                       (0.050)      (0.048)  (0.016)    (0.032)  (0.036)   (0.015)  (0.011)   (0.027) 
III Quarter     -0.035        -0.032   -0.008       0.030     0.013     0.002     0.000      0.030 
                       (0.046)      (0.045)  (0.015)    (0.030)   (0.033)   (0.014)  (0.010)  (0.024) 
IV Quarter     -0.085         0.140** -0.011     -0.050    -0.049      0.014   -0.008     0.049* 
                       (0.052)      (0.050)   (0.016)    (0.033)  (0.037)   (0.015)  (0.011)   (0.027) 
ρ
c
                    -0.230** 
                       (0.086) 
                            
 
Notes: Single, double, and triple asterisks indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels respectively. 
Numbers in parentheses are standard errors.  
a
  Slutsky terms calculated at the mean budget shares using model price parameters.  
b  
 Marginal budget shares calculated at the mean budget shares using expenditure parameters. 
c    Autocorrelation coefficient. 
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Table I-11. Parameter Estimates from the CBS Model 
 
                                                              Dependent Variable 
 
Independent                  Palm Oil                                Soybean Oil 
variable               Indo    Malay   ROW        Arg      Brazil    U.S.    ROW      Other Oil 
 
Intercept            0.040    -0.042    0.010       0.002     0.018   -0.006    0.002     -0.025                  
                         (0.032)   (0.030) (0.010)     (0.020)  (0.022)  (0.010) (0.007)    (0.018) 
Price ofa: 
 IndoPalm        -0.391      0.161    0.008     -0.355**  0.653*** 0.050   -0.071**    -0.055                
                         (0.309)   (0.280) (0.081)    (0.125)  (0.150)  (0.047)  (0.026)    (0.097) 
 MalayPalm                    -0.166   -0.097     0.448***-0.431***-0.000    0.062**      0.024     
                                       (0.315)  (0.079)   (0.129)   (0.150)   (0.042) (0.024)    (0.097) 
 ROWPalm                                    0.043     0.095*   -0.049     0.011     0.004     -0.016 
                                                     (0.044)   (0.046)   (0.055)  (0.016)  (0.009)    (0.040)                                                                                                                 
 ArgSoy                                                      -0.403***  0.086     0.028   -0.033**    0.134** 
                                                                    (0.098)   (0.093)  (0.025)  (0.015)    (0.060) 
 BrazilSoy                                                                  -0.217    -0.028    0.021      -0.035 
                                                                                   (0.140)  (0.031)  (0.018)    (0.078) 
 U.S.Soy                                                                                  -0.056*** 0.010     -0.014                                                                                    
                                                                                                 (0.014)  (0.007)    (0.024) 
 ROWSoy                                                                                              -0.017**     0.024 
                                                                                                               (0.006)    (0.014) 
 Other Oil                                                                                                             - 0.063 
                                                                                                                              (0.077) 
Expenditureb   0.197**      0.419*** 0.010      0.206*** 0.047      0.043*   -0.012     0.090**                                                                                                                       
                       (0.074)      (0.071)  (0.023)    (0.047)  (0.051)   (0.023)  (0.016)   (0.040) 
I    Quarter      0.019         0.005   -0.020       0.034   -0.048      0.006    -0.009     0.012 
                       (0.050)      (0.047)  (0.016)    (0.032)  (0.035)   (0.015)  (0.011)   (0.028) 
III Quarter     -0.034        -0.028   -0.008       0.030     0.014    -0.000     0.000      0.026 
                       (0.046)      (0.044)  (0.015)     (0.030)  (0.032)  (0.015)   (0.010)   (0.026) 
IV Quarter     -0.086         0.140** -0.011      -0.049   -0.048     0.015    -0.009      0.047 
                       (0.053)      (0.049)  (0.017)     (0.034)  (0.037)  (0.016)   (0.011)   (0.028) 
ρ
c
                    -0.201** 
                       (0.086) 
                            
 
Notes: Single, double, and triple asterisks indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels respectively. 
Numbers in parentheses are standard errors.  
a
  Model price parameters are slutsky terms.  
b  
 Marginal budget shares calculated at the mean budget shares using expenditure parameters. 
c    Autocorrelation coefficient. 
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Table I-12. Marginal Budget Shares of Imported Edible Oils from the General 
Model, 1999 (I Quarter) through 2006 (III Quarter) 
 
Year                              Palm Oil                                   Soybean Oil 
                        Indo      Malay   ROW             Arg      Brazil     U.S.    ROW      Other Oil 
 
1999               0.079      0.569*** 0.001           0.142***  0.041   0.052**  0.003        0.113***   
 
Mean              0.224*** 0.410*** 0.004           0.207***  0.040   0.037*   -0.006        0.084**                 
 
2006a              0.296*** 0.269*** 0.004           0.304***  0.031   0.034*    -0.011       0.072**    
 
                                 
 
Note: Single, double, and triple asterisks indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels respectively. 
a
 Marginal  Budget Shares calculated using the average budget shares of first three quarters.
                           
 
 
 
Table I-13. Marginal Budget Shares and Own-Price Slutsky Terms from all the 
Models 
 
                                         Palm Oil                                Soybean Oil 
Model                   Indo      Malay   ROW        Arg       Brazil    U.S.     ROW     Other Oil 
 
 
Marginal Shares   
 
       General        0.224*** 0.410***   0.004        0.207***  0.040    0.037*     -0.006    0.084** 
       Rotterdam   0.234***  0.432*** -0.009        0.220***  0.038    0.044*     -0.009    0.051 
       NBR            0.234***  0.434***-0.009        0.216***   0.037   0.042*     -0.008    0.053 
       AIDS           0.201**   0.416***  0.010        0.206***   0.046   0.041*     -0.011    0.090**   
       CBS             0.197**   0.419***  0.010        0.206***   0.047   0.043*     -0.012    0.090**    
 
Slutsky Terms
                            
 
 
       General       -0.591*   -0.313     0.019       -0.437***-0.246* -0.061*** -0.028*** -0.088        
       Rotterdam   -0.726** -1.109**  0.025       -0.343*** -0.211  -0.053*** -0.016**   0.004    
       NBR           -0.758**  -1.098**  0.022       -0.361*** -0.216  -0.055*** -0.019*** -0.009    
       AIDS          -0.427     -0.131    0.038       -0.416*** -0.225  -0.059***  -0.020*** -0.075     
       CBS            -0.391     -0.166    0.043       -0.403*** -0.217  -0.056***  -0.017**  -0.063      
 
Note:  Single, double, and triple asterisks indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels respectively.  
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Table I-14. Expenditure Elasticities, and Slutsky and Cournot Price Elasticities 
from the General Model 
 
                                     Palm Oil                                Soybean Oil 
                            Indo     Malay    ROW       Arg      Brazil    U.S.     ROW       Other Oil 
 
Expenditure     0.598***  1.480*** 0.377       1.191***  0.717    2.590*  -0.525       1.020**                                                                                                                    
                         (0.171)   (0.275)   (2.208)    (0.279)   (0.917)  (1.329) (1.411)     (0.419)  
Slutsky:     
  
IndoPalm          -1.579*   0.852    -0.017      -0.731**  1.608*** 0.135    -0.118*     -0.150 
                          (0.769) (0.738)   (0.201)    (0.323)    (0.389) (0.108)   (0.064)    (0.233) 
MalayPalm         1.152  -1.129    -0.214       1.451*** -1.399** -0.044     0.186*    -0.002      
                          (0.998) (1.922)   (0.285)    (0.444)    (0.551)  (0.148)  (0.093)    (0.342)   
ROWPalm        -0.669   -6.110     1.973       8.854*    -5.892     1.222     0.320      0.302       
                          (7.751) (8.135)   (4.316)    (4.459)    (5.418)  (1.463)   (0.858)   (3.672) 
ArgSoy             -1.576** 2.313***  0.495*    -2.517***   0.451     0.154    -0.121     0.801**        
                         (0.698)  (0.761)   (0.249)    (0.563)    (0.539)   (0.133)  (0.091)   (0.313)  
BrazilSoy        10.688***-6.875** -1.015       1.390     -4.357*    -0.220     0.388     0.001 
                         (2.588)  (2.706)   (0.933)     (1.661)   (2.429)   (0.536)   (0.309)  (1.245) 
U.S.Soy             3.497   -0.837     0.821        1.850     -0.860    -4.233*** 0.365    -0.582 
                         (2.796)  (2.835)   (0.983)     (1.602)    (2.091)  (0.883)   (0.434)  (1.429) 
ROWSoy         -3.705*   4.307*     0.260      -1.750       1.825     0.441    -2.333*** 0.956               
                         (2.003)  (2.144)   (0.696)     (1.314)    (1.453)  (0.523)   (0.538)   (1.063)    
Other Oil           1.072   -0.008      0.036       1.690**    0.001    -0.102     0.139    -1.072       
                         (1.059)  (1.150)   (0.433)     (0.659)    (0.852)  (0.251)   (0.155)   (0.804)                                                                                                                               
Cournot:      
  
IndoPalm          -1.803** 0.686    -0.023      -0.835**  1.575***  0.126     -0.126*     -0.199 
                          (0.772) (0.739)   (0.201)    (0.325)   (0.390)    (0.108)   (0.064)    (0.233) 
MalayPalm         0.597  -1.539    -0.229       1.193** -1.483**   -0.065      0.169*    -0.124       
                          (1.003) (1.923)   (0.285)    (0.480)   (0.551)    (0.148)   (0.093)    (0.343)   
ROWPalm        -0.810   -6.214     1.969       8.789*   -5.913      1.216       0.316      0.271       
                         (7.795)  (8.158)   (4.316)    (4.475)   (5.419)   (1.463)     (0.858)   (3.676) 
ArgSoy             -2.022*** 1.983**  0.483*    -2.724***  0.384      0.137      -0.135     0.703**        
                         (0.705)  (0.765)   (0.249)    (0.565)   (0.539)    (0.133)    (0.090)   (0.313)  
BrazilSoy        10.419***-7.073** -1.022      1.265    -4.397*       -0.231       0.379    -0.058 
                          (2.611) (2.718)   (0.933)    (1.669)   (2.430)    (0.536)    (0.309)   (1.247) 
U.S.Soy             2.526   -1.554      0.796      1.400    -1.006     -4.270***   0.334     -0.796 
                          (2.840) (2.859)   (0.983)    (1.619)   (2.092)   (0.883)     (0.434)   (1.433) 
ROWSoy          -3.508   4.453*     0.265     -1.659      1.854      0.448      -2.326***  0.999               
                          (2.072) (2.179)   (0.696)   (1.337)   (1.456)    (0.523)     (0.539)    (1.070)    
Other Oil          -1.454   -0.290      0.026     1.512**  -0.057     -0.117       0.127      -1.155       
                         (1.071)  (1.156)   (0.433)   (0.663)   (0.853)    (0.251)     (0.155)    (0.804)      
 
Notes: Single, double, and triple asterisks indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels respectively. 
Numbers in parentheses are standard errors.  
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Table I-15. Expenditure Elasticities, and Slutsky and Cournot Price Elasticities 
from the Rotterdam Model 
 
                                     Palm Oil                                Soybean Oil 
                            Indo     Malay    ROW       Arg      Brazil    U.S.     ROW      Other Oil 
 
Expenditure     0.624***  1.562*** -0.911       1.265***  0.669    3.030*  -0.772       0.618                                                                              
                         (0.162)    (0.348)   (2.101)    (0.328)   (0.875)  (1.544) (1.420)     (0.486)  
Slutsky:     
  
IndoPalm          -1.937** 2.221**  -0.500**   -0.754**  1.517*** 0.079     -0.111*    -0.514* 
                          (0.880) (0.878)   (0.204)    (0.342)   (0.402)  (0.113)   (0.063)    (0.246) 
MalayPalm        3.004**-4.006**   0.423       1.570**  -1.398** 0.025     0.164         0.217      
                          (1.187) (1.473)   (0.315)    (0.607)   (0.617)  (0.184)   (0.112)    (0.408)   
ROWPalm      -19.273**12.073     2.593       3.199     -1.560    1.420    -0.525       2.073       
                          (7.860) (8.972)   (3.925)    (4.378)    (5.027)  (1.483)   (0.827)    (3.585) 
ArgSoy             -1.629** 2.504**   0.179       -1.973***   0.200     0.163    -0.074      0.628*        
                         (0.738)  (0.968)   (0.244)    (0.640)    (0.552)   (0.164)  (0.101)    (0.358)  
BrazilSoy        10.079***-6.867** -0.269       0.616     -3.740      -0.390     0.369      0.201 
                         (2.668)  (3.030)   (0.866)     (1.700)   (2.280)   (0.545)   (0.302)   (1.316) 
U.S.Soy             2.061    0.478      0.954       1.960     -1.521    -3.637*** 0.602     -0.899 
                         (2.935)  (3.530)   (0.997)     (1.966)    (2.125)  (1.128)   (0.500)   (1.717) 
ROWSoy         -3.485*   3.801     -0.426      -1.076      1.737      0.727    -1.335**    0.057               
                         (1.971)  (2.589)   (0.671)     (1.461)   (1.420)   (0.603)   (0.530)   (1.219)    
Other Oil          -2.340*   0.730     0.244       1.325*      0.138    -0.158     0.008      0.052       
                         (1.120)  (1.371)   (0.423)     (0.754)    (0.901)  (0.301)   (0.177)   (0.925)                                                                                                                               
Cournot:      
  
IndoPalm          -2.171** 2.048**  -0.506**  -0.863**   1.482***  0.070     -0.119*     -0.566** 
                          (0.883) (0.879)   (0.204)    (0.343)   (0.402)   (0.113)    (0.063)    (0.247) 
MalayPalm         2.419* -4.438*** 0.408       1.299** -1.486**    0.002      0.146        0.088       
                          (1.194) (1.476)   (0.315)    (0.610)   (0.617)    (0.184)   (0.112)    (0.409)   
ROWPalm       -18.932**12.325    2.602      3.357      -1.508       1.433    -0.514       2.148       
                          (7.899) (8.911)   (3.925)    (4.393)   (5.028)   (1.484)     (0.828)   (3.589) 
ArgSoy             -2.101** 2.154**   0.167      -2.193***  0.129      0.145      -0.089      0.524       
                         (0.748)  (0.972)   (0.244)    (0.642)   (0.552)    (0.164)    (0.101)   (0.359)  
BrazilSoy          9.829***-7.052** -0.275      0.500     -3.778        -0.399      0.361       0.146 
                         (2.666)  (3.040)   (0.866)    (1.706)   (2.280)    (0.545)    (0.302)    (1.318) 
U.S.Soy             0.926   -0.361      0.925      1.434    -1.692      -3.681***  0.566      -1.148 
                          (2.991)  (3.556)  (0.997)    (1.984)   (2.127)   (1.129)     (0.500)     (1.721) 
ROWSoy          -3.195    4.015     -0.418     -0.941      1.781      0.738      -1.326**     0.121               
                          (2.041)  (2.618)  (0.671)    (1.482)   (1.422)   (0.603)     (0.531)     (1.225)    
Other Oil          -2.570**  0.558     0.238      1.218      0.103     -0.167       0.001        0.001       
                         (1.134)  (1.378)   (0.423)    (0.759)   (0.901)    (0.301)    (0.178)     (0.926)      
 
Notes: Single, double, and triple asterisks indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels respectively. 
Numbers in parentheses are standard errors.  
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Table I-16. Expenditure Elasticities, and Slutsky and Cournot Price Elasticities 
from the NBR Model 
 
                                      Palm Oil                                Soybean Oil 
                            Indo     Malay    ROW       Arg      Brazil    U.S.     ROW        Other Oil 
 
Expenditure     0.624***  1.567*** -0.943       1.247***  0.663    2.931*  -0.648      0.647                                                                                                             
                         (0.156)   (0.345)   (2.060)     (0.325)   (0.878) (1.461)  (1.428)    (0.460)  
Slutsky:     
  
IndoPalm          -2.023** 2.240**  -0.497**   -0.737**  1.514*** 0.085    -0.097*     -0.484* 
                          (0.842) (0.841)   (0.197)    (0.333)    (0.394) (0.109)   (0.061)    (0.236) 
MalayPalm        3.030**-3.966**   0.422       1.569**  -1.393** 0.008     0.161        0.168      
                          (1.137) (1.426)   (0.307)    (0.596)    (0.608)  (0.178)  (0.111)    (0.393)   
ROWPalm      -19.166**12.044     2.223       3.441      -1.826    1.382    -0.506      2.410       
                          (7.612) (8.756)   (3.883)    (4.337)    (5.027)  (1.452)   (0.818)   (3.502) 
ArgSoy             -1.589** 2.503**   0.192       -2.081***   0.193     0.165    -0.065     0.683*        
                         (0.719)  (0.950)   (0.242)    (0.631)    (0.552)   (0.157)  (0.100)   (0.344)  
BrazilSoy        10.059***-6.841** -0.314       0.595     -3.837      -0.299     0.374     0.264 
                         (2.618)  (2.987)   (0.866)     (1.700)   (2.296)   (0.541)   (0.303)  (1.283) 
U.S.Soy             2.198    0.146      0.929       1.978     -1.167    -3.790*** 0.527    -0.820 
                         (2.831)  (3.413)   (0.976)    (1.890)    (2.111)  (1.059)   (0.482)   (1.627) 
ROWSoy         -3.047     3.732     -0.410      -0.948      1.762      0.636    -1.617*** -0.108              
                         (1.921)  (2.564)   (0.663)     (1.453)   (1.428)   (0.581)   (0.534)   (1.169)    
Other Oil          -2.204*   0.566     0.284       1.440*      0.181    -0.144    -0.016     -0.108       
                         (1.072)  (1.320)  (0.413)     (0.726)    (0.878)   (0.285)   (0.170)   (0.877)                                                                                                                               
Cournot:      
  
IndoPalm          -2.257** 2.067**  -0.503**  -0.845**   1.479***  0.076     -0.105      -0.536** 
                          (0.844) (0.842)   (0.197)    (0.334)   (0.394)   (0.109)    (0.061)    (0.236) 
MalayPalm         2.443**-4.340*** 0.407      1.297**  -1.481**  -0.015       0.143       0.039       
                          (1.144) (1.429)   (0.307)    (0.599)   (0.608)   (0.178)    (0.111)    (0.394)   
ROWPalm       -18.813**12.305    2.232      3.604      -1.772     1.396      -0.495       2.487       
                          (7.651) (8.774)   (3.884)    (4.351)   (5.028)   (1.453)     (0.818)   (3.506) 
ArgSoy             -2.056** 2.158**   0.180      -2.298***  0.123      0.147      -0.080      0.580       
                         (0.729)  (0.954)   (0.242)    (0.634)   (0.552)   (0.157)     (0.100)   (0.345)  
BrazilSoy          9.811***-7.025** -0.321      0.479    -3.874        -0.309       0.366      0.209 
                         (2.639)  (2.997)   (0.866)    (1.706)   (2.296)   (0.541)     (0.304)   (1.285) 
U.S.Soy             1.100    -0.666    0.900       1.469    -1.332     -3.833***   0.492     -1.061 
                          (2.884)  (3.437)  (0.976)    (1.907)   (2.113)   (1.059)     (0.482)   (1.631) 
ROWSoy          -2.804    3.911     -0.404     -0.834      1.798      0.645      -1.609*** -0.055               
                          (1.994)  (2.594)  (0.663)    (1.474)   (1.430)   (0.582)     (0.534)    (1.175)    
Other Oil          -2.446**  0.387     0.278      1.328 *     0.144     -0.153      -0.023    -0.161  
                         (1.086)  (1.326)   (0.413)    (0.731)   (0.878)   (0.285)     (0.170)    (0.878)      
Notes: Single, double, and triple asterisks indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels respectively. 
Numbers in parentheses are standard errors.  
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Table I-17. Expenditure Elasticities, and Slutsky and Cournot Price Elasticities 
from the AIDS Model 
 
                                      Palm Oil                                Soybean Oil 
                            Indo     Malay    ROW       Arg      Brazil    U.S.     ROW        Other Oil 
 
Expenditure     0.537**   1.503*** 1.033       1.188***  0.808    2.834*  -0.896       1.098**                                                                                                                   
                         (0.194)   (0.256)   (2.380)    (0.265)   (0.921) (1.488)  (1.369)     (0.457)  
Slutsky:     
  
IndoPalm          -1.141    0.408      0.056      -0.918**   1.745*** 0.147    -0.179**    -0.118 
                          (0.808) (0.728)   (0.213)    (0.330)    (0.400) (0.122)   (0.068)    (0.253) 
MalayPalm        0.552   -0.474     -0.379      1.589*** -1.537** -0.026     0.221**     0.055      
                          (0.984) (1.114)   (0.282)    (0.458)    (0.541)  (0.150)  (0.088)    (0.342)   
ROWPalm         2.160  -10.821    3.888     10.447**    -5.835    1.086     0.520     -1.444       
                          (8.200) (8.045)   (4.574)    (4.635)    (5.676) (1.576)   (0.916)    (3.956) 
ArgSoy             -1.980**  2.534*** 0.584**    -2.397***   0.485    0.157    -0.179*     0.797**        
                         (0.712)  (0.730)   (0.259)    (0.551)    (0.536)  (0.138)  (0.086)    (0.328)  
BrazilSoy        11.592***-7.552** -1.005       1.494     -3.998     -0.389     0.378     -0.520 
                         (2.661)  (2.657)   (0.977)     (1.650)   (2.494)  (0.552)   (0.312)   (1.341) 
U.S.Soy             3.800   -0.497      0.730       1.890     -1.519    -4.058***0.594    - 0.940 
                         (3.157)  (2.866)   (1.059)     (1.654)    (2.153)  (0.983)  (0.462)   (1.579) 
ROWSoy         -5.593**   5.117 **   0.422      -2.602*     1.777     0.716   -1.685***   1.849              
                         (2.138)  (2.038)   (0.742)     (1.244)   (1.470)   (0.557)  (0.494)    (1.111)    
Other Oil          -0.534    0.184     -0.170       1.682**   -0.356    -0.165     0.275     -0.908       
                         (1.149)  (1.149)   (0.466)     (0.692)    (0.918)  (0.277)   (0.162)   (0.877)                                                                               
Cournot:      
  
IndoPalm          -1.342    0.259     0.050       -1.011*** 1.714***  0.139     -0.185**   -0.162 
                          (0.811) (0.730)  (0.213)     (0.332)   (0.401)   (0.122)    (0.068)   (0.253) 
MalayPalm        -0.011  -0.891    -0.393       1.328**   -1.622**   -0.048      0.203 ** -0.069       
                          (0.989) (1.116)  (0.282)    (0.460)   (0.541)    (0.150)    (0.088)   (0.342)   
ROWPalm          1.773 -11.107    3.878      10.267**-5.893      1.070       0.508    -1.529       
                          (8.248) (8.072)   (4.574)    (4.654)   (5.677)   (1.576)    (0.916)   (3.960) 
ArgSoy             -2.425*** 2.205*** 0.572**   -2.604***  0.418      0.140     -0.194**   0.700**       
                         (0.719)  (0.734)   (0.259)    (0.552)   (0.536)   (0.138)    (0.086)   (0.329)  
BrazilSoy        11.289***-7.775** -1.013       1.354    -4.043        -0.401      0.368    -0.587 
                         (2.683)  (2.670)   (0.977)    (1.658)   (2.495)    (0.552)    (0.312)  (1.343) 
U.S.Soy             2.739   -1.282     0.702       1.398    -1.679      -4.099***  0.560    -1.173 
                         (3.205)  (2.895)  (1.059)    (1.675)  (2.154)    (0.983)     (0.462)    (1.583) 
ROWSoy          -5.257**  5.365**   0.430     -2.447*    1.828      0.729      -1.675***  1.923               
                          (2.198)  (2.073)  (0.725)    (1.267)   (1.472)   (0.557)     (0.494)   (1.116)    
Other Oil          -0.946** -0.120    -0.181      1.491**  -0.418     -0.181       0.262    -0.999  
                         (1.161)  (1.156)   (0.466)    (0.697)   (0.918)   (0.277)     (0.162)   (0.878)      
                           
 
Notes: Single, double, and triple asterisks indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels respectively. 
Numbers in parentheses are standard errors.  
 58 
Table I-18. Expenditure Elasticities, and Slutsky and Cournot Price Elasticities 
from the CBS Model 
 
                                      Palm Oil                                Soybean Oil 
                            Indo     Malay    ROW       Arg      Brazil    U.S.     ROW        Other Oil 
 
Expenditure     0.526**   1.512*** 1.023       1.188***  0.838    2.995*   -1.024       1.092**                                                                                                                   
                         (0.196)   (0.255)  (2.400)     (0.271)   (0.908) (1.578)  (1.361)     (0.486)  
Slutsky:     
  
IndoPalm          -1.043     0.429      0.022      -0.947**   1.743*** 0.132    -0.190**    -0.146 
                          (0.826) (0.747)   (0.215)    (0.335)    (0.400) (0.125)   (0.069)     (0.260) 
MalayPalm         0.580  -0.599     -0.351      1.617*** -1.556***-0.001    0.223**      0.088      
                          (1.010) (1.136)   (0.284)    (0.466)    (0.540)  (0.152)  (0.088)     (0.350)   
ROWPalm         0.867  -10.016    4.435       9.743*     -5.053    1.172     0.449       -1.599       
                          (8.292) (8.097)  (4.563)     (4.708)    (5.666) (1.607)   (0.922)     (4.069) 
ArgSoy             -2.043** 2.578*** 0.545**     -2.318***   0.494    0.161    -0.190**     0.773**        
                         (0.722)  (0.743)  (0.263)     (0.565)    (0.539)  (0.145)  (0.088)     (0.346)  
BrazilSoy        11.579***-7.645***-0.870      1.523     -3.843     -0.498     0.381       -0.626 
                         (2.661)  (2.654)   (0.976)     (1.660)   (2.476)  (0.557)   (0.310)   ( 1.386) 
U.S.Soy             3.432   -0.026      0.787       1.938     -1.945    -3.884***0.672     - 0.973 
                         (3.240)  (2.914)   (1.080)     (1.744)    (2.174)  (1.059)  (0.482)    (1.689) 
ROWSoy         -5.944**   5.162 **  0.364      -2.754**    1.793     0.811   -1.403**      1.972              
                         (2.146)  (2.038)   (0.747)     (1.269)   (1.461)   (0.581)  (0.495)    (1.177)    
Other Oil          -0.666    0.297     -0.188       1.631**   -0.429    -0.171    0.287      -0.759       
                         (1.183) (1.177)    (0.480)     (0.729)    (0.948)  (0.296)  (0.171)    (0.939)                                                                                                            
Cournot:      
  
IndoPalm          -1.240    0.284     0.017       -1.038*** 1.713***  0.125     -0.196**    -0.190 
                          (0.829) (0.749)  (0.215)     (0.337)   (0.401)   (0.125)    (0.069)    (0.261) 
MalayPalm         0.014  -1.019     -0.366       1.354*** -1.641*** -0.023      0.205 **   -0.036       
                          (1.015) (1.139)  (0.284)    (0.468)    (0.540)   (0.152)    (0.088)    (0.351)   
ROWPalm          0.484 -10.299    4.425       9.566*    -5.110      1.157       0.436      -1.683       
                          (8.341) (8.124)   (4.563)    (4.726)   (5.667)   (1.607)    (0.922)    (4.074) 
ArgSoy             -2.488*** 2.249*** 0.533*     -2.525***  0.427      0.144     -0.204**    0.675*       
                         (0.729)  (0.747)   (0.263)    (0.567)   (0.539)   (0.145)    (0.088)    (0.346)  
BrazilSoy        11.265***-7.877***-0.878      1.377     -3.890       -0.511      0.371     -0.695 
                         (2.683)  (2.666)   (0.976)    (1.668)    (2.477)   (0.557)    (0.311)   (1.387) 
U.S.Soy             2.310   -0.856     0.758       1.418     -2.114     -3.927***  0.636     -1.220 
                          (3.293) (2.947)   (1.080)    (1.766)   (2.175)   (1.059)     (0.482)   (1.694) 
ROWSoy          -5.560** 5.445**    0.374     -2.576*     1.851      0.825      -1.391**   2.056               
                          (2.206)  (2.072)  (0.747)    (1.291)   (1.463)   (0.582)     (0.495)   (1.183)    
Other Oil          -1.075** -0.006    -0.199      1.441*    -0.490     -0.187      0.274     -0.849  
                         (1.197)  (1.184)   (0.480)    (0.733)   (0.949)    (0.296)    (0.171)   (0.940)      
                           
 
Note: Single, double, and triple asterisks indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels respectively. 
Numbers in parentheses are standard errors.  
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Table I-19. Expenditure Elasticities and Own-Price Slutsky and Cournot Elasticities 
from all the Models 
 
                                          Palm Oil                              Soybean Oil 
Model                   Indo      Malay   ROW        Arg       Brazil    U.S.     ROW     Other Oil 
 
Expenditure 
 
       General        0.598***  1.480*** 0.377        1.191*** 0.717   2.590*     -0.525      1.020**        
       Rotterdam   0.624***  1.562***-0.911        1.265*** 0.669   3.030*    -0.772      0.618    
       NBR            0.624***  1.567***-0.943        1.247*** 0.663   2.931*    -0.648      0.647   
       AIDS           0.537**   1.503***  1.033        1.188*** 0.808   2.834*    -0.896      1.098**     
       CBS             0.526**   1.512***  1.023        1.188***  0.838   2.995*    -1.024      1.092**      
 
Slutsky 
 
       General       -1.579*   -1.129       1.973       -2.517*** -4.357* -4.233*** -2.333*** -1.072 
       Rotterdam  -1.937**  -4.006**   2.593       -1.973*** -3.740  -3.637*** -1.335**   0.052 
       NBR           -2.023** -3.966**    2.223       -2.081*** -3.837  -3.790*** -1.617***  -0.108 
       AIDS          -1.141    -0.474      3.888       -2.397*** -3.998  -4.058*** -1.685*** -0.908   
       CBS            -1.043    -0.599      4.433       -2.318***-3.843   -3.884*** -1.403**  -0.759    
 
 
Cournot 
 
       General       -1.803** -1.539        1.969       -2.724***  -4.397* -4.270*** -2.326*** -1.155 
       Rotterdam   -2.171**-4.438***  2.602       -2.193*** -3.778   -3.681*** -1.326**   0.001 
       NBR           -2.257** -4.340***  2.232       -2.298*** -3.874   -3.833*** -1.609*** -0.161 
       AIDS          -1.342    -0.891      3.878       -2.604*** -4.043   -4.099*** -1.675*** -0.999   
       CBS            -1.240    -1.019      4.425       -2.525*** -3.890   -3.927*** -1.391**  -0.849    
 
Note: Single, double, and triple asterisks indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels respectively.  
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Model Specifications and Theoretical Restrictions 
  
                                                                                               Restriction 
   
Model                                                           Adding Up          Homogeneity       Symmetry              
 
Rotterdam 
wih d log qih=θih d log Q + ∑j ∑k πih jk d log pjk          ∑i ∑h θih = 1,         ∑j ∑k πih jk = 0        πih jk =  πjk ih  
                                                                             ∑i ∑h πihjk= 0                                                                                                                       
CBS    
wih (d log qih - d log Q )= βih d log Q                    ∑i ∑h βih = 0,         ∑j ∑k πih jk = 0       πih jk =  πjk ih 
 
                                       + ∑j ∑k πih jk d log pjk      ∑i ∑h πihjk =0                                  
 
 
AIDS   
dwih = βih d log Q  + ∑j ∑k λih jk d log pjk               ∑i ∑h βih = 0,          ∑j ∑k λih jk = 0       λih jk =  λjk ih   
                
                                                                             ∑i ∑h λih jk=0                                       
 
NBR 
dwih + wihd log Q  = θih d log Q                            ∑i ∑h θih = 1,          ∑j ∑k λih jk = 0       λih jk =  λjk ih   
 
                                + ∑j ∑k λih jk d log pjk             ∑i ∑h λih jk =0                                    
 
General 
wih d log qih =  dih d log Q  + δ1 wih d log Q         ∑i∑h dih = 1- δ1,   ∑j ∑k eih jk = 0    eih jk =  ejk ih 
                          + ∑j ∑k eih jk d log pjk                  ∑i ∑h eih jk =0   
                                    
   +δ2 (d log pih -d log P)           
      Notes:  Intercepts and seasonal dummy variables are not included. 
θih = wih + βih , λih jk  = πih jk + wih δih jk - wihwjk , dih = δ1 βih+(1- δ1) θih , and   
      eih jk = (1+ δ2) πih jk -δ2 λih jk .        
      where θih is the marginal budget share, and πih jk  is the compensated price effect  
      (Slutsky term). 
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Abstract 
In the United States, producers of ground beef use attributes like taste, nutritional content, 
processing techniques, and origin of production to differentiate their products. Some 
studies in psychology, marketing, and economics suggest that increasing the number of 
choices in the name of product differentiation might affect consumers’ utility in a 
negative way. Some studies also suggest that the impact of an increase in number of 
choices on an individual’s utility depends on his/her personal characteristics.   
        This study is intended to determine consumers’ willingness to pay for ground beef 
attributes; including traceability certified by the U.S. Government or a private company, 
humane production technique, certified natural beef, and fat content. This study is also 
intended to determine the impact of an increase in the number of ground beef choices on 
consumers’ utility. The impact of personal characteristics on the effect of number of 
choices on consumers’ utility is also considered.  A nationwide survey was conducted to 
elicit consumers’ preferences.  
      Results indicate that consumers are willing to pay more for traceability certified by 
the U.S. Government than any other ground beef attribute considered in this study. The 
results also show that an increase in the number of ground beef choices beyond a 
threshold level has a negative impact on consumers’ utility and that impact depends on 
consumers’ individual characteristics. 
 
Keywords: Willingness-to-pay for ground beef attributes, excessive choice effect, 
maximizers-satisficers.  
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Introduction 
In the United States food producers differentiate their products using various quality 
attributes like taste, nutritional content, processing techniques, and origin of production 
(Golan et al. 2004). Although consumers can detect some characteristics like taste, they 
cannot detect some credence characteristics like processing techniques, impact on 
environment, and origin of production (Golan et al. 2004). Producers have been using 
labeling, both mandatory and voluntary, to send signals to consumers regarding these 
credence attributes.  
 Product labels allow food retailers to differentiate beef products. To the extent 
that consumer demand is heterogeneous, this allows retailers to display a variety of 
products consistent with differences in beef demand. In the case of ground beef, retailers 
frequently differentiate beef by its fat content, as some consumers prefer the taste a 
higher fat content adds while others avoid fat due to health concerns. Other beef 
attributes that are receiving increased attention are natural beef, animal welfare concerns, 
and traceability.  
 Traceable beef refers to a beef production and marketing process by which all 
retail products can be traced back to where the meat was processed, the animal was 
harvested, and all the farms on which the animal was raised. The outbreak of BSE, also 
known as Mad Cow Disease, in 2003 has made the development of U.S. beef traceability 
systems an important issue to both consumers and policy makers. Outbreaks of BSE can 
easily be prevented by monitoring cattle feed. However, a single producer could possibly 
reduce their production costs by using unsafe feeding practices, threatening the health of 
consumers. Food safety is consumers’ number one meat issue, outweighing concerns 
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about farm profitability and animal welfare (Norwood, Lusk, and Prickett 2007).  
Without traceability programs these producers could not be detected and punished. Thus, 
the likelihood of unsafe made is reduced by purchasing meat that is traceable.  A tracing 
system, of course, would raise costs. However, as long as consumers will pay a premium 
commensurate with these costs for meat labeled traceable, differentiating beef by 
traceability could enhance profits. 
            Animal and meat traceability systems are the two different sets of traceability 
systems in the livestock/meat industry (Golan et al. 2004). The animal traceability system 
would allow the animal to be traced back to where it has been during its life. The three 
important reasons for livestock owners to implement animal traceability systems are to 
prevent theft or loss, to control or eradicate diseases like BSE, and to increase the value 
of their animals by maintaining the records of credence attributes like feeding practices, 
animal welfare, and proper medical care (Golan et al. 2004).  A voluntary National 
Animal Identification System (NAIS) was initiated in 2004 by USDA to help producers 
and animal health officials to respond to the outbreak of animal disease such as BSE 
effectively (USDA-APHIS 2007). This program would allow animals to be traced back to 
where they have been and what other animals have been in contact with them (USDA-
APHIS 2007). There has been a debate on whether this system should be made 
mandatory (Loureiro and Umberger 2007). Some groups representing livestock industry 
are against making this program mandatory as they are concerned about the increased 
cost this would impose on the producers and also about the confidentiality of the data. 
Consumer advocacy groups want to make this program mandatory as they believe this 
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would protect the consumers from animal disease such as BSE and also would help to 
maintain their confidence in beef.  
          The meat traceability system, which would allow the tracking of meat from 
retailers back to the slaughters/processors, was developed to effectively manage supply 
chain, and to maintain safety and quality (Golan et al. 2004). Almost all the meat is 
currently traceable to processor/slaughter as they are required to carry the USDA 
inspection numbers on the labels (Golan et al. 2004).  As animal diseases like BSE can 
cause human health problems, a strong motivation exists to link animal and meat 
traceability systems (Golan et al. 2004). By linking these two systems meat products can 
be traced back to the farms where the animals were raised. As consumers consider food 
safety to be very important, some producers may try to pass on the standard meat 
products as traceable to sell their products at a premium. Given the fact that traceability is 
a credence attribute consumers can not determine if the claim on traceability is genuine.  
For the market to function efficiently, the signals on credence attributes like traceability 
must be credible. Consumers may trust traceability certified by a public agency more than 
a private company.  
 The concept of natural foods is leading to many changes at the grocery store shelf.  
What constitutes “natural” food is not yet clear, but for consumers it likely refers to the 
employment of agricultural production practices similar to what would be considered 
“traditional” practices. For example, allowing animals to breed naturally in a field would 
be considered natural, whereas cloning of animals is not. Some consumers would 
consider meat from cattle administered growth hormones and antibiotics to also be 
unnatural. Mad Cow disease, mentioned above, was the result of feeding sheep parts to 
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cattle, which certainly is not natural. Processing also plays an important role in what is 
considered natural. Meat taken directly from a carcass with no further processing would 
be considered natural. Meat cured with nitrates and sanitized by irradiation would not. 
 As far as meat is concerned, the label “natural” meat usually means that the meat 
has undergone minimal processing, and has little to do with how the animal itself was 
raised or treated. There is one exception: natural beef usually implies the animal was fed 
a strictly vegetarian diet. That is, the natural label provides more information about what 
happened after the animal was slaughtered then when the animal was alive. Ground beef 
labeled natural more often than not means simply that the meat was taken from the 
carcass, ground with beef fat, without any chemicals or preservatives. In some cases it 
also refers to the absence of growth hormones and (sub therapeutic) antibiotic use. 
           The issue of animal welfare has been a point of debate between animal welfare 
activists and livestock industry groups for a long time (Norwood, Lusk, and Prickett 
2007). While animal welfare groups argue that modern production practices like the use 
of gestation crates are unethical and inhumane, industry groups argue that they make sure 
that animals are treated humanely by following scientifically proven practices (Norwood, 
Lusk, and Pickett 2007). To cater the needs of consumers who care about animal welfare, 
industry has started to sell meat products with animal welfare assurance labels (Martin 
2006). Although consumers consider “animal welfare” issue to be important, they 
consider it as less important relative to food safety, food prices, and financial well-being 
of farmers (Norwood, Lusk, and Prickett 2007). However, they are of the opinion that 
farms that treat animals humanely would also produce safer meat (Norwood, Lusk, and 
Prickett 2007).   
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        Sales of organic meat have increases by 140 percent from 2004 to 2006 (Mintel 
2006). The number of cows that are raised to produce organic beef has increased by 97.3 
percent from 2000 to 2003 (Mintel 2006). Organic beef reflects the three previous 
attributes; it is traceable; undergoes minimum processing and was fed a vegetarian diet 
and is therefore natural; and requires the producer to implement practices to ensure high 
animal welfare standards. Organic beef sells at an average premium of about 50 percent 
(Beef Retail Marketing 2007). 
 Given the large premium of organic beef, many retailers may want to provide a 
beef with only some of the attributes of organic beef. This may be traceable beef, natural 
beef, guaranteed humane beef, or any combination of these three attributes. To determine 
what type of premium should be set for this differentiated beef, the value of each three 
attributes must be estimated. Indeed, one of the objectives of this research is to measure 
the value consumers place on traceable beef, natural beef, and guaranteed humane beef, 
relative to traditional ground beef. 
 In food markets where consumers exhibit remarkably differing tastes, food 
retailers may consider selling a large number of ground beef varieties. Indeed, most 
economic models of demand would suggest that increasing product variety can only 
enhance, and would never detract from, profits. The reason is that these models 
universally predict that increasing product variety can only increase the probability of a 
purchase and the number of units purchased. However, prior research in psychology, 
economics, and marketing suggests that increasing product variety can have an adverse 
effect on consumer demand (Malhotra 1982; Iyengar and Lepper 2000; Iyengar, Jiang, 
and Huberman 2004). This adverse effect is termed here as an excessive-choice effect. 
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  If  consumers are provided with unlimited options, then there is a possibility that 
they might get confused with all the information and would end up either postponing the 
decision or not choosing any option at all (Iyengar and Lepper 2000; Schwartz 2000). 
Thus, product differentiation strategies must design varieties that appeal to different 
consumer types, without overburdening them with an excessive number of options. 
Marketing research has devoted a majority of effort on the former while neglecting the 
latter. Standard theoretical and empirical models do not account for the excessive-choice 
effect, and therefore may lead to unprofitable marketing strategies. 
 This study is concerned with consumer demand for traceable, natural, and 
guaranteed humane beef. Results of the study will help food retailers decide whether 
increasing the variety of ground beef placed for sale is in their best interest, and if it is, 
the premium that should be placed on these new varieties. Given that the excessive-
choice effect could dampen the profitability of increasing ground beef variety, it is 
important to understand at what point the excessive-choice effect may be realized and the 
magnitude of its effect on consumer demand. While it may be that some consumers do 
prefer beef differentiated according to a particular attribute, and will pay more for that 
attribute, the demand boost due the introduction of that variety could be offset by the 
excessive-choice effect. The excessive-choice effect refers to preferences for choice-set 
size. What is the optimal number of varieties from the consumers’ point-of-view, how 
does increasing variety beyond this point affect overall demand. Measuring preferences 
for choice set size is the second objective of this study. 
 The excessive-choice effect is a new phenomenon to economics and marketing.  
There are really only two things known regarding this effect. The first is that increasing 
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variety can reduce overall demand. The second is that consumers display differences in 
how they respond to increased product variety, and these differences are best described 
by the personality characteristics called maximizer and satisfizer. People who always 
look for the best outcome, referred to as maximizers, tend to get confused more than 
those who look for the “good enough” outcome, called satisficers. Psychologists have 
developed a multi-item survey that measures a person’s personality in relation to their 
shopping behavior. Two extremes of personalities are satisficers and maximizers, and this 
survey provides a numerical score indicating where one resides on the satisficer-
maximizer personality spectrum (Schwartz et al. 2002). 
 In the future, economists and marketing researchers will be interested in how 
satisficers and maximizers differ, their proportion of the population, and how to create 
marketing strategies to exploit personality differences. It would be useful if the satisficer-
maximizer personality survey could be used in conjunction with standard economic 
models. This question constitutes the third objective.  It is achieved by determining if 
individuals’ score on the psychometric scale can explain differences in preferences for 
choice set size.   
 The three aforementioned objectives are achieved using ground beef as a case 
study. Consumer demand is measured using hypothetical choice experiments and 
standard discrete choice models. Two different samples of subjects were used. One was 
recruited via mail surveys, and is representative of the U.S. population but subject to non-
response bias. The other is not subject to non-response bias but is biased towards one 
particular region. 
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Literature Review 
Differentiated Beef 
A number of studies have highlighted consumer preferences for certain beef attributes.  
For example, Dickson and Bailey (2002), using experimental auctions, found that 
consumers  in Utah were willing to pay for meat (beef and pork) attributes like 
“traceability,” “humane production processes,” “no growth hormones,” and “safety 
assurances.” They found that consumers considered food safety as the most important 
attribute. Furthermore, the results of their study indicated that it would be profitable to 
develop traceability, transparency, and extra assurances in the United States. 
        Loureiro and Umberger (2003), using a survey, found that consumers in Colorado 
were very concerned about the source of origin and were willing to pay for mandatory 
COOL program. They also found that consumers were willing to pay for steak and 
hamburger with label “U.S. Certified beef.” In another study the same authors, using a 
nationwide mail survey, found that U.S. consumers were willing to pay for steak 
attributes such as traceability, country of origin label (COOL), food safety, and 
tenderness. They found that consumers valued food safety as the most important attribute. 
Also, they found that consumers were willing to pay more for COOL than for traceability 
(Loureiro and Umberger 2007).  
       Hobbs et al. (2005), using experimental auctions, found that Canadian consumers 
were willing to pay for beef and pork with assurances on traceability, food safety, and 
animal welfare. They found that consumers were willing to pay more for the assurance on 
food safety than for the other attributes. They also found that consumers valued 
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traceability more when it was combined with other attributes such as food safety and 
animal welfare.  
       Grannis and Thilmany (2000), using a survey, found that consumers living in 
intermountain region of Colarado, Utah, and New Mexico perceived “no use of 
antibiotics” and “hormone free” as important drivers of beef demand. Lusk and Fox 
(2002), using a nationwide mail survey, found that U.S. consumers were willing to pay 
for a mandatory labeling program that would inform them whether the beef was from 
cattle produced using growth hormones or fed genetically modified food. They also 
found that consumers valued information regarding the beef from cattle produced with 
growth hormones more than the ones regarding the beef from cattle fed genetically 
modified corn.  
      Lusk, Roosen, and Fox (2003), using a mail survey, found that consumers in France, 
Germany, UK, and U.S. were willing to pay for beef steak from cattle raised without 
growth hormones, and not fed genetically modified corn. They found that consumers in 
France were willing to pay more for beef from cattle produced without growth hormones 
than those in the U.S. However, according to their study, consumers in Germany, and 
U.K. were willing to pay the same amount for the beef without growth hormones as those 
in the U.S. They also found that consumers in France, Germany, and U.K. were willing to 
pay more for beef from cattle not fed genetically modified corn than those in the U.S. 
Their study showed that consumers in U.S. were willing to pay a lot more for “hormone-
free” beef than for “GM-free” beef.  
            Onyango and Govindasamy (2005), using a nationwide telephone survey, found 
that U.S. consumers were willing to pay for ground beef produced from cows fed with 
 73 
less antibiotics. Also, they found that consumers expected compensation to purchase 
ground beef that was the product of a genetic modification involving animal and 
bacterium genes. 
    Steiner and Young (2007), using a web-based survey, found that consumers in Alberta 
and Montana were willing to pay for beef steak that carried labels such as “tested BSE,” 
“GM-free,” and “hormone-free.” They used a pooled sample of consumers in Alberta and 
Montana for their study as they determined that the preferences of consumers in those 
two regions were homogenous. They found that consumers were willing to pay more for 
beef steak with label “tested BSE” than for the one with label “GM-free,” or “hormone-
free.” They also found that consumers were willing to pay more for beef steak with label 
“hormone-free” than for the one with label “GM-free.” 
     Norwood, Lusk, and Prickett (2007), using a nationwide telephone survey, found that 
U.S. consumers valued food safety as the most important attribute. They found that 
consumers considered animal welfare to be less important than food safety, food prices, 
and financial well-being of U.S. farmers. 
 These studies show that consumers value food safety to be very important and 
they are willing to pay for quality assurances. These studies also demonstrate that product 
differentiation of beef could increase beef demand.  Consumer sects concerned about 
antibiotic use, hormone use, animal welfare, or other beef production practices may 
increase their beef consumption if products like natural beef, traceable beef, and certified 
humane were available.  Indeed, the growing prevalence of such products supports this 
claim.   
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        Natural beef refers to ground beef from cattle fed a strictly vegetarian diet, and 
produced without the use of antibiotics or growth hormones, and the meat is minimally 
processed without the use of artificial ingredients. Traceable beef refers to beef that can 
be traced back to the farm where the animal was raised. Certified humane refers to beef 
products from cattle that are guaranteed and slaughtered under humane processes.    
          As several studies demonstrate that consumers consider attributes like traceability, 
country of origin labeling (COOL), natural beef, and animal welfare to be important, it is 
imperative to discuss the issues surrounding them.  For several years consumer advocacy 
groups have been asking for legislation that would require the sellers to provide 
information regarding country-of-origin (COOL) for food products (Krissoff et al. 2004). 
They believe that mandatory COOL would increase the food safety by helping the 
consumers to avoid the beef from the region that is affected by animal disease such as 
BSE.  Some producer groups also support this initiative hoping that demand for their 
products would increase as, according to them, consumers prefer domestic products to 
imported products (Krissoff et al. 2004). In the 2002 Farm bill, Congress incorporated a 
COOL provision and the USDA issued guidelines for voluntary labeling in the same year 
(USDA-AMS 2007). This provision would require country of origin labeling for beef, 
pork, lamb, fish, perishable agricultural commodities, and peanuts (USDA-AMS 2007). 
Under this provision if a beef product is to be labeled “Product of USA”, it must be born, 
raised, and processed in the U.S. (USDA-AMS 2007).  The Congress wanted to make it 
mandatory before September 30, 2004 (USDA-AMS 2007). In the January of 2004, 
because of the concerns expressed by some producer groups, a public law was passed 
delaying the implementation of mandatory COOL until September 30, 2006 except for 
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wild and farm-raised fish and shell fish (USDA-AMS 2007). Again in November 2005, a 
public law was passed delaying the implementation of mandatory COOL until September 
30, 2008 (USDA-AMS 2007).    
        The outbreak of BSE in 2003 has intensified the debate regarding the importance of 
mandatory COOL. The proponents of this program argue that information regarding 
country-of-origin would have helped to segregate the meat from the region that was 
affected by BSE if the COOL system was in place when that incident occurred (Loureiro 
and Umberger 2007). They also believe that mandatory COOL would increase consumer 
confidence in beef resulting in increased demand for beef (Krissoff et al. 2004). 
Opponents argue that consumers are not interested in country-of-origin labeling and the 
mandatory COOL would impose additional costs on producers. They also believe that 
international trade agreements might be violated by making COOL provision mandatory 
(Krissoff et al. 2004). 
         In 2004, USDA started a National Animal Identification System (NAIS) to tackle 
the outbreak of animal disease such as BSE effectively (USDA-APHIS 2007). This 
program is currently voluntary and consists of three components: premises registration, 
animal identification, and animal tracing (USDA-APHIS 2007). The first component, 
premises registration, involves registering where the animals are raised, held, or boarded. 
The second component, animal identification, involves identifying, and linking the 
animals to the birthplace or premises of origin using a uniform numbering system. The 
third component, animal tracing, involves tracing the animals back to where they have 
been and what other animals have been in contact with them (USDA-APHIS 2007). Even 
though consumer advocacy groups want to make this program mandatory, some producer 
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groups are against this idea as they are concerned about the additional costs this program 
is expected to impose on the producers. They are also concerned about the confidentiality 
of the data provided by them. Rosende-Filho and Buhr (2006), using a generalized AIDS 
model, studied the impact of implementation of NAIS. They found that NAIS might not 
be profitable in the U.S. market as the costs would outweigh benefits. However, their 
study did not include the increase in the value of exports that might occur because of the 
implementation of NAIS (Resende-Filho and Buhr 2006). 
       Some of the livestock producers that support mandatory COOL do not support 
mandatory NAIS .They are concerned about the fact that mandatory NAIS would allow 
the food safety problems to be linked to individual producers and make them vulnerable 
to liability suits (Golan et al. 2004; Loureiro and Umberger 2007). They argue that 
National Animal Identification System would not bring any additional benefits to the 
livestock industry over the COOL provision (Ishmael 2004). 
        Currently there is a lot of controversy regarding the definition of the term “natural” 
(Heller 2006).  The Food Safety and Inspection Service (FSIS) of USDA allows a meat 
product to be certified “natural” if it does not contain artificial flavors, colorings, 
chemical preservations, or other synthetic ingredients, and it is minimally processed 
(USDA-FSIS 2007). This guidance has been in effect since 1982 (USDA-FSIS 2007).  
             However, this policy allows for some exceptions if it can be proved that the 
presence of an ingredient in question would not significantly change the product and 
make it “not natural”(USDA-FSIS 2007). In 2005, FSIS changed its guidelines and 
acknowledged that sugar, sodium lactate (from a corn source), and natural flavorings 
from oleoresins or extractives were acceptable as “natural” (USDA-FSIS 2007).   
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           Consumer advocacy groups and some food producers claim that some food 
manufacturers try to capture the niche market that is available for natural foods by 
making false claims about their products. Hormel Foods, a meat producer, has recently 
expressed concern about the exceptions that are allowed in the FSIS guidance. According 
to them, some manufacturers would manipulate these exceptions by using ingredients that 
are not “natural” and have requested FSIS to issue clear guidelines regarding the claim 
“natural” (USDA-FSIS 2007).  
       The five freedoms of animal welfare that have been developed from the guidelines 
given by the Farm Animal Welfare Council of U.K. are: 1) Freedom from thirst, and 
hunger 2) Freedom from discomfort due to environment 3) Freedom from pain, injury, 
and disease 4) Freedom to express normal behavior for the species 5) Freedom from fear 
and distress (Appleby and Hughes 2005).  Out of these five freedoms, consumers 
consider freedom from thirst, and hunger, and freedom from pain, injury, and disease as 
the most important ones (Norwood, Lusk, and Prickett 2007). Consumers believe that 
animal welfare is the responsibility of everybody including consumers, food companies, 
and Government (Norwood, Lusk, and Prickett 2007).  
        Because of the continued efforts of animal rights activists, changes in public policy 
and industrial standards are taking place (Norwood, Lusk, and Prickett 2007). Florida 
passed a legislation imposing a ban on gestation crates (Harper 2002). Backed by groups 
such as Humane Society of the United States and Farm Sanctuary, voters in Arizona 
approved for a ban on sow gestation and veal stalls (Arnaut and Gauldin 2006). A bill has 
been proposed by the House of Representatives which would make the producers of eggs 
and meat to comply with several animal welfare requirements (HSUS 2007).   
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       In January 2007, Smithfield Foods, the largest pork producer, announced that it 
would phase out gestation creates (Kaufman 2007). According to the company officials, 
they took this decision in response to concerns raised by customers such as McDonalds 
and not because of the pressure from voters or animal right activists (Kaufman 2007).  In 
March 2007, Burger King announced that it would purchase eggs and pork from suppliers 
that did not confine their animals in cages and crates. They also said that they would 
prefer chicken from suppliers that use gas rather than electric to make the birds 
unconscious before slaughter (Martin 2007).        
The Excessive Choice Effect 
The standard economic model of choice would predict that beef demand increases 
whenever a new, differentiated product becomes available. That is, conventional 
economic models predict that increased variety can only increase consumption of beef.  
An additional choice does not decrease the utility obtained from a choice set, because if 
the new choice increases utility it will be purchased and if it does not increase utility it 
will not be purchased. Either way, utility does not fall, and neither does beef demand. 
 However studies in psychology and marketing have found that proliferation of 
choices might negatively affect consumers’ utility from a choice set. That is, an 
additional variety in a choice set could decrease the utility obtained from the choice.   
Iyengar and Lepper (2000), in their study, found that more percentage of consumers 
purchased gourmet jams or chocolates when offered 6 choices rather than 24 or 30 
choices. They also found that students were more likely to complete optional extra-credit 
assignments when given 6 different essay topics rather than 30 different essay topics. 
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Using field and laboratory experiments they found that participants were more satisfied 
with the items and they wrote better papers when the available choices were limited. 
Iyengar, Jiang, and Huber (2004), using data from 800,000 employees, found that 
participation rate in 401k plans was higher when the number of choices was limited than 
when the number of choices was 10 or more. They found that when the number of funds 
offered was only two, the participation rate was 75 percent, but when the number of 
funds offered was 59, the participation rate was just 60 percent. 
        Iyengar and Lepper (2000) attributed two possible factors for this effect. The first 
factor is that, as the number of options increases, the likelihood of making a non-optimal 
choice also increases, which in turn would reduce the pleasure one gets from his or her 
actual choice. This is relevant to those individuals who experience regret from their 
purchases. Some people frequently ponder whether their choice was indeed optimal.  
Often the truly optimal choice is never known, and the more options there was to choose 
from, the higher the probability another option may really have been the best choice.  
Standard economic models do not account for this regret factor, and thus may miss a 
salient feature about consumer choices. As choice proliferates, consumers who seek to 
avoid regret may decide not to make a choice. As choice proliferates, demand falls--the 
excessive-choice effect. 
 The second factor that contributes to the dissatisfaction is that, as the number of 
options increases, it gets harder to gather the information about all the options that is 
necessary to choose the best option. The costs of gathering the required information 
necessary to identify the best choice become high. Some consumers may choose to not 
purchase any item, to avoid the cost of information gathering, instead of risk purchasing a 
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sub-optimal item. This points to an excessive-choice effect, where greater variety can 
decrease the probability of a purchase. For example, greater beef variety could decrease 
beef demand.  
 Further evidence is found in Boatwright and Nunes (2001), who discovered that 
reducing the number of items of different categories in a supermarket increased the 
overall sales significantly. They found that customers welcomed the reduction of number 
of items especially when there were few differences among them at the attribute level. 
Broniarczyk, Hoyer, and Mc Alister (2001) found that reducing the number of items 
would not hurt the sales significantly as long as the low preference items were removed. 
They suggested that optimal selection of items of a particular category would help the 
stores by reducing the carrying costs significantly without affecting the sales negatively. 
            As the beef industry continues to explore new ways of processing and packaging 
beef this excessive-choice effect must be considered. Stores may not be able to increase 
sales of beef by making more varieties available. Stores must determine the optimal 
number of varieties and the profit-maximizing varieties within that choice set.  
              Some marketing studies have delved deeper in the study of consumer behavior 
under different choice set sizes. Chernev (2003) found that the impact of unlimited 
options on the preferences depended heavily on the extent to which consumers were 
already familiar with the products. He found that consumers who had a fairly good idea 
of what they wanted could derive the highest utility by going through all the available 
options. On the other hand; consumers who did not have a very good idea of what they 
wanted could have their preferences weakened by the availability of unlimited options. 
He concluded that when the available options were fewer, consumers who knew what 
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they wanted were likely to have weaker preferences; compared to those who did not have 
such a good idea of what they wanted.  
 As several studies have documented the existence of excessive-choice effect, it is 
important to discuss the economic theories that can be utilized to explain this concept.  
In all the studies that have shown the existence of excessive-choice effect, the researcher 
has exogenously chosen the number of choices (Norwood 2006). However, in the real 
market, it is the market that determines the number of choices endogenously (Norwood 
2006). The optimal variety in a market is determined by the interplay of consumers’ 
preferences for a variety and the economies of scale in production (Lancaster 1990). 
Lancaster (1990, p. 192) in his paper states, “if there are no economies of scale associated 
with individual product variants, then it is clearly optimal to custom produce to 
everyone’s chosen specification.” Lancaster(1990, p. 192) also states, “if there is no gain 
from variety and there are scale economies, then it is clearly optimal to produce a single 
variant if those economies are unlimited, or only such variety as uses scale economies to 
the limit.”  Usually, in the markets, a balance is reached between some variety and some 
scale economies (Lancaster 1990). Based on the assumptions we make, the conclusions 
on optimal variety could differ (Lancaster 1990).   
           According to Chamberlin (1933), monopolistic competition would result in a 
number of varieties that is more than socially optimal. However, according to Dixit and 
Stiglitz (1977) monopolistic competition could result in fewer varieties than the ones that 
are socially optimal. According to Lancaster (1975), monopolistic competition would 
lead to more varieties, and monopolization of the market would result in less varieties. He 
also observes that it would not be possible to predict in a more complex market structure 
 82 
whether there would be more or less varieties. According to Spence (1976), monopolistic 
competition would lead to too many varieties if the own and cross price elasticities are 
high. On the other hand, according to him, low own and cross price elasticities would 
result in few varieties.   
          Assuming that monopolistic competition increases product differentiation and 
results in too many varieties, traditional economic models suggest that this increase in 
choices is always good for consumers. However these models do not take search cost in 
to account (Norwood 2006). Norwood (2006), assuming asymmetric monopolistic 
competition, found that incorporating search cost would result in an excessive-choice 
effect. This occurs because each time a consumer considers an additional variety, he or 
she loses some utility (Stivers and Tremblay 2005; Norwood 2006). The increase in 
number of choices increases the probability of finding a better option, and also decreases 
the prices. Because of the search cost, consumers go over only a subset of choices and the 
probability of finding a better choice decreases. If they cannot find the variety they prefer 
they would not make a purchase (Norwood 2006).  The model developed by Norwood 
(2006) assumes that the additional varieties are preferred by less consumers and market 
behaves in such a way that the most preferred items are sold first. However, Iyengar and 
Lepper (2000) in their experiment used the choices that were similar in utility (Norwood 
2000).  Norwood’s (2006) model can be used to explain the excessive choice effect found 
by Iyengar and Lepper (2000), if it is assumed that consumers develop shopping habits 
(Norwood 2006).  Based on this assumption, if more varieties are offered then consumers 
would know that the average utility from many varieties would be relatively less than the 
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average utility from few products. They also would know that the average utility would 
be less than the search cost, and would not consider any of the varieties (Norwood 2006).  
        Norwood’s (2006) model shows that an increase in fixed cost would reduce the 
number of varieties. His model also supports the concept that monopolistic competition 
would result in more than socially optimal number of varieties. 
        Irons and Hepburn (2007) developed a theoretical model incorporating regret factor 
along with search cost in the consumers’ utility function. The model shows that, when the 
search is non-sequential, increasing the number of options beyond a certain number 
would affect the consumers who experience regret negatively. The model shows, when 
the search is sequential with recall (being able to go back to the searched options), excess 
options would make consumers’ who experience regret not to perform any search and to 
choose none. It shows that, when the search is sequential with no recall (not being able to 
go back to the searched options), regret at having to stop the search before the best option 
is chosen increases the amount of search, and regret at skipping  the better option 
decreases  the amount of search.                          
Satisficers Versus Maximizers 
 Schwartz et al. (2002) consider the fact that the excessive-choice effect may differ 
according to an individuals’ personality. Individuals are classified as either “satisficers” 
or “maximizers” according to their personality. Through survey research, Schwartz et al. 
(2002) develop a scale that splits individuals into satisficers and maximizers. This scale is 
a 13 question survey where the individual’s score determines whether they are a 
satisficer, maximizer, or somewhere between these two extremes. The score can range 
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from 13 to 93. If an individual’s score is over 65, then he/she is a maximizer. If an 
individual’s score is below 40, then he/she is a satisficer (Schwartz 2004).   
          Maximizers are people who always look for the best option. They check out all the 
alternatives to make sure that they are choosing the best option. Satisficers are people 
who look for the “good enough” option, and they set standards for what they want. They 
will stop their search once they find what they are looking for and would not worry if 
something better is out there (Simon 1955, 1956, 1957).   
          Schwartz et al. (2002) hypothesized that added options would create problems for 
maximizers because they would try to choose the best one among all the available 
options, and the likelihood of choosing the best option decreases as the number of options 
increases. On the other hand, according to the authors, unlimited options would not create 
problems for satisficers because they are looking for an option that is “good enough” and 
they don’t care even if they come across a better alternative. Research does indicate that 
individual’s behavior depends on their satisficer - maximizer scale score. 
           Maximizers are likely to take a longer time than satisficers to make purchasing 
decisions and are also more likely to indulge in social comparisons than satisficers. 
Maximizers are also likely to spend a lot of time thinking about the purchases they have 
made, while satisficers rarely do that. Maximizers experience more regret regarding the 
choices they make than satisficers. Maximizers are also less happy and more depressed 
than satisficers (Schwartz et al. 2002). Schwartz et al. (2002) argue that proliferation of 
choices is the main reason for maximizers to feel depressed. According to the authors, as 
options proliferate it becomes difficult for maximizers to choose the best options and they 
blame themselves for not being able to make optimal decisions.  
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           Lusk and Norwood (2007b), using the Becker-DeGroot-Marschak (BDM) 
mechanism, studied the impact of individuals’ personality on their preferences for choice 
sets. They used the maximizer-satisficer scale developed by Schwartz et al. (2002) for 
their study. They asked the participants (students at Oklahoma State University) to 
choose one Jone’s soda from a choice set. The size of the choice set ranged from 6 to 24 
and it varied across individuals. They found that maximizers preferred less choice, and 
satisficers preferred more choice.   
         Iyengar, Wells, and Schwartz (2006), using the maximizer-satisficer scale 
developed by Schwartz et al. (2002) studied the impact of individuals’ personality on 
their job-search process. They found that although maximizers found better jobs than 
satisficers they were less satisfied and experienced more negative effects than satisficers 
throughout their job search. According to the authors, maximizers were less satisfied and 
experienced more negative effects than satisficers because of their tendency to look for 
the best job. Although this tendency helped them to find  better jobs than satisficers, 
because of the search cost and an almost limitless number of opportunities they felt regret 
as they thought that there were better jobs out there than the ones they actually chose 
(Iyengar, Wells, and Schwartz 2006) .    
             The excessive-choice effect may be more prevalent in maximizers than in 
satisficers because of the different strategies they use to choose an option from a choice 
set. As satisficers stop their search once they find an option that meets the standards they 
have in mind, added varieties would not be a problem for them. On the other hand, as 
maximizers try to choose the best option, added varieties would require them to put extra 
effort to achieve their objectives. To avoid the cognitive burden and regret maximizers 
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may avoid making a purchasing decision resulting in an excessive-choice effect.                                                                                       
In summary, there are three important points from the aforementioned research that 
motivate the objectives of this research. First, valuation research in agricultural 
economics indicates that consumers are willing to pay for beef attributes such as 
traceability and beef processing practices. Providing different beef attributes increases the 
variety of beef products. Second, marketing studies suggest that increasing product 
variety alone is not guaranteed to increase beef demand because of the excessive-choice 
effect. Third, the impact of the excessive-choice effect will likely differ across 
individuals according to where they lie on the satisficer-maximizer scale. 
Conceptual Framework 
The subsequent section describes a choice experiment administered to two different 
samples of consumers. A random utility model is estimated from these experiments. The 
choice experiments allow consumers to choose among several ground beef products that 
are differentiated by attributes like “traceability,” “certified natural,” “certified humane,” 
“fat content,”and “price per pound” at different levels. A no-choice option is also 
included among the different options.  
        This approach is based on the assumption that utility for ground beef can be split in 
to separate utilities for its attributes (Lancaster 1966). It is also based on random utility 
theory, which assumes that a consumer would choose an option that would maximize his 
or her utility (McFadden 1974). The utility function of a consumer can be expressed as 
(Loureiro and Umberger 2003): 
 (1)                                                U= U(X, m, q) 
where X represents ground beef attributes, m represents income, and q represents quality 
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of ground beef. 
      The utility derived by consumer i by choosing the ground beef option j can be written 
as:  
 (2)                                               Uij=Vij + eij 
where Vij is the systematic or measurable utility determined by the attributes of ground 
beef, and eij is an error term.  All options refer to one pound of ground beef. It is assumed 
that  
(3)                                               E(eij)=0 
       The utility derived by a consumer from consuming the ground beef of quality q0 can 
be expressed as: 
(4)                                               U0 = U(X, m, q0)   
       The utility derived by consuming the ground beef of improved quality q1 can be 
expressed as (Hanemann 1991): 
(5)                                                U1 = U(X, m, q1)   
        The maximum willingness to pay for a ground beef attribute is the premium set on 
ground beef with that attribute that makes one indifferent between this product and an 
otherwise identical product. In other words, it is the amount that makes consumers’ 
indifferent if subtracted from their income to improve the quality of a ground beef 
product from q0 to q1.  This can be expressed as: 
(6)                                           U (X, m-WTP, q1) = U (X, m, q0) 
        If the linear approximation is taken around the indifference point, then equation (6) 
becomes (Lusk and Norwood 2007a): 
(7)                                          WTP = [(∂U/ ∂q) (q1- q0)]/ (∂U/∂m)          
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        Equation (7) leads to the expression for willingness to pay for an attribute of ground 
beef which is the ratio of the marginal utility of that attribute to the marginal utility of 
money. It can be written as: 
(8)                                           WTPattribute=MUattribute/MUmoney    
where WTPattribute is the  willingness to pay for a ground beef attribute of interest,  
MUattribute is the marginal utility of the ground beef attribute, and MUmoney is the marginal 
utility of money. 
           Equation (2) can be specified as: 
 (9)                                        Uij = f ( TU.S, TPr, N, H, FL, FM, FH, P) + eij          
where TU.S represents traceability certified by the U.S. Government, TPr represents 
traceability certified by a private company, N represents certified natural, H represents 
certified humane,  FL, FM, and FH represents 10, 20, and 30 percent fat content 
respectively, P represents price per pound of ground beef. It can be hypothesized that 
attributes like certified traceability by U.S. Government or a private company, certified 
humane, and certified natural would have a positive effect on consumers’ utility. The 
impact of a higher fat content is hypothesized to depend on the current fat content. A 
higher price, of course, should have a negative effect on consumers’ utility.   
          The willingness to pay for a beef product j by the average consumer i can be 
expressed as: 
(10)                                                 WTPj  = Vij + eij  
        The willingness to pay for a beef product j in dollar value is the ratio of the utility 
derived from the beef product to the marginal utility of money. It can also be written as: 
(11)                                                WTPj= Uij/ MUmoney 
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            Traditional theory assumes that more choices are better and a rational consumer 
would choose an option that would maximize his or her utility. However, some studies in 
psychology and marketing suggest that more choices are always not good. The previous 
section described several reasons why increased choice could actually decrease demand. 
The proliferation of choices could weaken consumers’ preferences affecting the value of 
a product. If the number of alternatives does affect consumers’ utility, then equation (2) 
can be written as: 
(12)                                                 Uij= Vij + f (NCH) + eij 
where  f(NCH) is a function of the variable NCH, that represents the number of choices in 
a choice set. This leads to the second hypothesis that the utility of an average consumer is 
positively affected by NCH at some values of NCH, and negatively affected at other 
values of NCH.  At some point, it is hypothesized that NCH maximizes the value of a 
good as measured by equation (11).  
         According to prior research, the personality of an individual also plays an important 
role in his or her utility maximizing behavior. It suggests that an unlimited number of 
choices might affect people who always strive to choose the best choice among all the 
available options, called maximizers, more than those who settle for the choice that 
matches the criteria they expect, called satisficers (Schwartz et al. 2002). To incorporate 
personality variables in the utility function, equation (12) can be written as: 
(13)                                            Uij= Vij + f (NCH, MS) + eij 
where MS is a variable that represents the maximizer-satisficer score of  consumer i.        
This leads to the third hypothesis that the proliferation of choices would have different 
impacts on maximizers and satisficers and it is expected that there would be an inverse 
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relationship between the maximizer-satisficer scores and consumers’ utility.  Lusk and 
Norwood (2007b) find that increased choice benefits satisficers but maximizers, at least 
over a certain range of choice. This study will test whether this result holds true using a 
different sample of individuals, a different product, in a hypothetical choice experiment 
setting. 
Survey Instrument and Data 
To measure consumer preference for ground beef a self-administered paper and pencil 
survey is used. The survey instrument is an eight-page booklet printed back to back, and 
has three sections. The first section has four sets of choice questions, the second section 
has questions on socio-demographic characteristics and ground beef purchasing behavior 
of consumers, and the third section has maximizer-satisficer scale developed by Schwartz 
et al (2002). 
          As one of the objectives of this study is to estimate consumers’ willingness to pay 
for ground beef attributes like “Traceability Certified by the U.S. Government or a 
Private Company,” “Certified Humane,” “Certified Natural,” and “Fat Content,” the 
choice sets are developed using these attributes and the attribute “Price per Pound” at 
different levels. 
          The attribute “Traceability Certified,” which indicates if the beef can be traced 
back to the farm, enters the choice sets with three levels as certification is done either by 
the U.S. Government or a Private Company or by None. The attribute “Certified 
Humane,” which indicates if the cattle were raised and slaughtered under humane 
processes, enters the choice sets with two levels as either Yes or No. The attribute 
“Certified Natural,” which indicates if the cattle were produced without any antibiotics or 
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growth hormones, fed a strictly vegetarian diet, and undergoes minimum processing.  
This attribute enters the choice sets with two levels as either Yes or No.  
 The attribute “Fat Content,” which indicates the level of fat content in ground 
beef, enters the choice sets with three levels as ether 10%, or 20%, or 30%. The attribute 
“Price per pound” enters the choice sets with eight levels as either $2.00, or $2.50, or 
$3.00, or $3.50, or $4.00, or $4.50, or $5.00, or $5.50, or $6.00. The attributes are chosen 
based on the past literature and the information found on labels of ground beef products 
available in the local grocery stores. Respondents were given an information sheet 
describing the meaning of these attributes. That information sheet is provided in 
Appendix II-A.   
            An orthogonal fractional factorial design with main-effects only is used to create 
twenty four ground beef options (Louviere, Hensher, and Swait 2000). These twenty four 
options are used to create four choice sets with different number of options ranging from 
four to twenty four. Also, four different combinations of choice sets are designed by 
shuffling the order of the choice sets based on the number of options. The choice sets are 
designed with different number of options to determine if the increase in number of 
choices has any impact on consumers’ utility.  The options are randomly assigned to the 
choice sets, and 36 different versions of surveys are developed based on the order in 
which the options enter the choice sets. A no-choice option is also included in all the 
choice sets. The responders are asked to choose one option from each of the four choice 
sets. To help the responders to understand the choice experiment, instructions are 
provided along with an example of how to answer a choice based question.  A sample of 
the choice experiment can be found in Appendix II-B.       
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 The maximizer-satisficer scale taken directly from Schwartz et al. (2002) has 
thirteen questions, which are developed to determine whether an individual is a 
maximizer or a satisficer. These questions ask the respondents to choose on a scale of 1 
to 7, the extent to which the statements match their personality.  This psychometric scale 
is provided in Appendix II-C.  
            A cover letter explaining that the survey is conducted to elicit consumers’ 
preferences for ground beef is attached to the survey booklet. It also explains that the 
project is conducted by professors in the Department of Agricultural Economics at 
Oklahoma State University. To increase the response rate, three $50 cash prizes are 
awarded to those who win the drawing. 
            After the survey instrument was designed, pre-testing was done by administering 
the surveys to faculty, and graduate students in the Department of Agricultural 
Economics at Oklahoma State University, and people who worked in the beef industry. 
Some of the changes suggested by them were incorporated in the final survey. 
 The data were collected using a mail survey. A sample of 4,000 U.S. household 
addresses was purchased from Survey Sampling Inc. These addresses were collected 
from white-page directories and supplemented with other information sources. Based on 
the way in which the different choice sets were ordered, four different versions of the 
survey, 1,000 of each type, were generated. The generated surveys along with the 
attributes information sheet, cover letter, and a self addressed envelope were mailed in 
March 2007. 
 This sample is representative of the U.S. population in that each household in the 
U.S. has roughly the same probability of receiving a survey.  However, individuals with 
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certain personality characteristics are more likely to complete and return the survey than 
others.  For example, individuals truly concerned about food safety and animal welfare 
are more likely to return a completed survey, simply because they are interested in the 
topic. There may also be a difference in the rate at which satisficers and maximizers 
return the surveys. The point is that there is a non-response bias in that certain personality 
characteristics will be correlated with the rate at which surveys are returned. It is 
expected that this non-response bias will bias the value of ground beef attributes upward. 
 A second sample of individuals was taken which is not subject to non-response 
bias, but is subject to a geographic bias. Mathis Brothers’ Furniture is a large retail 
furniture store in Oklahoma City, Oklahoma.  The store employs over 175 diverse 
salespeople.  All salespeople are required to attend business meetings each Saturday. In 
May of 2007, each salesperson was offered $10 to complete the aforementioned survey.  
Each salesperson present did indeed complete the survey, resulting in no non-response 
bias. The number of responses received was 173. Of course, since all respondents work in 
Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, there is a geographic bias.  
 All surveys are subject to some sort of bias. This study sought to pursue two 
different subject recruiting procedures to ensure the entire sample is not dominated by 
one particular bias. Throughout the study the data are pooled and used to estimate one 
consumer profile. Pooling is not undertaken because we believe preferences to be the 
same in both samples. Pooling is undertaken because we are more interested in obtaining 
descriptive statistics for the entire sample, and are less interested in how the two samples 
differ. 
 
 94 
Empirical Methodology      
This section uses data from the choice experiments and the conceptual model from the 
previous section to obtain empirical estimates that achieve all three aforementioned 
objectives. The utility person i receives from consuming a product j is assumed to be the 
sum of a deterministic component, which is a function of the choice experiment data,  
and an error term. The error term in equation (2) is assumed to be independently and 
identically distributed according to the extreme-value distribution. The extreme value 
Type I distribution can be defined as (Louviere, Hensher, and Swait 2000): 
 (14)                                             F(eij) = exp(-exp(- eij)) 
If there are J possible options in a choice set B then the consumer i would choose option j 
over all the other options if and only if 
 (15)                                          Uij>Uik ; k=1,2,…,J for all j≠k   
The probability that the consumer i chooses option j from the choice set B is given by 
(16)                                          Probij= Prob(Uij>Uik; k=1,2…,J for all j≠k  ) 
Equation (16) results in 
(17)                                         Prob(eij-eik> Vik- Vij ; k=1,2,…,J for all j≠k ) 
where Vij=Xijβ ; Xij is a vector of independent variables representing the attributes of 
ground beef, and sometimes demographic or personality variables, and β is a vector of 
parameters. As the residuals are assumed to be identically and independently distributed 
and follow Type I extreme value distribution, a conditional logit model can be used to 
represent ith consumer probability of choosing the jth  ground beef option (McFadden): 
(18)                                       Probij= exp(Xijβ)/ ∑j exp(Xijβ)  for j=1,…,J 
The log- likelihood function of the conditional logit model is given as: 
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(19)                                            L= ∑i ∑j  Wi yij  ln [exp(Xijβ)/ Σj exp(Xijβ) ] 
where yij  is equal to 1 if the option j is chosen, otherwise it is equal to 0. The variable Wi 
is a weighting variable discussed shortly. The models will be estimated using a 
weighting procedure. The choice experiment is designed to predict the decisions 
consumers would make in a grocery store. Some individuals may do a majority of the 
grocery shopping for the household while others may not. Thus, the responses of some 
individuals give a better indication of grocery store purchases than others. Responses 
from individuals who shop more frequently for ground beef should be given greater 
weight, so that utility function estimates will resemble actual shopping patterns.   
 A weighting procedure is used that weights the likelihood function for some 
individuals more than others. Notice the variable Wi in (19) can be given different values 
across the respondents so that their choices have a larger impact on the log-likelihood 
function value. Values of Wi are assigned as follows. A survey question asked how 
frequently the respondent purchases fresh ground beef, with the options being about once 
a week, about once a month, rarely, and never. The respondents who purchase fresh 
ground beef once a week will be given a weight of Wi = 4, those who purchase once a 
month will be given a weight of Wi = 1, those who purchase rarely will be given a weight 
of Wi = 0.2, and those who never purchase will be given a weight of Wi = 0.  The 
weighting decisions Wi = 4 and 1 are based off the assumption that those who purchase 
once a week purchase roughly four times more fresh ground beef than those who say 
they purchase about once a month.  The weight Wi = 0.2 was based off intuition. 
        The empirical model underlying the conditional logit model to estimate equation (2) 
is specified as: 
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(20)                   Uij = β Xij + eij 
                               =  β1 TUSij+ β2 TPrij + β3 Nij + β4 Hij + β5 FLij + β6 FMij + β7 FHij 
                                                  
+ β8Pij+ eij 
where Uij  is the latent unobserved  utility of  consumer i from choosing the ground beef 
choice j. The term TUSij is a dummy variable representing the attribute “Certified 
Traceability.” It is equal to 1 if the traceability is certified by the U.S. Government, 
otherwise it is equal to 0. The term TPrij  is a dummy variable  also representing the same 
attribute. It is equal to 1 if the traceability is certified by the private company, otherwise it 
is equal to 0. The term Nij is a dummy variable representing the attribute “Certified 
Natural.” It is equal to 1 if it is “Yes,” and 0 if it is “No.” The term Hij is a dummy 
variable 
 
representing the attribute “Certified Humane.” It is equal to 1 if it is “Yes,” and 
0 if it is “No.” The term FLij is a dummy variable representing the attribute “Fat 
Content.” It is equal to 1 if the fat content is 10%, otherwise it is equal to 0. The term 
FMij  is the second dummy variable representing “Fat Content.”  It is equal to 1 if the fat 
content is 20%, otherwise it is equal to 0. The term FHij is the third dummy variable  
representing “Fat Content.” It is equal to 1 if the fat content is 30%, otherwise it is equal 
to 0. The term Pij is a variable representing the attribute “Price per Pound.” The βs are the 
parameters that need to be estimated.  Notice that the intercept is dropped from equation 
(20) because all possible dummy variables for the attribute “Fat Content” is used. 
         In a conditional logit model the parameters cannot be interpreted directly other than 
the signs and statistical significance (Burton et al. 2001). However the mean willingness 
to pay estimates (WTP) of all the attributes can be estimated by calculating the ratios of 
the parameters of the attributes over the parameter of price (Burton et al. 2001): 
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(21)                                         WTP= (βattribute/(-β8)) 
where βattribute  is the parameter of an attribute of interest. 
          The confidence intervals of the mean WTP estimates can be computed using Monte 
Carlo integration. This is done by generating 10,000 values of the parameter estimates 
from the joint normal distribution using the variance-covariance matrix of the parameters 
of the estimated model. Then, 10,000 WTP values are calculated and the calculated WTP 
values are ranked from the highest to the lowest. To compute the 95 percent confidence 
interval, the values at the 2.5th percentile and the 97.5th percentile are chosen. 
           This empirical model can be expanded to determine how the utility of a choice 
varies with the number of varieties the consumer has to choose from. The empirical 
model to estimate equation (12) can be written as: 
(22)                       Uij=  β1 TUSij+ β2 TPrij + β3 Nij + β4 Hij + β5 FMij+ β6 FHij+ β7 Pij  
                                         +γ1 NCH5i + γ2 NCH10i+ γ3 NCH20i+ γ4 NCH25i+ eij 
 The terms NCH5i, NCH10i, NCH20i, and NCH25i are dummy variables that represent the 
number of choices in a choice set faced by consumer i. They are equal to 1 if the choice 
sets have five, ten, twenty, and twenty five options respectively, otherwise they are equal 
to 0. The βs, and γs are the parameters that need to be estimated. The dummy variable 
representing 10% fat content is dropped from equation (22) because all possible dummy 
variables for the number of choices is used. 
             The marginal effects due to the increases in the number of choices can be 
determined using the following set of equations: 
                          ( ∂Uij/∂ NCH10i)- ( ∂Uij/∂ NCH5i)   = γ2- γ1, 
(23)
                             
( ∂Uij/∂ NCH20i)- ( ∂Uij/∂ NCH10i) = γ3- γ2, and 
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( ∂Uij/∂ NCH25i)- ( ∂Uij/∂ NCH20i) = γ3- γ2 . 
            The confidence intervals of the marginal effects can be calculated using Monte 
Carlo integration as described previously.  If the marginal effect is found to be positive, 
then an increase in the number of choices has a positive impact on consumers’ utility. If it 
is found to be zero, then an increase in the number of choices has no impact on 
consumers’ utility. Finally, if the marginal effect is found to be negative, then an increase 
in number of choices has a negative impact on consumers’ utility.       
 Recall that in each choice set there is an opt-out option “none.” Individuals check 
this option if they would not purchase any of the ground beef products. The utility of the 
none option is set to equal zero, which normalizes the utility function. 
 A previous section discussed research into personality differences among 
individuals. When faced with a large choice set, not all people use the same decision-
making process. One way to articulate these differences is in the satisficer-maximizer 
personality scale. Let MAXi be the score from the satisficer-maximizer psychometric 
scale discussed previously, where a higher value indicates the individual takes on 
maximizer personality traits as opposed to satisficer personality traits. The empirical 
model to estimate equation (13) can be written as: 
(24)                Uij = β1 TU.Sij+ β2 TPrij + β3 Nij + β4Hij + β5FMij+ β6FHij+ β7Pij  
                                +γ1NCH5i + γ2NCH10i+ γ3NCH20i+ γ4NCH25i+α1MAXi* NCH 
                                + α2MAXi* NCH10i + α3MAXi* NCH20i + α4MAXi* NCH25i +eij 
The terms MAXi*NCH5i, MAXi*NCH10i, MAXi*NCH20i , and MAXi*NCH25i are the 
variables that represent the interactions between the variable that represents the 
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maximizer-satisficer scores and the variables that represent the number of choices in a 
choice set. The αs, βs, and γs are the parameters that need to estimated.  
         The effect of personality (satisficer or maximizer) on the impact of an increase in 
the number of choices can be determined using the following set of equations: 
                          ( ∂Uij/∂ NCH10i)- ( ∂Uij/∂ NCH5i)   = (γ2+ α2*MAXi) – (γ1+ α1*MAXi), 
(25)
                             
( ∂Uij/∂ NCH20i)- ( ∂Uij/∂ NCH10i) = (γ3+ α3*MAXi) – (γ2+ α2*MAXi), and 
                                       
( ∂Uij/∂ NCH25i)- ( ∂Uij/∂ NCH20i) = (γ4+ α4*MAXi) – (γ3+ α3*MAXi). 
          Using the above equations, marginal effects due to the increases in number of 
choices for both satisficers and maximizers can be calculated by substituting the 
appropriate values for MAXi . The value of 28 will be used for satisficers as it is the 
lowest maximizer-satisficer score, and a value of 82 will be used for satisficers as it is the 
highest score in the sample. After calculating marginal effects, confidence intervals will 
be computed using Monte Carlo integration.  
       If the marginal effect is positive, then the personality of an individual (satisficer or 
maximizer) has a positive effect on the impact of number of choices on his/her utility. On 
the other hand, if it is negative, then the personality of an individual has a negative effect. 
If the marginal effect is zero, then the personality of an individual does not have any 
effect on the impact of number of choices.  
Results 
Profile of Survey Respondents 
Out of the 4,000 surveys mailed, 222 responses were received (about 5% response rate), 
and 2 were returned undelivered because of the incorrect addresses. Out of the responses 
that were received, 209 were found to be usable. A survey was determined to be usable if 
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the respondent was 18 years or over, had answered all the choice questions, and had 
chosen a single alternative from a choice set. The low response rate could be because of 
the presence of large choice sets in the surveys. The median age of the respondents was 
57 years, and the average household income was from $60,000 to $79,000.The 
respondents were predominantly white (90 %). About 44 percent of the respondents were 
females. The median age of the respondents was higher than that of the U.S. population 
and the percentage of minorities was less than that of the U.S. population. The summary 
statistics of this sample, called as mail sample, is presented in Table II-1.  
         Out of these 173 responses received from Mathis Brothers, 140 were found to be 
usable. The median age of the respondents in this sample was 37 years, and the average 
house hold income was $40,000 to $59,000. About 74 percent of the respondents were 
white and about 27 percent of the respondents were females. The summary statistics of 
this sample, called as captive sample, is presented in Table II-2.  
     Mailed sample and captive sample are combined and the summary statistics of the 
pooled sample is presented in Table II-3, and the comparison of the pooled sample with 
U.S. population is presented in Table II-4. The pooled sample has more people with a 
bachelor’s degree or higher, and has fewer women compared to the U.S. population. It 
also has fewer households with children below the age of 18 compared to the U.S. 
population. The sample is comparable to U.S. population in terms of income. It is also 
loosely comparable to U.S. population in terms of race, and age. About 51 percent of the 
people in the pooled sample purchase fresh ground beef once a week, and about 33 
percent purchase fresh ground beef once a month. About 58 percent eat food products 
containing fresh ground beef frequently, and about 34 percent eat fresh ground beef 
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products periodically. We do not claim that this sample perfectly represents the U.S. 
population, but we do believe that it is a good sample with individuals who are diverse.      
Exploratory Analysis of Maximizer-Satisficer Scale 
A factor analysis using principal factor method and varimax rotation was used to 
determine the underlying structure of the maximizer -satisficer scale. The number of  
underlying factors was determined to be four.  The results are presented in Table II-5.  
             The items that represent the difficulty in choosing an option such as difficulty in 
renting videos, difficulty in finding a gift for a friend, difficulty in finding clothes while 
shopping, and difficulty in finding the right words while writing loaded on factor one. 
Items such as having the highest standard for oneself, not settling for the second best, and 
trying to imagine all the possible alternatives even ones that are not present loaded on to 
factor two. 
          The items such as treating relationships like clothing, liking lists that rank lists, 
always looking out for better options, and fantasizing about living in different ways 
loaded on to the third factor. The items such as channel surfing while watching T.V, and 
checking other stations while listening to radio loaded on to the fourth factor. The 
Cronbach’s alpha for the maximizer-satisficer scale is 0.63. The structures of factors one 
two are same as the results of factor analysis obtained by Schwartz et al. (2002) in their 
paper. However the items that loaded on to factors three and four in our study loaded on 
to the same factor component in their study. Also, they obtained a value of 0.71 for 
Cronbach’s alpha. 
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Consumers’ Preferences for Ground Beef Attributes 
The estimated results of Equation (20) are given in Table II-6. All the coefficients have 
expected signs. The null hypothesis that all the coefficients are equal to zero is rejected 
by likelihood ratio test at the 1 per cent significance level. The coefficients of all the 
variables except for Fat 30% are significant at 1 percent, and the coefficient of Fat 30% 
is significant at 5 percent.  
        The null hypothesis that the coefficients of the variables Traceability by U.S. 
Government and Traceability by Private Company are equal is rejected by likelihood 
ratio test at the 1 percent significance level. This implies that the impacts of the variables 
representing traceability certified by the U.S. Government and Private Company on 
consumers’ utility are significantly different.  The null hypothesis that the coefficients of 
the variables Certified Humane and Certified Natural are equal is rejected by likelihood 
ratio test at the 1 percent significance level. This implies that the impacts of these two 
variables on consumers’ preferences are different. The null hypothesis that the 
coefficients of the variables Fat 10% and Fat 20% are equal is rejected by likelihood 
ratio test at the 1 percent significance level. This implies that the increase in fat content 
from 10 to 20 percent affects consumers’ utility.  The null hypothesis that the 
coefficients of the variables Fat 20% and Fat 30% are equal is rejected by likelihood 
ratio test at the 1 percent significance level. This implies that the increase in fat content 
from 20 to 30 percent has a significant impact on the consumers’ utility.   
      The variable Traceability Certified by U.S. Government has the highest impact on 
utility. Among the variables that have positive impacts on utility, Certified Humane has 
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the lowest impact. The results show that as the percentage of fat content increases, the 
utility decreases. The variable price also has a negative impact on utility. 
Willingness to Pay 
The mean willingness to pay estimates (WTP) for all the attributes are calculated using 
the formula given in Equation (21). The confidence intervals of the WTP estimates are 
calculated using Monte Carlo integration. The WTP estimates and the confidence 
intervals for all the attributes are given in Table II-7.  
         All the WTP estimates are different from zero at the 5 percent significance level. 
The results show that consumers are willing to pay a premium of $3.13 per pound for 
traceability certified by the U.S. Government, which is the highest premium among the  
premiums for all the attributes. The consumers are willing to pay a premium of $2.20 per 
pound for traceability certified by a private company. The estimated premiums for the 
traceability certified by the U.S. Government or a private company are higher than the 
values of WTP estimates for traceability estimated in the previous studies by Dickson and 
Bailey (2002) and Loureiro and Umberger (2007). However, in our study traceability 
entered the choice set with three levels as either it is certified by the U.S. Government or 
a Private company or by None, which is different from the previous studies. 
          The meat products considered in the previous studies were also different. Dickson 
and Bailey (2002) considered roast beef sandwich, and pork, and Loureiro and Umberger 
(2007) considered rib eye steak. While Dickson and Bailey (2002) used an experimental 
auction, Loureiro and Umberger (2007) used a survey for their study. Although the 
methodology used by Loureiro and Umberger (2007) is comparable to this study, their 
study included a different set of attributes. Their study had a separate attribute 
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representing food safety, which commanded the highest premium. As we did not include 
a separate attribute representing food safety in our study, survey responders might have 
associated the attribute representing traceability with food safety. That could be the 
reason for the highest premium for traceability certified by the U.S. Government. The 
studies by Dickson and Bailey (2002), Hobbs et al. (2005), and Steiner and Young (2007) 
also show that consumers value food safety as the most important attribute.  
       The consumers are willing to pay $2.15 per pound to be indifferent between the 
ground beef that carried a label “Certified Natural” and the one without that label. The 
estimated premium for the attribute “Certified natural” is less than the mean WTP value 
($3.33) for beef steak from cattle raised without growth hormones, and is similar to the 
mean WTP premium ($2.42) for beef raised without any genetically modified organisms 
estimated by Steiner and Young (2007). However, other than using a different product 
(steak), they also used a pooled sample of consumers from Alberta in Canada, and 
Montana in U.S for their study. It is also less than the WTP premium ($8.12) for beef 
steak from cattle not administered with growth hormones, and less than the WTP 
premium($3.21) for beef steak from cattle not fed genetically modified corn estimated by 
Lusk, Roosen, and Fox (2003). Even though the methodology used by them is 
comparable to this study, the set of attributes used in their study was different. Their 
study did not include attributes representing traceability or food safety, and the 
consumers could have associated the attributes representing beef from cattle not 
administered growth hormones and not fed genetically modified corn with food safety. 
       The premium for humane treatment of animals is $0.56 per pound, which is the 
lowest among all the positive premiums. The premium for humane treatment is similar to 
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that of the value obtained by Dickson and Bailey (2002) in their study, which is $0.50 for 
roast beef sandwich, and $ 0.53 for pork.  
        As the fat content increases from 10 percent to 20 percent, WTP decreases by $1.17 
per pound, and as it increases from 20 percent to 30 percent, WTP decreases by $1.22 per 
pound. This shows that consumers are concerned about the negative effects of fat on their 
health, and they are willing to pay more for ground beef products with less fat. 
Impact of Number of Choices on Consumers’ Utility 
The estimated results of Equation (22) are presented in Table II-8. The null hypothesis 
that all the coefficients are equal to zero is rejected by likelihood ratio test at the one 
percent significance level. The coefficients of all the variables are statistically significant 
at the one percent significance level.  It can be seen from the results that the inclusion of 
dummy variables representing number of choices in a choice set did not affect the values 
of coefficients of choice attributes significantly. The values are almost identical to the 
ones from the previous model [Equation (20)]. The significance of the coefficients of the 
dummy variables representing the number of choices in a choice set shows that existence 
of excessive choice effect for an average consumer. The marginal effects due to the 
increases in the number of choices are calculated by substituting the estimated parameters 
in Equation (23). 
          The confidence intervals at 90 percent and 95 percent are computed using Monte 
Carlo integration. The calculated marginal effects and confidence intervals are presented 
in Table II-9.  A graph, as shown in Figure II-1, is plotted to show the impact of an 
increase in the number of choices on the marginal effect. The marginal effect for an 
increase in the number of choices from 5 to 10 is not different from zero at the 10 percent 
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significance level. This implies that the increase in number of choices from 5 to 10 does 
not have any impact on an average consumer’s utility. The marginal effect for an increase 
in the number of choices from 10 to 20 is also not statistically different from zero at the 
10 percent significance level. This implies that the increase in number of choices from 10 
to 20 does not have any significant impact on the purchasing decision of an average 
consumer. But, the marginal effect for an increase in the number of choices from 20 to 25 
is negative and statistically significant at the 10 percent significance level. This implies 
that the increase in number of choices from 20 to 25 has a negative impact on the 
preferences of an average consumer. As the negative excessive choice effect  
occurs when the number of choices is increased beyond 20, it can be interpreted that the 
optimum number of choices in a choice set for an average  consumer is roughly 20. This 
implies that if the number of choices is increased beyond 20, then the probability of 
choosing a ground beef item decreases for an average consumer.   
         The excessive-choice effect is detected, indicating it exists in hypothetical choices 
as well as real choices. A comparable study by Malhotra (1982) suggests that consumers 
experience information overload when the number of alternatives is increased from 5 to 
10 or more, and the number of attributes is increased from 10 to 15 or more. He used 
hypothetical profiles of houses to construct his choice sets. As purchasing a house is 
obviously more complex than purchasing a ground beef item, respondents would have 
been overwhelmed when the number of alternatives was increased beyond just 5. The 
results prove the existence of excessive choice effect and the hypothesis that the 
proliferation of choices has a negative impact on the preferences of an average consumer. 
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Impact of an Individual’s Personality in Dealing with Large Choice Sets 
The estimated results of Equation (24) are presented in Table II-10. The null hypothesis 
that all the coefficients are equal to zero is rejected by the likelihood ratio test at a 
significance level of one percent. The values of the coefficients of choice attributes are 
similar to that of the previous two models [Equations (20) and (22)]. The significance of 
the variables MAX*NCH5, MAX*NCH10, and MAX*NCH25 at the significance level of  
10 percent shows that the personality of an individual does affect the impact of number of 
choices on his/her utility. The marginal effects for satisficers and maximizers are 
calculated using Equation (25).  The confidence intervals at 90 percent and 95 percent are 
computed using Monte Carlo integration. The calculated marginal effects and confidence 
intervals are presented in Table II-11. A graph, as shown in Figure II-2 is plotted to show 
the impact of an increase in number of choices on satisficers and maximizers. 
      For both satisficers and maximizers, the marginal effects as the number of choices 
increases from 5 to 10 are not significant at the 10 percent significance level. This implies 
that as the number of choices increases from 5 to 10, the personality of an individual 
(satisficer or maximizer) does not affect the impact of number of choices. This could be 
because both satisficers and maximizers perceive no real difference between a choice set 
with 5 options and a choice set with 10 options. However, as the number of choices 
increases from 10 to 20, the marginal effect is positive and significant at the 10 percent 
significance level for satisficers, and it is negative and significant at the 5 percent 
significance level for maxmizers. This implies that the increase in number of choices 
from 10 to 20 affects satisficers positively and maximizers negatively. Finally, as the 
number of choices increases from 20 to 25, the marginal effects are not significant at the 
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10 percent significance level for both maximizers and satisficers.This implies that the 
increase in number of choices from 20 to 25 has no impact on the preferences of both 
satisficers and maximizers. This could be because both maximizers and satisficers do not 
consider the increase to be significant and they approach a choice set with 25 options in 
the same way as they do to a choice set with 20 options.  
        Lusk and Norwood (2007b) have found similar results in their study. They found 
that if the number of choices is increased from 6 to 24 excessive choice effect is positive 
for satisficers with score below 40, and negative for maximizers with score above 75. If 
the scores are between 40 and 75, then according to them the choice effect is not 
significantly different from zero. The results show that the personality of an individual 
does affect the impact of number of choices on his/her utility, when the number of 
choices in a choice set is increase from 10 to 20.  This increase has a positive impact on 
the preferences of people who look for a good enough option (satisficers) and a negative 
impact on the people who look for the best option (maximizers).  
Summary and Implications 
In addition to fat content, meat attributes such as traceability, humane production 
processes, and natural beef have received increased attention. This study, using a choice 
experiment, estimated consumers’ willingness to pay for ground beef attributes such as 
traceability certified by the U.S. Government or a private company, natural beef, humane 
production technique, and fat content. The results indicate that consumers trust the U.S. 
Government more than a private company when it comes to food safety as they are 
willing to pay more for traceability certified by the U.S. Government than a private 
company. The results also show that consumers are less concerned about animal welfare 
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than traceability and natural beef as they are willing to pay less for humane production 
technique than traceability certified by the U.S. Government or a Private Company, and 
natural beef. The results also show that willingness to pay decreases as the fat content 
increases.  
        This study also determined the impact of an increase in number of ground beef 
varieties on consumers’ utility. The results show the existence of negative excessive-
choice effect in the ground beef purchasing behavior. The results indicate that an increase 
in number of choices beyond 20 affects an average consumer’s preferences for ground 
beef in a negative way. This implies that the optimum number of choices in a choice set 
is roughly 20 for an average consumer.       
         Moreover, this study determined the effect of an individual’s personality on the 
impact of proliferation of ground beef varieties on his/her preferences. The results show 
that if the number of choices is increased from 10 to 20, it has a positive impact on 
consumers who look for a “good enough” option (satisficers), and a negative impact on 
those who look for the best option (maximizers). 
     As consumers are willing to pay for attributes such as traceability certified by the U.S. 
Government or a private company, natural beef, and humane production technique, 
traditional economic models would suggest that producers could increase their profits by 
introducing new ground beef varieties with these attributes. However, this study suggests 
that the optimum number of varieties from an average consumer’s perspective is finite. 
The results show that if the number of varieties offered is more than optimum, then it 
would affect the profits in a negative way by reducing the probability of purchase.  
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The negative excessive-choice effect can be avoided if the retailers place optimum 
number of ground beef varieties for sale as suggested by Norwood (2006).  The retailers 
would want to choose the optimum number of varieties that are most preferred by 
consumers and place them for sale.  
       As the results show that increasing the number of varieties has different impacts on 
satisficers and maximizers, choosing the optimum number of varieties is complicated. If 
the number of varieties is decreased to reduce the impact of negative excessive-choice 
effect because of maximizers, this would affect satisficers who actually benefit from the 
increase in number of varieties. Therefore, future research in this area can try to come up 
with marketing strategies that would help maximizers to deal with large choice sets.   
   
      
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 111 
References 
Appleby, M. C., and B. O. Hughes. 2005. Animal Welfare. CABI Publishing. 
 
Arnot, C., and C. Gauldin. 2006. “Arizona Vote Turns Out Bad Night for Industry.” 
         Feedstuffs, November 13. 
 
Beef Retail Marketing. 2007. “Natural and Organic Beef.” Internet Site:    
http://www.beefretail.org/reseNaturalOrganicBeef.aspx. Accessed August 15, 2007.  
 
Boatwright, P., and J. C. Nunes. 2001. “Reducing Assortment: An Attribute-Based 
         Approach.” Journal of Marketing 65(3):50-63. 
 
Broniarczyk, S. M., W. D. Hoyer, and L. McAlister. 2001. “Consumers’ Perceptions of the 
         Assortment Offered in a Grocery Category: The Impact of Item Reduction.” Journal  
         of  Marketing Research 35: 166-176. 
 
Burton, M., D. Rigby, T. Young, and S. James. 2001. “Consumer attitudes to genetically 
modified organisms in food in the UK.” European Review of Agricultural Economcs 
28(4): 479-498. 
 
Chamberlin, E. H. 1933. The Theory of Monopolistic Competition.Boston: Harvard 
University Press. 
 
Chernev, A. 2003. “When More Is Less and Less Is More: The Role of Ideal Point  
        Availability and Assortment in Consumer Choice.” Journal of Consumer Research  
         30(2):170-183. 
 
Dickson, D. L., and D. Bailey. 2002. “Meat Traceability: Are U.S. Consumers Willing to 
Pay for It?”Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics 27(2):348-364. 
 
Dixit, A. K., and J. E. Stiglitz. 1977. “Monopolistic Competition and Optimum Product 
Variety.” The American Economic Review 67(3): 297-308. 
 
Golan, E., B. Krisoff, F. Kuchler, L. Calvin, K. Nelson, and G. Price. 2004. Traceability in  
         the  U. S. Food Supply: Economic Theory and Industry Studies. Washington  DC:  
         U.S.Department of Agriculture/Economic Research Service (USDA-ERS), 
         Agricultural Economics Report.830, March. 
 
Grannis, J., and D. Thilmany. 2000. “Marketing Opportunities for Natural Beef Products in    
         the Intermountain West. Department of Agricultural and Resource Economics. 
        AMR- 00-02, Colorado State University. 
 
Hanemann, W. M. 1991. “Willingness to Pay and Willingness to Accept: How Much Can  
         They Differ?.” The American Economic Review 81(3): 635-647. 
 
 112 
Harper, A. 2002. “Florida’s Ban on Gestation Crates.” Virginia Cooperative Extension,  
          Virginia Tech, December. 
 
Heller, L. 2006. “USDA to review ‘natural’ claims for meat, poultry.” Food navigator.com, 
December 06. 
 
Hobbs, J. E., D. Bailey, D. L. Dickson, and M. Haghiri. 2005. “Traceability in the  
           Canadian  Red Meat Sector: Do Consumers Care?” Canadian Journal of  
           Agricultural Economics 53(1): 47-65. 
 
Humane Society of the United States (HSUS). 2007. “Farm Animal Stewardship 
          Purchasing Act.” Internet Site: http://www.hsus.org/legislation_laws/. Accessed  
          August 25, 2007.   
 
Irons, B., and C. Hepburn. 2007. “Regret Theory and the Tyranny of Choice.” The 
          Economic Record 83(261): 191-203. 
 
Ishmael, W. 2004. “Raining Regulations.” BEEF, February 01. 
 
Iyengar, S. S., W. Jiang, and G. Huberman. 2004. “How much choice is too much?:  
         Contibution to 401(k) retirement plans.” Pension Research Council Working Paper, 
         The Wharlton School, University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia.  
 
Iyengar, S. S., and M. R. Lepper. 2000. “When Choice is Demotivating: Can One Desire 
Too Much of a Good Thing?”Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 
79(6):995-1006. 
 
Iyengar, S. S., R. E. Wells, and B. Schwartz. 2006. “Doing Better but Feeling Worse-
Looking for the “Best” Job Undermines Satisfaction.” Psychological Science.17 (2): 
143-150. 
 
Kaufman, M. 2007. “Largest Pork Processor to Phase Out Crates.” Washingtonpost.com, 
26 January. 
 
Krissoff, B., F. Kucker, K. Nelson, J. Perry, and A. Somwaru. 2004. Country-of-Origin 
Labeling: Theory and Observation. Washington DC: United Stated Department of 
Agriculture/ Economic Research Service (USDA-ERS), January. 
 
Lancaster, K. 1966. “ A New Approach to Consumer Theory.” Journal of Political 
Economy 74(2): 132-157. 
 
Lancaster, K. 1975. “Socially Optimal Product Differentiation.” The American Economic 
Review 65(4):567-585. 
 
Lancaster, K. 1990. “The Economics of Product Variety: A Survey.” Marketing Science 
9(3): 189-206. 
 113 
 
Loureiro, M. L., and W. J. Umberger. 2003. “Estimating Consumer Willingness to Pay for 
Country-of-Origin Labeling.” Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics 28(2): 
287-301. 
 
Loureiro, M. L., and W. J. Umberger. 2007. “A Choice Experiment Model for Beef: What 
US Consumer Responses Tell Us about Relative Preferences for Food Safety, 
Country-of-Origin Labeling and Traceability.”Food Policy 32:496-514. 
 
Louviere, J., D. Hensher, and J. Swait. 2000. Stated Choice Methods: Analysis and 
Applications. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. 
 
Lusk, J. L., and J. A. Fox. 2002. “Consumer Demand for Mandatory Labeling of Beef from 
Cattle Administered Growth Hormones or Fed Genetically Modified Corn,” Journal 
of Agricultural and Applied Economics 34(1): 27-38. 
 
Lusk, J. L., and F. B. Norwood. 2007a. “Bridging the Gap between Laboratory 
Experiments and Naturally Occuring Markets.”Working Paper, Department of 
Agricultural Economics, Oklahoma State University, Stillwater. 
 
Lusk, J. L., and F. B. Norwood. 2007b. “Dual Nature of Choce: When Consumers Prefer 
Less to More.” Paper presented at the Southern Association of Agricultural 
Economics Annual Meeting, Mobile, Alabama, 4-7 February. 
 
Lusk, J. L., J. Roosen, and J. A. Fox. 2003. “Demand for Beef from Cattle Administered 
Growth Hormones or Fed Genetically Modified Corn: A Comparison of Consumers 
in France, Germany, the United Kingdom, and the United States.” American Journal 
of Agricultural Economics 85(1):16-29.  
 
Malhotra, N. K. 1982. “Information Load and Consumer Decision Making.” The Journal of  
          Consumer Research 8 (4):419-430. 
 
Martin, A. 2006. “Meat Labels Hope to Lure the Sensitive Carnivore.” New York Times, 24 
October. 
 
Martin, A. 2007. “ Burger King Shifts Policy on Animals.” New York Times, 28 March. 
 
McFadden, D. 1974. “Conditional Logit Analysis of Qualitative Choice Behavior.” In P.    
Zarembka (Ed.), Frontiers in Econometrics. New York: Academic Press, pp. 105-
142. 
 
Mintel (Mintel, Organic Foods). 2006. Organic Foods-US. Chicago. 
 
Norwood, F. B. 2006. “Less Choice is Better, Sometimes,” Journal of Agricultural and 
Food Industrial Organization 4(1).Article 3. 
 
 114 
Norwood, F. B., J. L. Lusk, and R. Prickett. 2007. “Consumer Preferences for Farm Animal 
Welfare: Results of a Nationwide Telephone Survey.” Working Paper, Department of 
Agricultural Economics, Oklahoma State University, Stillwater. 
 
Onyango, B., and R. Govindasamy. 2005. “Consumer Willingness to Pay for GM Food     
         Benefits: Pay-Off or Empty Promise? Implications for the Food Industry.”Choices, 
         4th Quarter, pp.1-7. 
 
Resende-Filho, M. A., and B. L. Buhr. 2006. “Economic Evidence of Willingness to Pay 
         for the National Animal Identification System in the U.S.” Paper presented at the  
         International Association of Agricultural Economists Conference, Gold Coast, 
        Australia, 12-18 August. 
 
Schwartz, B. 2000. “Self Determination-The Tyranny of Freedom.”American Psychologist 
55(1):79-88. 
 
Schwartz, B. 2004. The Paradox of Choice: Why More is Less. New York, NY: 
HarperCollins Publishers, Inc. 
 
Schwartz, B., A.Ward, J. Monterosso, S. Lyubomirsky, K.White, and D. R. Lehman. 2002.         
“Maximizing versus Satisficing: Happiness Is a Matter of Choice.” Journal of    
Personality and Social Psychology 83(5):1178-1197. 
 
Simon, H. A. 1955. “A Behavioral Model of Rational Choice.” Quarterly Journal of 
Economics 69(1): 99-118. 
 
Simon, H. A. 1956. “ Rational Choice and the Structure of the Environment.” 
Psychological Review 63: 129-138. 
 
Simon, H. A. 1957. Models of Man, Social, and Rational: Mathematical Essays on 
Rational Human Behavior. New York: Wily. 
 
Spence, M. 1976. “Product Selection, Fixed Costs, and Monopolistic Competition. “ The 
Review of Economic Studies 43(2): 217-235. 
 
Steiner, B., and J. Yang. 2007. “A Comparative Analysis of US and Canadian Consumers’   
Perceptions towards BSE Testing and the Use of GM Organisms in Beef Production.” 
Paper presented at the American Agricultural Economics Association Annual 
Meeting, Portland, Oregon, July 29-August 1. 
 
Stivers, A., and V. J. Tremblay. 2005. “Advertising, Search Costs, and Social Welfare.” 
Information Economics and Policy 17(3): 317-333. 
 
United States Department of Agriculture/ Agricultural Marketing Services (USDA-AMS). 
2007. “2002 Farm Bill Provisons-Country-of-Origin Labeling.” Internet site:  
         http://www.ams.usda.gov/cool/. Accessed August 20, 2007. 
 115 
 
United States Department of Agriculture/Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service 
(USDA-APHIS). 2007. “National Animal Identification System (NAIS).” Internet 
site: http://animalid.aphis.usda.gov/nais/index.shtml. Accessed August 18, 2007. 
 
United States Department of Agriculture/Food Safety Inspection Service (USDA-FSIS). 
2007. “Product Labeling: Definition of the term “Natural”.” Internet site:  
http://www.fsis.usda.gov/. Accessed August 28, 2007. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 116 
Table II-1. Summary Statistics of Mail Sample 
            
          Variable Name                            Description                                     Mean   
                Gender                          1 if female; 0 if male                              0.435           
                Age                                in years                                                 56.950         
                 Degree                          1=bachelors degree                                 0.492           
                                                        or higher;0=otherwise 
                 Income                          0=less than $20,000                                3.095          
                                                       1=$20,000 to $39,000 
                                                       2=$40,000 to $59,000 
                                                       3=$60,000 to $79,000 
                                                       4=$80,000 to $99,000 
                                                       5=$100,000 to $119,000 
                                                       6=$120,000 to $150,000 
                                                       7=$150,000 to $179,000 
                                                       8=greater than $180,000 
                Under18                        1 if a household has                                0.230          
                                                       children below 18; 
                                                       0 otherwise 
                Race                              1 if white; 0 otherwise                            0.902           
                Purchase1                     1=purchase fresh ground beef                0.449           
                                                      once a week; 0=otherwise 
                Purchase2                     1=purchase once a month;                      0.354          
                                                      0=otherwise 
                Purchase3                     1=purchase rarely; 0=otherwise             0.129           
                Purchase4                     1=Never; 0= otherwise                           0.062           
                Eat1                               1=eat food containing ground                0.483           
                                                       beef frequently;0=otherwise 
                Eat2                               1=eat periodically; 0=otherwise             0.411           
                Eat3                               1=eat rarely; 0=otherwise                       0.081           
                Eat4                               1=Never eat ground beef;                       0.023           
                                                       0=otherwise               
   
 Note: Number of Responses=209 
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Table II-2. Summary Statistics of Captive Sample 
 
                Variable Name                     Description                                     Mean        
                 
                 Gender                          1 if female; 0 if male                             0.278          
Age                                       in years                                         39.461         
Degree                           1=bachelors degree                              0.294           
                                                        or higher;0=otherwise 
                 Income                           0=less than $20,000                              2.791           
                                                        1=$20,000 to $39,000 
                                                        2=$40,000 to $59,000 
                                                        3=$60,000 to $79,000 
                                                        4=$80,000 to $99,000  
                                                        5=$100,000 to $119,000 
                                                        6=$120,000 to $150,000 
                                                        7=$150,000 to $179,000 
                                                        8=greater than $180,000 
Under18                        1 if a household has                              0.307          
                                                       children below 18; 
                                                        0 otherwise 
Race                              1 if white; 0 otherwise                          0.742           
                 Purchase1                      1=purchase fresh ground beef              0.592           
                                                        once a week; 0=otherwise 
                 Purchase2                      1=purchase once a month;                    0.285           
                                                        0=otherwise 
Purchase3                      1=purchase rarely; 0=otherwise            0.107           
Purchase4                      1=Never; 0= otherwise                          0.014           
                Eat1                                1=eat food containing ground               0.721           
                                                        beef frequently;0=otherwise 
                Eat2                                1=eat periodically; 0=otherwise            0.221           
                Eat3                                1=eat rarely; 0=otherwise                      0.057           
                Eat4                                1=Never eat ground beef;                      0.000           
                                                        0=otherwise               
   
 Note: Number of Responses=140 
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Table II-3. Summary Statistics of Pooled Sample 
 
Variable Name                     Description                                      Mean        
                 Gender                         1 if female; 0 if male                              0.372           
Age                                       in years                                         49.863         
Degree                           1=bachelors degree                              0.413           
                                                        or higher;0=otherwise 
                 Income                           0=less than $20,000                              2.970           
                                                        1=$20,000 to $39,000 
                                                        2=$40,000 to $59,000 
                                                        3=$60,000 to $79,000 
                                                        4=$80,000 to $99,000 
                                                        5=$100,000 to $119,000 
                                                        6=$120,000 to $150,000 
                                                        7=$150,000 to $179,000 
                                                        8=greater than $180,000 
Under18                        1 if a household has                              0.261          
                                                       children below 18; 
                                                        0 otherwise 
Race                              1 if white; 0 otherwise                          0.838           
Purchase1                     1=purchase fresh ground beef              0.507           
                                                       once a week; 0=otherwise 
Purchase2                     1=purchase once a month;                    0.326           
                                                        0=otherwise 
Purchase3                     1=purchase rarely; 0=otherwise            0.120           
Purchase4                     1=Never; 0= otherwise                          0.042           
Eat1                              1=eat food containing ground               0.578           
                                                       beef frequently;0=otherwise 
Eat2                              1=eat periodically; 0=otherwise            0.335           
                 Eat3                              1=eat rarely; 0=otherwise                      0.071           
                 Eat4                              1=Never eat ground beef;                      0.014           
                                                       0=otherwise               
   
 Note: Number of Responses=349 
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Table II-4. Pooled Sample and U.S. Population 
 
Variable                                    Pooled Sample                        U.S. Populationa    
White                                                84%                                         77%    
Household with                                26%                                         36% 
children below 18 
Bachelor’s degree                             41%                                         24%                           
or higher   
 
Female                                               37%                                        51%     
 
Median age                                       52 years                                   45 years b                                 
 
Average household                     $40,000 to $ 59,000                     $56,604 
income 
                                                          
a
 Source: U.S. Bureau of the Census, Census 2000 
b 
 Approximate median age of the people who are 18 and above calculated  using the age distribution  data 
for the whole U.S. population. 
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Table II-5. Results of the Factor Analysis of Maximizer-Satisficer Scale 
 
 Items                                                     Factor1         Factor2      Factor3         Factor4    
Renting videos is really difficult              0.69              -0.01          0.14                0.02 
 
Writing is very difficult                            0.65               0.09         -0.03                0.14 
 
When shopping hard time                         0.58              -0.06         -0.01              -0.06 
 finding clothes 
 
Difficult to shop for a gift                        0.57               0.00           0.21               0.10         
for a friend 
 
I never settle for second best                   -0.02               0.84          0.08              -0.01 
 
I have the highest standard                      -0.02               0.83         -0.09              -0.06 
for myself 
 
I try to imagine all the possibilities           0.04               0.42          0.19               0.14 
even ones that aren’t present 
 
I treat relationships like clothing               0.14               0.04          0.74              -0.10 
 
I always lookout for better                       -0.25               0.29          0.59               0.22 
opportunities 
 
I am a big fan of lists that                         0.29              -0.09          0.56                0.09 
rank things 
 
Fantasize about living in different            0.05               0.10          0.51                0.26 
ways than actual life 
 
When I watch TV I channel surf               0.05              -0.04          0.03                0.85   
 
When I am in a car listening radio            0.10               0.10           0.20                0.78 
I often check other stations 
 
Cronbach’s alpha                                      0.63 
 
Notes: Number of responses used=320. The responses of people who never purchase ground beef or who 
did not respond to the question asking for the frequency at which they purchase ground beef, and those of 
who did not respond to all the items in the maximizer-satisficer scale are not included in the analysis. 
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Table II-6. Conditional Logit Estimates for Model with Variables Representing 
Ground Beef Attributes 
 
Variable Name                    Coefficient                Standard Error                  p-value 
        Traceability U.S.                   2.061                       0.072                                0.000 
Traceability Private               1.451                        0.075                               0.000 
Humane                                  0.371                       0.080                               0.000 
Natural                                   1.415                        0.053                               0.000 
Fat 10%                                  1.001                        0.113                               0.000 
Fat 20%                                  0.232                        0.100                               0.021 
Fat 30%                                 -0.576                        0.106                               0.000 
Price                                      -0.657                        0.024                               0.000 
      LR(Chi square)                  2675.229 
      Log-likelihood value      -10954.216 
      Pseudo R-squared                    0.108         
Notes: Number of responses used =333; Number of choice sets=333*4=1332. The responses of people who 
never purchase ground beef are given a weight of zero, and those of the people who did not answer the 
question asking for the frequency at which they purchase ground beef are not included.  
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Table II-7. WTP (Dollars per pound of ground beef) Estimates and Confidence 
 Intervals 
Attributes                                     Mean WTP ($/lb)                     95 % Confidence Interval       
Traceability  U.S.                                3.13                                      [2.91, 3.37] 
Traceability Private                            2.20                                      [2.00, 2.42] 
Natural                                                2.15                                      [2.02, 2.29] 
Humane                                              0.56                                      [0.32, 0.82] 
Fat 10%                                              1.52                                       [1.23, 1.79] 
Fat 20%                                              0.35                                       [0.05, 0.63] 
Fat 30%                                             -0.87                                      [-1.24, -0.54] 
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Table II-8. Conditional Logit Estimates for Model with Variables Representing 
Ground Beef Attributes, and Number of Choices 
 
   Variable Name                     Coefficient              Standard Error                p-value 
      NCH5                                  1.014                             0.130                        0.000 
     NCH10                                 1.080                             0.155                        0.000 
     NCH20                                 1.105                             0.199                        0.000 
    NCH25                                  0.680                             0.188                        0.000 
    Traceablity US                      2.063                             0.072                        0.000 
    Traceability Private              1.453                             0.075                        0.000 
    Humane                                 0.371                            0.080                         0.000 
    Natural                                  1.416                             0.053                         0.000 
    Fat 20%                               -0.769                             0.052                         0.000 
    Fat 30%                                -1.578                            0.062                         0.000 
    Price                                     -0.658                            0.024                         0.000 
   LR(Chi Square)                2679.557   
   Log Likelihood Value  - 10952.052  
   Pseudo-R Squared                 0.108          
Note: Number of responses used=333; Total number of choice sets=333*4=1332 
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Table II-9. Marginal Effects and Confidence Intervals for an Average Consumer 
 
 Change in Number of Choices                                  Marginal Effects 
            5 to 10                                                                   0.065 
                                                                                    [-0.181, 0.315]a                                                                               
                                                                                    [-0.228, 0.367]b 
           10 to 20                                                                  0.025 
                                                                                    [-0.333, 0.380]a 
                                                                                    [-0.406, 0.451]b 
 
           20 to 25                                                                  -0.425 
                                                                                    [-0.822, -0.029]a 
                                                                                    [-0.896,   0.051]b 
 
 aConfidence Intervals at 90 percent. 
 bConfidence Intervals at 95 percent.                                                                                                                                                 
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Table II-10. Conditional Logit Estimates for Model with Variables Representing 
Ground Beef Attributes, Number of Choices, and Maximizer-Satisficer Scale   
 
Variable Name                      Coefficient                Standard Error                  p-value 
      NCH5                                  0.260                             0.497                          0.601 
     NCH10                                 0.655                             0.672                          0.329 
     NCH20                                 3.002                             1.040                          0.003 
     NCH25                                 2.210                             0.950                          0.020 
    MAX*NCH5                          0.015                             0.008                          0.093 
    MAX*NCH10                        0.007                             0.012                          0.511     
    MAX*NCH20                       -0.033                             0.017                          0.055                                   
    MAX*NCH25                       -0.027                             0.016                          0.092 
    Traceablity US                      2.042                              0.073                          0.000 
    Traceability Private              1.450                              0.076                          0.000 
    Humane                                 0.379                             0.081                           0.000  
    Natural                                  1.384                              0.053                          0.000 
    Fat 20%                                -0.774                              0.053                          0.000 
    Fat 30%                                -1.561                              0.063                          0.000 
    Price                                     -0.657                              0.024                           0.000 
    LR(Chi Square)               2559.144   
    Log Likelihood Value - 10678.379  
    Pseudo-R Squared                 0.107          
 Notes:  Number of responses used=320; Number of choice sets=320*4=1280.Number of responses used is 
less  than the ones used in the other two models because the responses of  people who did not answer all the 
13 items in the maximizer-satisficer scale are not included. 
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Table II-11. Marginal Effects and Confidence Intervals for Satisficers and 
Maximizers 
 
    Change in Number of Choices                                  Marginal Effects                                        
                                                                           Satisficers                    Maximizers 
                 5 to 10                                                0.195                                  -0.190 
                                                                     [-0.491, 0.888] a                  [-1.005, 0.618]a 
                                                                     [-0.625, 1.026] b                  [-1.175, 0.761]b 
  
                10 to 20                                               1.175                                  -1.085 
                                                                     [0.123, 2.253]a                    [-1.942, -0.233]a 
                                                                     [-0.083, 2.460]b                   [-2.098, -0.069]b 
 
                20 to 25                                              -0.613                                  -0.270  
                                                                     [-1.847, 0.584]a                    [-1.335, 0.795]a   
                                                                     [-2.103, 0.848]b                    [-1.541, 1.016]b                                                                  
 
a Confidence Intervals at 90 percent. 
b 
 Confidence Intervals at 95 percent. 
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Figure II-1. Marginal effects for an average consumer as the number of choices increases 
from 5 to 10, 10 to 20, and 20 to 25. 
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Figure II-2. Marginal effects for satisficers and maximizers as the number of choices 
increases from 5 to 10, 10 to 20, and 20 to 25. 
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Survey of Consumer Food Preferences 
 
The purpose of this survey is to ask you about your preferences for 
ground beef products.  In the survey booklet included we will 
describe various ground beef products and ask you about your 
preferences for those products.  Each ground beef product will be 
described by its price and the four characteristics described below.  
Please read the following descriptions carefully, then proceed to the 
survey booklet. 
 Price - each item has its own unique price, expressed in dollars 
per pound. 
 Traceability Certified - traceable beef refers to beef that can be 
traced back to the farm(s) where the animal was raised.  
Traceability can be assured by either the U.S. government, a 
private company, or no traceability. 
 Certified Humane - refers to ground beef products derived 
from cattle that are guaranteed to be raised and slaughtered 
under humane processes. 
 Certified Natural - refers to beef products from cattle fed a 
strictly vegetarian diet, are produced without the use of 
antibiotics or growth hormones, and the meat is minimally 
processed without the use of artificial ingredients. 
 Fat Content - each ground beef product you will see in the 
survey has a fat content of 30%, 20%, or 10%. 
 Note that some beef products may be certified humane and/or 
certified natural but are not traceable because information on 
the farm of origin is confidential. 
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Oklahoma State University Consumer Preference Survey 
 
In just a moment, we will ask about your grocery shopping patterns.  The 
purpose of this page is to help prepare you for those questions.  You will be 
given questions similar to that in the table below.  In the table, there are four 
ground beef options.  In the first option, the meat can be traced back to the 
farm of origin by a private company, is certified humane, is not certified 
natural, has a 30% fat content, and has a price of $2.00 per pound.  Options 
2-4 differ according to these traits, as you can see in the table below. 
 
Imagine you were at your local grocery store on a typical shopping trip, and 
these four ground beef options were available for purchase.  Further, 
suppose that during this shopping trip you would most likely purchase 
Option 3.  If this is the case, then you would check the third option as 
illustrated below. 
 
If, on the other hand you would most likely choose Option 4, simply check 
Option 4, and if you would most likely not purchase any of these products 
simply check NONE.  However, you may only select ONE OPTION for 
each table. On the following pages we ask you to make four of these 
hypothetical shopping decisions, where the number of options is varied 
across questions.  For each question, please make your selection in a manner 
that best reflects your true preferences. 
 
Option 
 
Meat  
Traceability 
Certified by 
Certified  
Humane 
Certified 
Natural 
Fat 
Content 
 
Price 
($/lb) 
I Would 
Purchase 
(Check ONE): 
Option 1 Private Company 
 
 
Yes No 30% $2.00  
Option 2 None 
 
 
No Yes 20% $4.50  
Option 3 Private Company 
 
 
Yes Yes 10% $5.00  
Option 4 None 
 
 
Yes No 10% $2.50  
 
NONE:  I WOULD NOT PURCHASE ANY OF THESE PRODUCTS  
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Imagine you were at your local grocery store on a typical shopping trip.  Suppose there 
were 4 options of ground beef products to choose from, each option is described below, 
where each product is one pound of ground beef.  Of the 4 options, please select the ONE 
ground beef product you would MOST prefer to purchase.  Or, if you would not purchase 
any of the products, select NONE in the last row. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Option 
 
Meat 
Traceability 
Certified by 
Certified  
Humane 
Certified 
Natural 
Fat 
Content 
 
Price 
($/lb) 
I Would 
Purchase 
(Check ONE): 
Option 1 
 
 
None Yes No 30% $2.50 
□ 
Option 2 
 
 
None No Yes 20% $4.50 
□ 
Option 3 
 
 
None No No 30% $4.00 
□ 
Option 4 
 
 
None Yes Yes 10% $3.00 
□ 
 
NONE: I WOULD NOT PURCHASE ANY OF THESE PRODUCTS □ 
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This question is the same as the previous question, except that now there are 9 items to 
choose from.  Please select the ONE ground beef product you would MOST prefer to 
purchase.  Or, if you would not purchase any, select NONE in the last row. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Option 
 
Meat  
Traceability 
Certified by 
Certified  
Humane 
Certified 
Natural 
Fat 
Content 
 
Price 
($/lb) 
I  Would         
Purchase 
  (Check ONE): 
Option 1 
 
 
U. S. Government Yes No 30% $3.00 
□ 
Option 2 
 
 
None Yes No 10% $2.50 
□ 
Option 3 
 
 
None No No 20% $2.00 
□ 
Option 4 
 
 
None Yes Yes 30% $6.00 
□ 
Option 5 
 
 
None Yes No 20% $4.50 
□ 
Option 6 
 
 
Private Company Yes No 20% $3.50 
□ 
Option 7 
 
 
None Yes Yes 20% $4.50 
□ 
Option 8 
 
 
U. S. Government Yes Yes 10% $5.50 
□ 
Option 9 
 
 
U. S. Government Yes Yes 30% $5.50 
□ 
 
NONE: I WOULD NOT PURCHASE ANY OF THESE PRODUCTS □ 
 134 
This question is the same as the previous two questions, except that now there are 19 
items to choose from.  Please select the ONE ground beef product you would MOST 
prefer to purchase.  Or, if you would not purchase any, select NONE in the last row. 
 
Option 
 
Meat  
Traceability 
Certified by 
Certified  
Humane 
Certified 
Natural 
Fat 
Content 
 
Price 
($/lb) 
I Would  
Purchase 
(Check ONE): 
Option 1 
 
Private Company Yes No 30% $2.00 □ 
Option 2 
 
Private Company Yes Yes 20% $5.00 □ 
Option 3 
 
U. S. Government Yes No 20% $2.00 □ 
Option 4 
 
Private Company Yes Yes 10% $5.00 □ 
Option 5 
 
Private Company Yes No 10% $5.00 □ 
Option 6 
 
None No Yes 30% $4.00 □ 
Option 7 
 
None No No 10% $2.50 □ 
Option 8 
 
None No Yes 10% $3.50 □ 
Option 9 
 
U. S. Government Yes Yes 20% $4.00 □ 
Option 10 
 
Private Company Yes Yes 30% $3.50 □ 
Option 11 
 
U. S. Government Yes No 10% $6.00 □ 
Option 12 
 
U. S. Government Yes No 30% $3.00 □ 
Option 13 
 
None Yes No 10% $2.50 □ 
Option 14 
 
None No No 20% $2.00 □ 
Option 15 
 
None Yes Yes 30% $6.00 □ 
Option 16 
 
None Yes No 20% $4.50 □ 
Option 17 
 
Private Company Yes No 20% $3.50 □ 
Option 18 
 
None Yes Yes 20% $4.50 □ 
Option 19 
 
U. S. Government Yes Yes 10% $5.50 □ 
 
NONE: I WOULD NOT PURCHASE ANY OF THESE PRODUCTS □ 
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This question is the same as the previous three questions, except that now there are 24 
items to choose from.  Please select the ONE ground beef product you would MOST  
prefer to purchase. Or, if you would not purchase any, select NONE in the last row. 
Option 
 
Meat  
Traceability 
Certified by 
Certified  
Humane 
Certified 
Natural 
Fat 
Content 
 
Price 
($/lb) 
  I  Would     
Purchase 
  (Check ONE): 
Option 1 None No No 10% $2.50 □ 
Option 2 None No Yes 10% $3.50 □ 
Option 3 U. S. Government Yes Yes 20% $4.00 □ 
Option 4 Private Company Yes Yes 30% $3.50 □ 
Option 5 U. S. Government Yes No 10% $6.00 □ 
Option 6 U. S. Government Yes No 30% $3.00 □ 
Option 7 None Yes No 10% $2.50 □ 
Option 8 None No No 20% $2.00 □ 
Option 9 None Yes Yes 30% $6.00 □ 
Option 10 None Yes No 20% $4.50 □ 
Option 11 Private Company Yes No 20% $3.50 □ 
Option 12 None Yes Yes 20% $4.50 □ 
Option 13 U. S. Government Yes Yes 10% $5.50 □ 
Option 14 Private Company Yes No 30% $2.00 □ 
Option 15 Private Company Yes Yes 20% $5.00 □ 
Option 16 U. S. Government Yes No 20% $2.00 □ 
Option 17 Private Company Yes Yes 10% $5.00 □ 
Option 18 Private Company Yes No 10% $5.00 □ 
Option 19 None No Yes 30% $4.00 □ 
Option 20 None Yes No 30% $2.50 □ 
Option 21 None No Yes 20% $4.50 □ 
Option 22 None No No 30% $4.00 □ 
Option 23 None Yes Yes 10% $3.00 □ 
Option 24 U. S. Government Yes Yes 30% $5.50 □ 
 
NONE: I WOULD NOT PURCHASE ANY OF THESE PRODUCTS □ 
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This is the last portion of the survey.  Please indicate the degree to which the 
following statements describe you personally.  On a scale of 1-7, with 1 being 
completely disagree and 7 being completely agree, indicate the extent to which you 
agree with each of the following 13 statements by circling a number. 
 
1.  Whenever I’m faced with a choice, I try to imagine what all the other possibilities are, 
even ones that aren’t present at the moment.  (circle one number) 
 
2.  No matter how satisfied I am with my job, it’s only right for me to be on the lookout 
for better opportunities. 
 
 
3.  When I am in the car listening to the radio, I often check other stations to see if 
something better is playing, even if I’m relatively satisfied with what I’m listening to. 
 
 
4.  When I watch TV, I channel surf, often scanning through the available options even 
while attempting to watch one program. 
 
 
5.  I treat relationships like clothing: I expect to try a lot on before I get the perfect fit. 
 
 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Completely 
DISagree 
Completely 
AGREE 
Neither agree 
nor disagree 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Completely 
DISagree 
Completely 
AGREE 
Neither agree 
nor disagree 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Completely 
DISagree 
Completely 
AGREE 
Neither agree 
nor disagree 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Completely 
DISagree 
Completely 
AGREE 
Neither agree 
nor disagree 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Completely 
DISagree 
Completely 
AGREE 
Neither agree 
nor disagree 
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6.  I often find it difficult to shop for a gift for a friend. 
 
 
7.  Renting videos is really difficult.  I’m always struggling to pick the best one. 
 
 
8.  When shopping, I have a hard time finding clothing that I really love. 
 
 
9.  I’m a big fan of lists that attempt to rank things (the best movies, the best singers, the 
best athletes, the best novels, etc.). 
 
 
10.  I find that writing is very difficult, even if it’s just writing a letter to a friend, because 
it’s so hard to word things just right.  I often do several drafts of even simple things. 
 
 
11.  No matter what I do, I have the highest standards for myself. 
 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Completely 
DISagree 
Completely 
AGREE 
Neither agree 
nor disagree 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Completely 
DISagree 
Completely 
AGREE 
Neither agree 
nor disagree 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Completely 
DISagree 
Completely 
AGREE 
Neither agree 
nor disagree 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Completely 
DISagree 
Completely 
AGREE 
Neither agree 
nor disagree 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Completely 
DISagree 
Completely 
AGREE 
Neither agree 
nor disagree 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Completely 
DISagree 
Completely 
AGREE 
Neither agree 
nor disagree 
 139 
 
12.  I never settle for second best. 
 
 
13.  I often fantasize about living in ways that are quite different from my actual life. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Completely 
DISagree 
Completely 
AGREE 
Neither agree 
nor disagree 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Completely 
DISagree 
Completely 
AGREE 
Neither agree 
nor disagree 
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